Completes the rename commit (which carried only the file move): defaults.env
layering header, docker-compose usage comment, serving/Makefile (sets
COMPOSE_ENV_FILES), serving/.gitignore (.env), and the README/TODO references.
The agent's baked default pointed at the PUBLIC admin-UI name
(diskless-server.bitasylum.org), which resolves to the serving host's outbound IP
— unreachable from the fleet LAN. There's no split-horizon to "automate": the
manager agent plane is just another *.fleet.lab, served by the fleet dnsmasq like
boot/nvme/audit.
- serving/.env.example: MGMT_HOST=manager.fleet.lab.
- serving/docker-compose.yml: dnsmasq --address=/${MGMT_HOST}/${SERVER_IP}.
- files/agent/agent.env + main.go default: FLEET_AGENT_MANAGER=manager.fleet.lab:9600.
- server-pki.sh: AGENT_SANS default -> manager.fleet.lab (cert SAN matches the
baked name, so no FLEET_AGENT_SERVER_NAME override).
- docs/TODO #14 gotcha #4 updated: fleet name, not the IP+server-name workaround.
The public diskless-server.bitasylum.org stays the ADMIN-UI name (Traefik/:443).
Record the 2026-07-10 end-to-end verification (Dell 820 comet-beacon-54, real
TPM): TPM-identity mTLS -> enrolled -> streaming health + receiving desired-state,
manager logs "agent connected". Add the "deploying the agent plane" gotcha list
(placeholder CA, root+intermediate client CA, distroless PKI perms, split-horizon
DNS, out-of-band inventory seeding) — all automated by commit a89c3d2 — so the
next deploy doesn't rediscover the debug chain.
Companion to the previous commit's file move: point the 2b-agent install at
/tmp/agent/agent.env (the agent's own upload) instead of the deleted
/tmp/etc-stage path, update the file-provisioner comment, the enable_agent var
description, and the TODO source-path reference. packer validate passes.
Build the on-host agent that pairs with fleet-hostapi and feeds the
fleet-manager control plane (TODO #14 "STILL TO BUILD (a)"). Nothing on the
workstation talked to the manager before this; Monitor + InfluxDB stayed empty.
Scope: telemetry only. The agent reuses the host TPM identity for mTLS (read-only
tpmkey.LoadSigner at 0x81000100 + cert from NV 0x01800100; the private key never
leaves the TPM), opens the long-lived FleetAgent.Session bidi stream, sends Hello
+ periodic HealthSnapshot (load/cpu/temp/mem/tmpfs/nvme/auth/selinux/chrony/kiosk,
probed read-only from /proc+/sys plus hostapi facts), and LOGS but does not act on
the DesiredState/Command it receives. Reconcile actuators (kiosk URL, reboot,
drain) are deferred until the telemetry half is bench-verified.
- files/agent/: new module (go-tpm + grpc), static CGO_ENABLED=0 like enrol/hostapi.
Copies the enrol tpmkey (+ read-only LoadSigner) and the generated fleet.agent.v1
proto so it stays self-contained without importing the initramfs enrol module.
- files/agent/simtest/: proves the TPM-signed cert completes a real mTLS client-auth
handshake (RequireAndVerifyClientCert) against the go-tpm software simulator.
- files/etc/fleet-agent/agent.env: fleet-generic config (manager DNS name, fleet CA
reused from radius-ca.pem, TPM handle/nvindex, interval). No per-host state.
- fleet-agent.service: hardened unit (tss group for /dev/tpmrm0, INET egress).
- CI builds fleet-agent out-of-VM + runs vet/test + the simulator handshake test.
- Packer: enable_agent flag (default on) + 2b-agent provisioner + fapolicyd trust.
Post-switch-root only, so no dracut/initramfs changes.
- docs: TODO #14 + fleet-management-design as-built updated.
Requires the host already enrolled (broker approve births the inventory row) —
else the manager returns PermissionDenied, the correct "not enrolled yet" signal.
DEPLOY.md gains a "Hardening status" section (done vs operator-to-close), and
TODO #14 records the deployment as CI-built + acme-cert + backup, with the open
items called out: network-segment the :9500/:9600 listeners to the mgmt net, run
server-pki.sh when the agent lands, choose :9500 vs a 443 proxy, and digest-pin
the images.
Complete the deployment story for the server-side control plane:
- docker-compose.yml: private InfluxDB (published to loopback only) + a
host-networked fleet-manager (reaches the loopback enrol-broker on
127.0.0.1:9443 and binds a routable gRPC agent listener, like the broker).
- .env.example: RP origin (diskless-server.bitasylum.org), Influx token/DB
password, cert/PKI paths; the Influx token wires influxdb + manager with
one value.
