Files
diskless-workstation/files/agent/simtest/tpm_tls_test.go
T
Audiobuzz d5c833addf fleet-agent: on-host TPM-mTLS telemetry client (v1)
Build the on-host agent that pairs with fleet-hostapi and feeds the
fleet-manager control plane (TODO #14 "STILL TO BUILD (a)"). Nothing on the
workstation talked to the manager before this; Monitor + InfluxDB stayed empty.

Scope: telemetry only. The agent reuses the host TPM identity for mTLS (read-only
tpmkey.LoadSigner at 0x81000100 + cert from NV 0x01800100; the private key never
leaves the TPM), opens the long-lived FleetAgent.Session bidi stream, sends Hello
+ periodic HealthSnapshot (load/cpu/temp/mem/tmpfs/nvme/auth/selinux/chrony/kiosk,
probed read-only from /proc+/sys plus hostapi facts), and LOGS but does not act on
the DesiredState/Command it receives. Reconcile actuators (kiosk URL, reboot,
drain) are deferred until the telemetry half is bench-verified.

- files/agent/: new module (go-tpm + grpc), static CGO_ENABLED=0 like enrol/hostapi.
  Copies the enrol tpmkey (+ read-only LoadSigner) and the generated fleet.agent.v1
  proto so it stays self-contained without importing the initramfs enrol module.
- files/agent/simtest/: proves the TPM-signed cert completes a real mTLS client-auth
  handshake (RequireAndVerifyClientCert) against the go-tpm software simulator.
- files/etc/fleet-agent/agent.env: fleet-generic config (manager DNS name, fleet CA
  reused from radius-ca.pem, TPM handle/nvindex, interval). No per-host state.
- fleet-agent.service: hardened unit (tss group for /dev/tpmrm0, INET egress).
- CI builds fleet-agent out-of-VM + runs vet/test + the simulator handshake test.
- Packer: enable_agent flag (default on) + 2b-agent provisioner + fapolicyd trust.
  Post-switch-root only, so no dracut/initramfs changes.
- docs: TODO #14 + fleet-management-design as-built updated.

Requires the host already enrolled (broker approve births the inventory row) —
else the manager returns PermissionDenied, the correct "not enrolled yet" signal.
2026-07-05 03:15:13 +00:00

