Audiobuzz
a89c3d2af1
Four fixes from the on-host agent bring-up:
1. Bake the real fleet CA into the image. New `fleet_ca` build var (default =
the committed placeholder) file-provisions the trust anchor to
/etc/dot1x/radius-ca.pem — used by wpa_supplicant (RADIUS) AND the fleet-agent
(verify the manager). CI materializes a FLEET_CA secret to a runner-temp file
and passes -var fleet_ca; unset => placeholder (lab). No CA material committed.
2. server-pki.sh installs the agent CLIENT CA as root+intermediate (not root
only). Host TPM certs are leaf-only in NV and signed by the step-ca
intermediate, so a root-only client CA makes the manager advertise only the
root in its CertificateRequest -> Go clients send no cert ("tls: certificate
required") and it couldn't verify a leaf-only cert anyway. bootstrap.sh now
exports intermediate_ca.crt so FLEET_CA_INTERMEDIATE resolves.
3. New `fleet-manager register-host <serial> [-name] [-hostnqn]` subcommand:
seeds/updates an inventory record for a host enrolled out of band (bench
broker, migrated fleet) through the real store, so its agent stream is
accepted. The manual counterpart to the authorise-approve flow.
4. The agent surfaces the authoritative recv-side gRPC status instead of the
bare io.EOF gRPC returns on the send side when the server ends the stream —
so "host is not enrolled" (PermissionDenied) shows up instead of "EOF".
147 lines
7.5 KiB
Bash
Executable File
147 lines
7.5 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# bootstrap.sh — one-time setup of the bench CA after `docker compose up -d step-ca`.
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#
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# 1. export the CA root to pki/root_ca.crt (-> image radius-ca.pem)
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# 1b. raise the cert-duration claim (so 720h fleet certs are allowed)
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# 2. ensure an enrolment provisioner exists (signs each host's TPM CSR)
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# 3. issue the RADIUS server cert/key into pki/radius/ (FreeRADIUS mounts it)
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#
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# `step` runs INSIDE the CA container (docker compose exec). Container paths:
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# /home/step = CA state (certs/root_ca.crt, secrets/password, config/ca.json)
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# /export = host ./pki (files written here appear on the host)
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# Flags vary a little across step versions — BENCH-VERIFY against your `step
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# version` and adjust. Reads .env.
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set -euo pipefail
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cd "$(dirname "$0")/.."
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[ -f .env ] && . ./.env
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CA_DNS=${CA_DNS:-ca.fleet.lab}
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CA_PORT=${CA_PORT:-8443}
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# The CLI must reach the CA over a name that RESOLVES on the serving host AND is
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# in the CA cert's SAN. ca.fleet.lab is only served by the fleet dnsmasq to
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# booting clients — the serving host itself can't resolve it — so default to
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# 'localhost' (the compose adds it to DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_DNS_NAMES). CA_DNS stays
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# the cert/SAN name (and the RADIUS cert CN). Override CA_CONNECT if the CA is
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# remote/reachable by another resolvable SAN.
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CA_CONNECT=${CA_CONNECT:-localhost}
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CA_URL="https://${CA_CONNECT}:${CA_PORT}"
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PKI=pki
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# step-ca initialises its state into ./pki/stepca as uid 1000, but Docker created
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# the top-level ./pki as ROOT (it auto-creates a missing bind-mount source), so
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# the host user can't write into it ("mkdir: Permission denied"). Self-heal — LAB
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# ONLY: make the tree read/write for everyone, so BOTH your host user and the
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# uid-1000 CA container can use it. (Pre-creating ./pki owned by you before
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# `compose up` avoids this; once fixed it stays fixed.)
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# The CA's password (auto-init wrote it here in the container volume). Also the
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# 'enrol' provisioner password the broker needs (copy to ../enrol-pki/password).
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# Location varies by smallstep image version: newer writes $STEPPATH/password,
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# older $STEPPATH/secrets/password — accept whichever exists.
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PW="$PKI/stepca/password"
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[ -e "$PW" ] || { [ -e "$PKI/stepca/secrets/password" ] && PW="$PKI/stepca/secrets/password"; }
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# same file as seen inside the container (/home/step is the ./pki/stepca mount).
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CONTAINER_PW="/home/step/${PW#"$PKI/stepca/"}"
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# Two uid hazards, both self-healed here (LAB ONLY):
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# - Docker auto-creates a missing ./pki as ROOT -> host mkdir denied.
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# - step-ca writes its state as uid 1000 mode 600 -> host user can't read $PW.
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# If we can't create the radius dir OR can't read the password, chmod the tree
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# readable/writable for everyone (your user AND the uid-1000 CA container).