- server-pki.sh: issue the agent-plane server cert from the fleet CA (step)
and stage the fleet root as the client-verify CA.
- DEPLOY.md: end-to-end runbook — three-cert PKI (fleet-CA agent cert, broker
admin-client cert, Let's Encrypt DNS-01 UI cert), register-admin passkey
bootstrap, compose up, hardware-free smoke test, backups.
- .dockerignore: keep host node_modules/dist/pki/secrets out of the build
context so the embedded SPA is the one built in-image.
- .gitignore: never commit .env / issued PKI / data.
Design docs marked as-built: fleet-management-design.md as-built note
(resolved forks — gRPC bidi transport, InfluxDB metrics, SPA graphs, passkey
admin auth, broker fold-in "alongside"); tpm-enrolment-design.md (broker
fold-in + agent transport fork resolved); TODO.md #14 → partly built, with
the on-host agent + per-host boot-version assignment (#6) called out as the
remaining work.
Combines the image trim (#18: langpack/firmware slim, kiosk weak-deps, nss-mdns
KEEP+mask-avahi fix, final kiosk-stack build guard) with optimise-ram's overlay-RAM
work (#17 fapolicyd db_max_size cap, .pyc unchecked-hash recompile).
Conflict resolutions:
- diskless.pkr.hcl (2d hygiene tail): kept BOTH additions — the .pyc recompile
runs first (the 'must run last after every dnf' mutation), then the read-only
FINAL GUARD (rpm -q kiosk stack) as the absolute last step. The nss-mdns fix
(mask avahi, keep the package) auto-merged above the conflict — no regression.
- docs/TODO.md: kept both #17 (fapolicyd db_max_size) and #18 (image trim), as the
#18 stack-note predicted.
The '#18 render should be safe' call on the nss-mdns drop (5cc72cc) was wrong: it
bricked the kiosk on trim-rpm-48dc3e1 (chromium hard-Requires nss-mdns, so the 2d
remove cascaded chromium + its GUI stack out → 500 MB browserless image, flashing
cursor). Fixed in 2bc2daf (keep nss-mdns, mask avahi daemon; final build guard
asserts the kiosk stack survived). Re-verified booting into the kiosk on the 820;
container image measured 1.8 GiB → 755 MiB (~58%).
0bfe872 builds, deploys, and the host now mounts ONLY its own version's image
instead of connect-all'ing every served version — the targeted 'nvme connect -n
rd.nvmf.nqn' works. Each host = 1 controller on its own subsystem, which is what
lets old versions drain to 0 and spdk-loader auto-reap. Still to confirm: the reap
payoff (migrate a host, watch its old version drain + reap), and the secure path's
new step-6 connect over macsec0.
f59eb79 now fully bench-verified: the fleet SPA renders on both the VM
(virtio-gpu) and the 820 (i915), so the i915 DMC/GuC firmware loads on real
hardware and the firmware keep-list is validated end-to-end. The two later
commits (nss-mdns drop, omit_drivers + keep-list tightening) don't touch i915,
so render should be safe, but still need their own build+boot.
The ~800 MB trim (glibc langpacks en-only + linux-firmware strip to the i915
keep-list, run pre-dracut) builds and boots — the boot/root path survives it
(firmware 678->147 MB, initramfs bundles only the keep-list). Notes still-open
checks: kiosk RENDER on real i915 hardware ('booted' != 'display up'), and that
the two later commits (nss-mdns drop 5cc72cc; omit_drivers + keep-list tightening
853ae20) are NOT in f59eb79 and need separate bench-verify.
First trim build confirmed firmware 678 MB -> 147 MB, but the initramfs came
out 97 MB and is now kernel-MODULE-bound, not firmware: --no-hostonly +
plymouth's drm dep instmods every GPU driver (amdgpu.ko etc.) though the fleet
is i915-only.
- omit_drivers += amdgpu radeon nouveau (90-diskless.conf): drop the discrete-GPU
kmods (amdgpu.ko is the biggest single module in the initramfs); keep i915 +
virtio-gpu/bochs for the splash. Shrinks the initramfs/UKI pulled over PXE on
every boot.
- Firmware keep-list tightened: drop mellanox/ (mlxsw_spectrum SWITCH-ASIC blobs,
not NIC fw — mlx5 NIC fw is on-card) and narrow intel/ to just ice (drop
ish/sof/ibt sensor-hub/audio/bluetooth, none loaded at boot per the audit).
- Add an 'initramfs largest files' diagnostic (sort lsinitrd.txt by size) so the
next build shows what dominates the .img.
BENCH-VERIFY: kiosk still renders on the 820 (i915 kept); watch the new initramfs
largest-files log line for the post-omit size.
