234 lines
14 KiB
Markdown
234 lines
14 KiB
Markdown
# TODO — diskless fleet boot system
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Persistent backlog, kept in sync with the working session task tracker. Status:
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`[ ]` pending · `[~]` in progress · `[x]` done.
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---
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## [ ] 1. Port the dracut module off `network-legacy` → `network-manager`
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Durable replacement for the current `dhcp-client` stopgap. `dhclient` is
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deprecated in RHEL 9 and will eventually leave the repos; the build only works
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today because the provisioner installs `dhcp-client` so `network-legacy` passes
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dracut's `check()`.
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- Rewrite both network bring-up paths in
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[../files/dracut/95dot1x-macsec/dot1x-macsec-up.sh](../files/dracut/95dot1x-macsec/dot1x-macsec-up.sh):
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the secure path's `ifup macsec0` and the `rd.dot1x=0` bypass path's
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`ifup $NIC` — use `nmcli`/NetworkManager-in-initramfs (or `ip=` cmdline + the
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nm module) instead.
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- Change `depends()` `network-legacy` → `network-manager` in
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[../files/dracut/95dot1x-macsec/module-setup.sh](../files/dracut/95dot1x-macsec/module-setup.sh).
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- Update `add_dracutmodules` in
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[../files/etc/dracut.conf.d/90-diskless.conf](../files/etc/dracut.conf.d/90-diskless.conf).
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- Drop `dhcp-client` from the provisioner `dnf install` in
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[../diskless.pkr.hcl](../diskless.pkr.hcl).
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- Re-verify the `lsinitrd` assertion.
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- **Gate:** full boot-chain smoke test (swtpm + hostapd + FreeRADIUS) before
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merge, per CLAUDE.md.
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## [ ] 2. Apply RHEL9 STIG hardening to the built image
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OpenSCAP + SCAP Security Guide (`xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_profile_stig`), run
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as a Packer provisioner after `dnf install` and before the dracut/initramfs build
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and cleanup.
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- **Tailoring** (`autotailor`): unselect rules this architecture can't satisfy —
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separate-partition rules (single erofs root + tmpfs overlay; satisfy intent
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with `nodev,nosuid,noexec` tmpfs mounts), GRUB/kernel-cmdline rules (no GRUB),
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and AIDE/file-integrity rules (dm-verity is the documented compensating
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control).
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- **Kernel params → UKI cmdline** in
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[../scripts/extract-artifacts.sh](../scripts/extract-artifacts.sh) before
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signing: `audit=1 audit_backlog_limit=8192 slub_debug=P page_poison=1
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vsyscall=none` (+ `fips=1` if FIPS).
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- **Reproducibility guard:** strip non-deterministic remediation output (SSH host
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keys → regen at boot into overlay, AIDE db, timestamps, fresh UUIDs) so the
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verity hash stays stable.
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- **Audit logging:** `audisp-remote`/rsyslog to a central collector addressed by
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DNS name (host-generic).
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- **Optional FIPS:** `fips=1` cmdline + `01fips` dracut module + FIPS crypto
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policy.
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- **CI:** run `oscap eval` (no `--remediate`) to publish an ARF+HTML STIG report
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as a build artifact; optionally hard-fail below a score threshold.
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- **Decisions needed before implementing:** FIPS on/off · remote-audit collector
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DNS name (or ephemeral/none for lab) · CI fail-on-score threshold vs
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report-only.
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- Note: orthogonal to the `rd.dot1x=0` test toggle, but a full STIG production
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posture wants 802.1X re-enabled.
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## [ ] 3. Roll the errata into design doc v3
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Once the boot path is validated and item 1 lands, fold
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[design-v2-errata.md](design-v2-errata.md) into the source design document and
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re-export a **v3** PDF (key change: `rootovl` → `systemd.volatile=overlay` in §3
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step 8 and §5). Retire/reset the errata afterward. Needs the design-doc source
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(not in this repo).
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## [ ] 4. Kiosk mode — autologin + fullscreen Chromium loading a URL
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Make the diskless workstation boot straight into a locked-down kiosk: a
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fullscreen Chromium showing a configured site (initial target: Reddit). All
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baked at **build time** into the root tree (immutable erofs/verity root; runtime
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is the tmpfs overlay), fleet-generic (no per-host state).
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- **Graphical stack (keep it minimal):** add a Packer provisioner installing a
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lightweight kiosk compositor + browser. Preferred: `cage` (Wayland
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single-app kiosk compositor) + Mesa (software GL fallback for VMs/no-GPU);
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X11 + a minimal WM (matchbox/openbox) as the alternative. Chromium on Rocky 9
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is in **EPEL** — enabling EPEL adds a repo/supply-chain surface (decision
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below).
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- **Autologin + session:** dedicated unprivileged `kiosk` user; launch the
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session via a `kiosk.service` running `cage -s -- chromium --kiosk …`
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(or `greetd` + cage). Stage units/configs under `files/` like the other
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provisioned config.
