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diskless-workstation/README.md
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# Diskless Fleet Image Build (Packer)
Builds the fleet-generic boot artifacts for PXE/HTTP-booted diskless hosts that
authenticate with 802.1X EAP-TLS (TPM-held key, certificate in TPM NV) and run
MACsec on the access link. The root filesystem is an immutable, reproducible
**erofs image with an appended dm-verity hash tree**, served as a single
shared **read-only NVMe/TCP namespace**, with a tmpfs overlay for runtime
state. Companion to `docs/diskless-fleet-design-v2.pdf` (see
`docs/design-v2-errata.md` for as-built deltas on RHEL/Rocky 9).
## Layout
```
diskless.pkr.hcl Packer template (qemu builder)
http/ks.cfg Kickstart for the throwaway build VM
files/dracut/95dot1x-macsec/ Custom dracut module
module-setup.sh module definition
dot1x-macsec-up.sh initqueue hook: NV cert -> @wpa_supplicant
-> wait authorized + macsec0 -> DHCP
-> hostnqn derived from cert
files/etc/dot1x/wpa_supplicant-dot1x.conf Fleet-generic supplicant config
files/etc/dot1x/radius-ca.pem PLACEHOLDER - replace with real CA chain
files/etc/dracut.conf.d/90-diskless.conf no-hostonly + nvmf/verity/erofs + drivers
files/etc/NetworkManager/ marks NIC/macsec0 unmanaged post-pivot
scripts/extract-artifacts.sh qcow2 -> vmlinuz + initramfs.img
+ rootfs.erofs (+verity) + cmdline
scripts/build-oci.sh ukify (+sbsign) + roothash gate -> OCI image
serving/ Lab serving stack (docker compose):
dnsmasq DHCP/DNS + nginx (UKI/HTTP) + SPDK
.gitea/workflows/ Gitea CI: lint -> packer build -> push OCI
docs/diskless-fleet-design-v2.pdf Architecture design (authoritative)
```
## Build host requirements
- Packer >= 1.10, qemu plugin (`packer init .`)
- qemu-kvm with KVM available
- libguestfs-tools, **erofs-utils**, **cryptsetup**, jq (artifact extraction)
- **systemd-ukify** + **systemd-boot-efi** (the EFI stub `ukify` wraps;
it's only a *recommends* of ukify) (+ **sbsigntools** when signing) — UKI assembly
- **buildah** (or docker) — OCI release-artifact image build
The default `iso_url`/`iso_checksum` point at a version-pinned **Rocky 9.x
minimal** ISO on the internal mirror. `http/ks.cfg` installs only core+sshd from
that ISO; the diskless tooling is pulled online by the provisioner, so the build
VM needs **outbound network to the distro repos** (and a fast mirror helps).
Bump the URL and the pinned sha256 together when moving to a new point release.
## Build
```bash
# 1. Replace the CA placeholder
cp /path/to/radius-ca-chain.pem files/etc/dot1x/radius-ca.pem
# 2. Set the NIC drivers for your real fleet hardware (default covers
# common Intel + Mellanox); the build VM only has virtio, so anything
# not listed here will not be in the initramfs.
packer init .
packer build \
-var image_version=1.0.0 \
-var nic_drivers="ice mlx5_core" \
-var oci_image=registry.example.org/fleet-boot \
-var oci_push=true \
-var sb_key=/secure/ci/fleet-sb.key \
-var sb_cert=/secure/ci/fleet-sb.crt \
.
```
Omit `sb_key`/`sb_cert` for unsigned lab builds (the pipeline warns).
Set the NVMe discovery address with `-var nvmet_traddr=<dns-name>` (default
`nvme.fleet.lab`, which the `serving/` stack's dnsmasq resolves); it is baked
into the cmdline and **immutable once signed**, so prefer a per-environment DNS
name over a raw IP. Deploy/boot-test instructions live in
[serving/README.md](serving/README.md).
**Test mode (auth disabled).** Add `-var disable_dot1x=true` to bake
`rd.dot1x=0` into the cmdline. At boot the hook then skips 802.1X/MACsec and
DHCPs the physical NIC directly to reach the NVMe/TCP target — for validating
the UKI/rootfs/NVMe-oF path on an **open switch port**. The auth stack stays in
the image (dormant); drop the var to restore the secure boot. See `serving/`
for the matching DHCP/HTTP/NVMe-oF lab stack.
Outputs: `artifacts/<version>/` gains `fleet-<version>.efi` (the signed
UKI) alongside `rootfs.erofs`/`verity.json`, and the build produces the
release-artifact OCI image `<oci_image>:<version>` containing only
`/artifacts/{fleet-<version>.efi, rootfs.erofs, verity.json, SHA256SUMS}`
with the roothash recorded as an image label. The build hard-fails if the
roothash baked into the UKI cmdline does not match `verity.json`.