Hosts connected with 'nvme connect-all', which attaches EVERY subsystem in the
discovery log. Each host then mounts only its own by-UUID verity namespaces but
leaves a live controller on every other served version's subsystem. Observed via
spdk-release list: more controllers than workstations, each box on every version
(1/3/3/1/3 across 5 versions for ~3 boxes). Beyond wasted connections
(O(hosts x versions)), it defeated the rolling-update drain/reap: no version ever
reached 0 connections while any host was up, so spdk-loader's auto-reap could
never fire and old versions accumulated without bound.
Fix — targeted connect to this build's subsystem only:
- extract-artifacts.sh bakes the per-version SUBNQN (already in verity.json
.subnqn, matched by the serving side) into the signed UKI cmdline as
rd.nvmf.nqn=. NQN is version identity, not per-host state, and the cmdline is
already per-version + immutable-per-signed-UKI, so invariant #1 holds.
- nvmf-connect.sh (test path) uses 'nvme connect -n <nqn>'; legacy UKIs without
rd.nvmf.nqn fall back to connect-all with a warning so they still boot.
- dot1x-macsec-up.sh (secure path) gains an explicit step-6 targeted connect over
macsec0 (after it's addressed, per invariant #2), replacing the delegation to
the dracut nvmf module's discovery connect-all.
Now each host = 1 controller on its own subsystem; versions drain to 0 when their
hosts migrate, so auto-reap works and connections scale O(hosts). Requires a
rebuild + re-sign (cmdline change, invariant #6). BENCH-VERIFY both paths;
confirm the dracut nvmf module isn't also connect-all-ing on the secure path.
CLAUDE.md invariant #2 + TODO #6 updated.
Follow-up to the linux-firmware strip (prev commit put it in the 2d hygiene
block, which runs AFTER the dracut build — so it only shrank the rootfs erofs,
not the initramfs). Move the strip to step 2, before the dracut build: with
--no-hostonly, plymouth's drm dep instmods a broad DRM set and dracut bundles
each module's firmware into the initramfs (amdgpu being the classic UKI
bloater). Trimming first means dracut never sees it, so both the rootfs erofs
AND the UKI initramfs shrink. Keep-list is unchanged (i915 + intel/ + mellanox
+ intel-ucode), so the fleet splash GPU (i915) and ice DDP firmware the
initramfs actually needs are retained; dracut just warns 'firmware not found'
for the removed drm modules and continues.
Add a post-build diagnostic (initramfs .img size + bundled firmware, expected
i915 only) so the initrd win is measured in the build log, not estimated.
The 2b rpm-size manifest revealed the biggest packages aren't the kiosk but
base bloat: linux-firmware 678 MB and glibc-all-langpacks 228 MB (vs chromium
370 + llvm 129). The uncompressed erofs is read over NVMe/TCP on every boot,
so this is fleet-wide dead weight + attack surface.
glibc: swap glibc-all-langpacks (every language) for glibc-minimal-langpack +
glibc-langpack-en. ~220 MB; image is English-only.
linux-firmware: a live fleet audit (modinfo -F firmware over loaded modules +
sysfs/lspci driver bindings on the real 820-class hosts and the VMs) proved the
only firmware any host loads is Intel i915 (GPU). Every NIC is firmware-free
(e1000e reports on-chip NVM, not a fw file; virtio_net loads nothing), so the
catastrophic missing-NIC-firmware case is off the table. Keep i915 + intel/
(ice DDP insurance) + mellanox + intel-ucode; strip the ~600 MB of foreign
vendor blobs (amdgpu/nvidia/radeon/ath/qcom/...). Remove iwl*-firmware (Wi-Fi,
~83 MB) on a wired-only fleet. Strip-in-place since the package can't be
removed without losing i915; du reports the result in the build log.
BENCH-VERIFY: kiosk still renders on the 820 (i915 DMC/GuC load) — the one real
risk; widen the keep-list if any host has a non-Intel GPU or an ice/mlx5 NIC.
Test-path enrolment (rd.dot1x=0) succeeded end-to-end on the Dell 820 — the
hard case that previously found the un-clearable OEM platform NV at 0x01800001
and silently bypassed enrolment every boot. Confirms BOTH the NV-index move
(0x01800001 -> 0x01800100) and the signing-key handle move (EK slot -> 0x81000100)
on a physical TPM, not just the Proxmox swtpm: ensure ECDSA key -> CSR -> broker
fingerprint -> approve -> leaf cert -> NV write all run on the metal.
Mark #11 in-progress ([~]). Still to verify: the enrolled cert authenticating
EAP-TLS on the secure 802.1X/MACsec path (this run was test-mode), and
tpm2_nvreadpublic on other fleet hardware models to confirm 0x01800100 is free
fleet-wide.