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- **Chromium flags:** `--kiosk --noerrdialogs --disable-infobars --incognito
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--no-first-run --disable-session-crashed-bubble <URL>`. Writable profile/cache
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land on the `systemd.volatile=overlay` tmpfs (RAM-backed, ephemeral) — fine,
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but watch RAM sizing; pin `--user-data-dir`/`--disk-cache-dir` to a tmpfs path
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if needed.
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- **Kiosk URL = Packer var** (e.g. `kiosk_url`, default the target site), baked
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into the launch command; keep it host-generic (per-env via DNS if ever needed).
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- **Verify in boot test:** graphical session comes up on real/VM display,
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Chromium fullscreen loads the URL over the booted network (works with the
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current `rd.dot1x=0` test path / open network).
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- **Decisions:** Wayland(cage) vs X11; accept EPEL for Chromium (vs another
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source); confirm the target URL.
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- **⚠ Conflict with item 2 (STIG):** passwordless autologin and a desktop
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browser are STIG findings and enlarge the attack surface/image. Reconcile —
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e.g. a tightly-constrained kiosk session + documented deviation — when
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hardening lands.
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## [~] 5. Deploy & validate the end-to-end boot path (open-network test)
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In progress. Stand up `serving/` (dnsmasq + nginx + SPDK) per
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[serving/README.md](../serving/README.md), rebuild the UKI with
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`nvmet_traddr=nvme.fleet.lab` (now a Packer var — older UKIs have the literal
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`NVMET_TRADDR` placeholder and won't connect), then boot a UEFI HTTP-boot client
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(**Secure Boot OFF**, unsigned UKI; no TPM needed in `rd.dot1x=0` mode) on the
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boot LAN.
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- **Pass criteria:** UKI fetched over HTTP → initramfs → DHCP on NIC → NVMe/TCP
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namespace connected → dm-verity root mapped → `systemd.volatile=overlay`
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writable → multi-user.
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- This validation **gates** item #1 (network-manager port) and item #3
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(errata → design v3).
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- **Bench findings (boot debug, 2026-06-14):**
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- Initramfs has no resolver (dracut writes `resolv.conf` only via its own
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DHCP path, not a manual `dhclient`), so the NVMe discovery address must be
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an **IP**, not a DNS name — build with `-var nvmet_traddr=192.168.50.10`.
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Old UKIs carrying `nvme.fleet.lab` can't connect early in boot.
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- NVMe controller indices are **not stable**: a transient discovery
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controller can take `nvme0`, pushing the I/O controller to `nvme1`. The
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hardcoded `/dev/nvme0n1` in the cmdline was a latent brick. **Fixed:**
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namespace UUID pinned on the target (`spdk-setup.sh` `add_ns -u
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f1ee7000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001`) and the cmdline now references
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`/dev/disk/by-id/nvme-uuid.<uuid>` (`extract-artifacts.sh`). The two
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constants MUST stay in sync; make them version-specific for #6.
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- `nvme_tcp`/`nvme_fabrics` must be loaded before `/dev/nvme-fabrics` exists
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(dracut's `nvmf` module does this in a normal boot; at `rd.break` modprobe
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manually).
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- **Don't double-configure the NIC in test mode.** With `ip=dhcp` on the
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cmdline, dracut's network module brings the NIC up AND emits the "online"
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event that the `nvmf` module's `initqueue/online` hook waits on to run
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`nvme connect-all`. The `rd.dot1x=0` bypass used to *also* `ifup $NIC`,
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which (a) raced dracut → `Error: ipv4: Address already assigned`, and (b)
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didn't fire the nvmf online hook, so the namespace never auto-connected and
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boot spun on `/dev/mapper/root` forever (manual `connect-all` worked, which
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is what masked it). **Fixed:** the bypass branch no longer touches the NIC;
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`ip=dhcp` owns networking. (The secure path still addresses macsec0 itself —
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dracut doesn't know about that interface.)
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- **dracut's `nvmf` module never auto-connects on this distro.** Its cmdline
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hook (`92-parse-nvmf-boot-connections.sh`) parses `rd.nvmf.discover` into
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`/etc/nvme/discovery.conf` correctly, but `initqueue/online/` is **empty** —
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no autoconnect hook is registered, so `nvme connect-all` is never run (no
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attempt in dmesg) and the namespace never appears. Drivers load and
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`/dev/nvme-fabrics` exists; only the connect trigger is missing. A job
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placed on the *main* initqueue from a settled hook gets registered but is
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**never re-executed** once the loop blocks on udev events (verified: job
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present, manual `connect-all` works, namespace stays absent). **Fixed:** a
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dedicated `initqueue/online` hook (`nvmf-connect.sh`, installed via
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`inst_hook initqueue/online 90`) runs `nvme connect-all` when network-legacy
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sources online hooks on DHCP-bound — the event-driven trigger the nvmf
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module omits. **⚠ The secure path has the same dependency on the
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(absent) nvmf autoconnect** — when 802.1X is re-enabled, the macsec0 path
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must likewise drive `connect-all` (or the network-manager port #1 must wire
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a working autoconnect). Currently only the test path is fixed.