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if ! mkdir -p "$PKI/radius" 2>/dev/null || { [ -e "$PKI/stepca" ] && [ ! -r "$PW" ]; }; then
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echo "==> fixing $PKI perms with sudo (docker/uid-1000 owns it; lab)"
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sudo chmod -R a+rwX "$PKI"
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mkdir -p "$PKI/radius"
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fi
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if [ ! -r "$PW" ]; then
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echo "ERROR: CA password $PW missing/unreadable — step-ca did not initialise." >&2
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echo " Check: docker compose logs step-ca (look for an init failure)." >&2
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echo " Common cause: DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_PASSWORD not set (see compose). To reset:" >&2
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echo " docker compose down && sudo rm -rf $PKI && docker compose up -d step-ca" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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step() { docker compose exec -T step-ca step "$@"; }
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incca() { docker compose exec -T step-ca "$@"; }
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# --- 1. export the root (becomes files/etc/dot1x/radius-ca.pem) --------------
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echo "==> exporting CA root"
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incca cp /home/step/certs/root_ca.crt /export/root_ca.crt
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FP=$(openssl x509 -in "$PKI/root_ca.crt" -noout -fingerprint -sha256 | cut -d= -f2)
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echo " root fingerprint: $FP"
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echo " copy to: files/etc/dot1x/radius-ca.pem (image trust anchor)"
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# Also export the INTERMEDIATE: leaf certs (host TPM identities, RADIUS, the
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# fleet-manager server cert) are signed by it, so the fleet-manager agent-plane
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# CLIENT CA must be root+intermediate (server-pki.sh reads it via
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# FLEET_CA_INTERMEDIATE). Best-effort — a single-tier CA has none.
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incca cp /home/step/certs/intermediate_ca.crt /export/intermediate_ca.crt 2>/dev/null \
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&& echo " exported intermediate_ca.crt (-> server-pki.sh fleet-ca.crt bundle)" \
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|| echo " (no intermediate_ca.crt — single-tier CA)"
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# --- 1b. raise the CA cert-duration claim (idempotent) ----------------------
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# A stock step-ca caps issued certs at 24h. Both the RADIUS server cert below
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# AND the enrol-broker (--not-after 720h) need longer-lived fleet certs, so the
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# CA rejects them with "requested duration ... more than the authorized maximum
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# certificate duration of 24h". Patch authority.claims in the mounted ca.json
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# and restart the CA. Set CA_MAX_CERT_DUR / CA_DEFAULT_CERT_DUR in .env to tune.
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CA_JSON="$PKI/stepca/config/ca.json"
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CA_MAX_CERT_DUR=${CA_MAX_CERT_DUR:-2160h}
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CA_DEFAULT_CERT_DUR=${CA_DEFAULT_CERT_DUR:-720h}
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if [ -f "$CA_JSON" ]; then
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if python3 - "$CA_JSON" "$CA_MAX_CERT_DUR" "$CA_DEFAULT_CERT_DUR" <<'PY'
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import json,sys
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p,maxd,defd=sys.argv[1],sys.argv[2],sys.argv[3]
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c=json.load(open(p))
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claims=c.setdefault("authority",{}).setdefault("claims",{})
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if claims.get("maxTLSCertDuration")==maxd and claims.get("defaultTLSCertDuration")==defd:
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sys.exit(1) # already set — no restart needed
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claims["maxTLSCertDuration"]=maxd
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claims["defaultTLSCertDuration"]=defd
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json.dump(c,open(p,"w"),indent=2)
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PY
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then
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echo "==> raised CA claims (max=$CA_MAX_CERT_DUR default=$CA_DEFAULT_CERT_DUR); restarting step-ca"
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docker compose restart step-ca >/dev/null
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for _ in $(seq 1 50); do
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curl -fsS -k "$CA_URL/health" >/dev/null 2>&1 && break; sleep 0.2
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done
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else
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echo "==> CA claims already set (max=$CA_MAX_CERT_DUR)"
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fi
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else
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echo "WARNING: $CA_JSON not found — cannot raise cert-duration claim; 720h certs will be REJECTED." >&2
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fi
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# --- 2. enrolment provisioner (idempotent) ----------------------------------
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# JWK provisioner 'enrol' is created by auto-init (DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_PROVISIONER_NAME).
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# Enrolment authorizes a CSR with a one-time token:
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# step ca token <host-id> --provisioner enrol → passed to `step ca sign`
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# That token-gated sign is what the enrol-broker and enrol/tpm-provision.sh use.
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echo "==> provisioners:"
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step ca provisioner list --ca-url "$CA_URL" --root /export/root_ca.crt \
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| grep -E '"(name|type)"' || true
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# To UPGRADE to TPM attestation later, add an ACME attestation provisioner and
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# switch enrolment to device-attest-01 (key residency is then PROVEN, not trusted):
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# step ca provisioner add acme-attest --type ACME \
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# --challenge device-attest-01 \
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# --attestation-format tpm \
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# --attestation-root <tpm-vendor-EK-roots.pem>
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# (then `step ca acme` / an ACME client on the host instead of `step ca sign`.)
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# --- 3. RADIUS server cert (FreeRADIUS serves this; supplicant validates it) --
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# Written via /export so the files land in the host's pki/radius/ that FreeRADIUS
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# mounts. Uses the in-container CA root + provisioner password (no host copies).
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echo "==> issuing RADIUS server cert (radius.${CA_DNS#ca.})"
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RADIUS_CN="radius.${CA_DNS#ca.}"
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incca mkdir -p /export/radius
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step ca certificate "$RADIUS_CN" \
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/export/radius/server.pem /export/radius/server.key \
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--ca-url "$CA_URL" --root /export/root_ca.crt \
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--provisioner enrol --provisioner-password-file "$CONTAINER_PW" \
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--not-after 720h --force
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incca cp /export/root_ca.crt /export/radius/ca.pem
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echo "==> done. FreeRADIUS will read pki/radius/{server.pem,server.key,ca.pem}."
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echo " Next: cp $PKI/root_ca.crt ../../files/etc/dot1x/radius-ca.pem && rebuild secure-path image."
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