## Publishing a version
The OCI image **is** the release. The serving stack stays constant
(separate, independently-patched SPDK and nginx/caddy images); each fleet
release only changes which artifact image feeds them:
1. Push `<oci_image>:<version>` (or let `oci_push=true` do it) and record
the **digest**.
2. In the fleet-boot deployment manifest (k8s Deployment or compose),
bump the artifact initContainer / image-volume reference to that digest
— one commit per fleet release; this manifest is the single place
coupling UKI <-> root namespace.
3. The initContainer copies `/artifacts` into the shared volume; nginx
serves `fleet-<version>.efi` over HTTPS (firmware validates against
the TlsCaCertificate CA, then Secure Boot verifies the UKI signature);
SPDK exposes `rootfs.erofs` as a **read-only** NVMe/TCP namespace.
4. Rollout = digest bump; rollback = revert the commit. cosign the image
so the deploy pipeline verifies provenance (sbsign is for firmware,
cosign is for your cluster).
## Kernel command line (per build — emitted in cmdline.txt)
```
rd.neednet=1 systemd.volatile=overlay \
rd.dot1x.nvindex=0x01800001 rd.dot1x.timeout=60 \
rd.nvmf.discover=tcp,NVMET_TRADDR,4420 \
root=/dev/mapper/root rootfstype=erofs rootflags=ro \
systemd.verity=yes roothash=<from verity.json> \
systemd.verity_root_data=/dev/nvme0n1 \
systemd.verity_root_hash=/dev/nvme0n1 \
systemd.verity_root_options=hash-offset=<from verity.json>
```
`systemd.volatile=overlay` gives the writable tmpfs overlay over the read-only
verity root — RHEL/Rocky dracut has **no** `rootovl`/`overlayfs` module (that is
a Debian/third-party feature), and systemd's volatile overlay is the supported
mechanism for dm-verity roots. Single-file layout: data and hash tree share one
namespace, split by `hash-offset`. `rd.dot1x.if=` may pin the NIC; otherwise the
first non-loopback interface is used. Test builds prepend `rd.dot1x=0`.
## Bench-verify before fleet rollout
1. **erofs module present** in the target RHEL kernel (`modprobe erofs`) —
enabled in later RHEL 9 minors for image mode; if absent, fall back to
journal-less ext4 (`mkfs.ext4 -O ^has_journal -d <tree>`) in
`extract-artifacts.sh`.
2. **systemd.verity_root_options support** in the shipped systemd/dracut
(needs a reasonably recent systemd; otherwise publish data and hash as
two separate namespaces and drop the hash-offset option).
3. **TPM key reference**: confirm wpa_supplicant accepts
`private_key="handle:0x81010001"` via the OpenSSL tpm2 provider; if not,
switch to the tpm2-pkcs11 option in the supplicant config.
4. **CONFIG_MACSEC** in the shipped wpa_supplicant build.
5. **Pivot survival**: `@wpa_supplicant` survives switch-root; MKA continuity
across it. NVMe/TCP keepalives must also ride out the pivot (they will,
if the link never drops — that is the point of the @-daemon).
6. **network backend**: the hook uses `network-legacy`/`ifup`, which requires
`dhclient`. RHEL 9 deprecated it and the minimal ISO omits it, so the
provisioner installs `dhcp-client` explicitly (without it dracut fails with
"module network-legacy can't be installed"). dhclient is on its way out; the
durable fix is to port the hook to the `network-manager` dracut module.
7. **hostnqn allow-listing**: if the nvmet target filters hosts, the
allowed-NQN list must be fed from the enrolment pipeline (NQNs are
derived from certificate serials — see the hook).
8. **CI smoke test**: boot artifacts in qemu/Proxmox with swtpm against
hostapd-as-authenticator + FreeRADIUS (remember bridge group_fwd_mask=8
for EAPOL); assert macsec0 up, dm-verity root mapped, overlay rw.
9. **writable root overlay**: provided by `systemd.volatile=overlay`, which
needs `systemd-volatile-root.service` in the initramfs (bundled by recent
dracut). If the root stays read-only at boot, add `install_items+="
/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-volatile-root
/usr/lib/systemd/system/systemd-volatile-root.service "` to
`90-diskless.conf`. Known to misbehave with NFS root — N/A here (NVMe block).
## What is deliberately NOT in the image
- Private keys, certificates, host names, per-host config of any kind.
All identity lives in each host's TPM (persistent handle + NV index);
the NVMe hostnqn is derived from the certificate at boot.