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- The target Rocky 9 kernel's erofs is built **without
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`CONFIG_EROFS_FS_ZIP`** — mounting a compressed image fails `erofs: lz4
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algorithm isn't enabled`, which silently blocks the root mount. **Fixed:**
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`extract-artifacts.sh` now builds the erofs **uncompressed** (`mkfs.erofs`
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without `-z`). Tradeoff: larger rootfs namespace + more NVMe/TCP bandwidth
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per read. Re-enable compression only against a kernel verified to have
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`EROFS_FS_ZIP` (`grep CONFIG_EROFS /boot/config-$(uname -r)`). This is the
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CLAUDE.md bench-verify item ("erofs module availability on the target RHEL
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kernel"). Larger image size also feeds the "shrink the rootfs" angle of #7.
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- SPDK: add the listener to the discovery subsystem explicitly
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(`nqn.2014-08.org.nvmexpress.discovery`) to silence the deprecation warning.
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## [ ] 6. Rolling fleet updates (multi-version serve → cohort reboots)
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Image-based, reboot-to-update across many live workstations. Hosts are immutable
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(read-only erofs/verity root over NVMe/TCP, ephemeral overlay), so updates are
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**atomic A/B reboots**, never in-place. The released OCI artifact + digest-pinned
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manifest + roothash coupling already give the atomic unit and instant rollback;
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this item builds the rollout machinery around it.
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- **Serve versions side-by-side** (must not overwrite a live rootfs): extend
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`serving/` so SPDK/nvmet exposes each release as its **own subsystem/NQN**
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(`nqn…:rootfs-<ver>`) and nginx serves multiple `fleet-<ver>.efi` (keep
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current + previous). Make the UKI's NQN version-specific so each signed UKI
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connects only its matching namespace (constant discovery DNS name).
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- **Version selection at boot**: dnsmasq **cohort tagging** (MAC / vendor class /
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assigned tag) hands each cohort a different option-67 UKI URL. Moving a
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cohort's URL = assigning the release.
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- **Control plane + in-image reboot agent**: a baked-in systemd timer polls a
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"desired version" endpoint and reboots **when idle / in a maintenance window**
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(or out-of-band via Redfish/BMC). Stagger + jitter reboots to avoid UKI-fetch
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/ NVMe-connect storms.
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- **Staged rollout**: canary → waves (10/50/100%) with health gates
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(multi-user reached, NVMe connected, dm-verity mapped, kiosk URL rendered,
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prod: MACsec/802.1X up); auto-halt on threshold.
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- **Rollback**: repoint cohort URL to previous UKI + reboot (current+previous
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stay served); security rollback via dbx-revoke / TPM monotonic counter
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(design §6).
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- **Drain & retire** an old version only when SPDK/nvmet reports zero connected
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controllers on it.
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- **Availability**: run NVMe/TCP target replicas behind distinct discovery
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entries (design §7) — never serve the whole fleet from one unreplicated node,
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especially mid-rollout (N versions + reboot bursts).
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- Note: kiosk *content* changes are server-side (the website) and need no fleet
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update — only OS/UKI/rootfs changes require a reboot.
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## [ ] 7. Harden / evaluate the NVMe-oF target (serving-node resilience)
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There is **no production-grade memory-safe NVMe-oF target** — the Rust NVMe work
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is all driver/initiator-side (vroom, RedLeaf, Rust-for-Linux); the only
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production targets are C (Linux kernel `nvmet`, SPDK). So this is **serving-node
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hardening, not a language swap**. dm-verity already removes the target from the
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clients' integrity TCB (verify-on-read rejects tampered blocks), so the risk is
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RCE/DoS on the node that holds the fleet's disk, not client integrity. The
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export is read-only + single-namespace = inherently small attack surface.
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- **Evaluate kernel `nvmet` vs SPDK** for the target: kernel `nvmet` keeps the
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data path in the hardened/fuzzed kernel with a tiny userspace footprint
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(arguably a better attack-surface story); SPDK is a userspace C daemon
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(current choice, needs hugepages + caps). Decide per environment.
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- **Confine the target** (whichever): unprivileged, drop caps, seccomp +
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SELinux/AppArmor profile, read-only container, minimal mounts; minimal
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immutable serving image, digest-pinned.
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- **Slim the SPDK image (multi-stage build)**: the current single-stage
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from-source image is ~600 MB (it keeps the whole toolchain — gcc, meson/ninja,
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kernel headers, the python venv — plus the SPDK/DPDK source and build trees).
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Convert `serving/spdk/Dockerfile` to a builder stage + a minimal runtime stage
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that copies only `nvmf_tgt` + its `ldd` shared libs (libnuma, libssl/crypto,
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libuuid, libaio…) + `rpc.py`/`python3`. Expect ~150–250 MB (debian-slim base
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or a static SPDK link trims further). Smaller attack surface + faster pulls,
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and it pairs with the confinement above.
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- **Network-isolate :4420** so only the boot VLAN reaches the target (compose
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with 802.1X/MACsec segmentation in prod).
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- **Replicas** behind distinct discovery entries (availability is the real risk
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— it's the fleet's disk). Ties into #6 (rolling updates) availability.
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- Revisit a memory-safe target only if/when an off-the-shelf one matures
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(e.g. a future Rust-for-Linux `nvmet`).
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