208 lines
6.2 KiB
Go

// Package simtest validates the agent's reused-TPM mTLS identity against the
// go-tpm software simulator (the MS TPM 2.0 reference). It lives in its own module
// so the CGO simulator never enters the shipped fleet-agent build; see go.mod.
//
// The crux it proves: crypto/tls can drive tpmkey's go-tpm crypto.Signer to sign
// the TLS CertificateVerify, so a host holding ONLY a TPM key (no exportable
// private key) authenticates to a server doing RequireAndVerifyClientCert against
// the fleet CA — the exact posture of the fleet-manager agent plane (agent.go).
package simtest
import (
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"crypto/x509/pkix"
"math/big"
"testing"
"time"
"fleet-agent/tpmkey"
"github.com/google/go-tpm-tools/simulator"
"github.com/google/go-tpm/tpm2"
"github.com/google/go-tpm/tpm2/transport"
)
func openSim(t *testing.T) transport.TPM {
t.Helper()
sim, err := simulator.Get()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("simulator: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { sim.Close() })
return transport.FromReadWriter(sim)
}
// testCA is a throwaway fleet CA for the handshake.
type testCA struct {
cert *x509.Certificate
key *ecdsa.PrivateKey
pool *x509.CertPool
}
func newTestCA(t *testing.T) *testCA {
t.Helper()
key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
tmpl := &x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1),
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "test fleet CA"},
NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour),
NotAfter: time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
IsCA: true,
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageCertSign,
BasicConstraintsValid: true,
}
der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, key.Public(), key)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
cert, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(der)
pool := x509.NewCertPool()
pool.AddCert(cert)
return &testCA{cert: cert, key: key, pool: pool}
}
// issue signs a leaf cert for pub with the CA (as the enrol-broker/step-ca does).
func (ca *testCA) issue(t *testing.T, tmpl *x509.Certificate, pub crypto.PublicKey) []byte {
t.Helper()
der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, ca.cert, pub, ca.key)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CA issue: %v", err)
}
return der
}
func TestTPMClientCertHandshake(t *testing.T) {
tpm := openSim(t)
const (
keyHandle = tpm2.TPMHandle(0x81000100)
nvIndex = tpm2.TPMHandle(0x01800100)
)
// Enrolment side: create the persistent signing key (once).
if _, _, err := tpmkey.EnsureKey(tpm, keyHandle); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("EnsureKey: %v", err)
}
// Agent side: load it read-only (the function the agent actually uses).
signer, err := tpmkey.LoadSigner(tpm, keyHandle)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadSigner: %v", err)
}
ca := newTestCA(t)
// The host's identity cert (CA-signed over the TPM public key). Its SERIAL is
// the value the manager derives as the inventory key.
wantSerial := big.NewInt(0xC0FFEE)
leafDER := ca.issue(t, &x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: wantSerial,
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "fleet-host"},
NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour),
NotAfter: time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature,
ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth},
}, signer.Public())
// Exercise the NV round-trip the agent's identity path uses.
if err := tpmkey.WriteNVCert(tpm, nvIndex, leafDER); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("WriteNVCert: %v", err)
}
got, err := tpmkey.ReadNVCert(tpm, nvIndex)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ReadNVCert: %v", err)
}
if string(got) != string(leafDER) {
t.Fatalf("NV cert round-trip mismatch")
}
leaf, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(leafDER)
// TPM-backed client cert (private key = the TPM signer; never exported).
clientCert := tls.Certificate{Certificate: [][]byte{leafDER}, PrivateKey: signer, Leaf: leaf}
// Server standing in for the manager agent plane: verify the client to the CA.
serverKey, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
serverDER := ca.issue(t, &x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(2),
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "fleet-manager"},
DNSNames: []string{"fleet-manager"},
NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour),
NotAfter: time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature,
ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
}, serverKey.Public())
serverCfg := &tls.Config{
Certificates: []tls.Certificate{{Certificate: [][]byte{serverDER}, PrivateKey: serverKey}},
ClientAuth: tls.RequireAndVerifyClientCert,
ClientCAs: ca.pool,
MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12,
}
clientCfg := &tls.Config{
Certificates: []tls.Certificate{clientCert},
RootCAs: ca.pool,
ServerName: "fleet-manager",
MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12,
}
ln, err := tls.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0", serverCfg)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer ln.Close()
serialCh := make(chan *big.Int, 1)
errCh := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
conn, err := ln.Accept()
if err != nil {
errCh <- err
return
}
defer conn.Close()
tc := conn.(*tls.Conn)
tc.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second))
if err := tc.Handshake(); err != nil {
errCh <- err
return
}
st := tc.ConnectionState()
if len(st.PeerCertificates) == 0 {
errCh <- err
return
}
serialCh <- st.PeerCertificates[0].SerialNumber
}()
conn, err := tls.Dial("tcp", ln.Addr().String(), clientCfg)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("client handshake with TPM cert failed: %v", err)
}
defer conn.Close()
select {
case err := <-errCh:
t.Fatalf("server rejected TPM client cert: %v", err)
case serial := <-serialCh:
if serial.Cmp(wantSerial) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("server saw serial %x, want %x", serial, wantSerial)
}
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("handshake timed out")
}
}
// TestLoadSignerRejectsEmptyHandle proves the agent fails clearly on a host that
// isn't enrolled (no key at the handle) rather than creating one.
func TestLoadSignerRejectsEmptyHandle(t *testing.T) {
tpm := openSim(t)
if _, err := tpmkey.LoadSigner(tpm, tpm2.TPMHandle(0x81000100)); err == nil {
t.Fatal("LoadSigner on an empty handle should error (agent must not create a key)")
}
}