Two fixes from the booted-host overlay RAM audit (2026-07-03). The writable
root overlay (systemd.volatile=overlay, tmpfs) held 124.5 MiB of runtime
writes; almost all of it is runtime-regenerated state, not real fs deltas.
1. fapolicyd db_max_size 100 -> 50 (TODO #17). /var/lib/fapolicyd/data.mdb was
100 MiB fully allocated (~80% of the overlay). fapolicyd's LMDB trust DB is
rebuilt at boot onto the overlay, so db_max_size is a fixed RAM reservation.
Sed it to 50 before the fapolicyd-cli --update rebuild. 50 was fapolicyd's
long-time upstream default (covered a full workstation rpmdb), so it has
headroom for this smaller image. Reclaims ~50 MiB.
BENCH-VERIFY (STIG-critical exec guard): boot + kiosk + admin SSH + sudo +
custom-binary exec must work (undersize -> MDB_MAP_FULL bricks exec).
2. .pyc invalidation fix (TODO #16 item 2). erofs -T 0 zeroes mtimes, so
Python thinks every baked .pyc is stale and rewrites it into the overlay at
runtime (wasting RAM + throwing lib_t write/unlink AVCs that flood the SIEM).
Observed trigger: dnf-makecache.timer (~10 min post-boot) re-importing the
dnf Python stack. Fix both ends: (a) compileall --invalidation-mode
unchecked-hash over /usr/lib*/python3.* at the end of 2d (mtime-independent
.pyc, no rewrite, also more reproducible); (b) mask dnf-makecache.timer next
to the existing rhsmcertd mask (removes the trigger). Firewalld enablement
(#16 items 1 & 3) still open.
The kiosk dnf transaction was measured at 229 pkgs / 1.0 GB. Nearly all
of the non-core packages are Recommends: a locked-down single-URL kiosk
never uses flatpak + its ostree/bubblewrap sandbox runtime, tracker-miners
(a filesystem indexer — dead weight and a threat surface), the pipewire/
pulseaudio audio stack, or libproxy-webkitgtk4 -> webkit2gtk3-jsc (an 8.9M
second browser engine dragged into a Chromium kiosk for libproxy's PAC
runner).
Add --setopt=install_weak_deps=False to cut them, and an rpm -qa size
manifest to the build log so the next CI build reports the exact new
footprint (turning 'seems unnecessary' into data for the next trim round:
gstreamer/media codecs, or mesa-dri-drivers if the GPU path is abandoned).
The immovable floor is chromium + chromium-common + llvm-libs (mesa sw-GL)
+ gtk3/adwaita + libicu, all hard deps. BENCH-VERIFY the kiosk still
renders with weak deps off (watch for a missing font or libva).
The Dell 820 kept "finding a cert" and bypassing enrolment despite repeated BIOS
TPM clears. tpm2_nvreadpublic revealed 0x01800001 on that hardware is a FIRMWARE
platform index (platformcreate|policydelete|writelocked, 70 bytes — not our
cert; siblings at 0x01800003/4 + 0x01810000). platformcreate survives TPM2_Clear
and policydelete needs the platform's secret policy, so it's permanent and
unusable by us — the blind check false-positived on it, and enrolment could
never write there anyway. Same class of bug as the EK-handle collision.
Move the NV cert index default 0x01800001 -> 0x01800100 (free on the 820, owner
range, overridable via rd.dot1x.nvindex): cmdline (extract-artifacts.sh),
fleet-enrol -nvindex, the dracut hooks, bench scripts, CLAUDE.md invariant #1,
and design/SSP docs. The signing-key handle (0x81000100) is unchanged.
Harden WriteNVCert: refuse a platformcreate index with a clear "pick a free
owner index via rd.dot1x.nvindex" error instead of a confusing undefine
failure. Regression simtest/TestWriteNVCertRefusesPlatformIndex; NV roundtrip +
ReadNVCert tests moved to 0x01800100. All go tests + packer validate pass.
Captures the decision to re-enable a CONFIGURED firewalld (currently removed),
the required .pyc/-T0 root-cause fix (compileall --unchecked-hash), the 4 STIG
waivers it converts, and the load-bearing NVMe/TCP-survives-firewalld bench gate.
The nvmeof (spdk-target) service carried a versioned bootstrap mount
(type: image, source ${OCI_IMAGE}:${IMAGE_VERSION} -> /artifacts) plus an
IMAGE_VERSION env. Bumping IMAGE_VERSION therefore changed the service config,
so `docker compose up -d` recreated the container -> nvmf_tgt restarted ->
every connected host's NVMe/TCP root dropped at once. That is precisely the
fleet-wide outage the long-lived-target design exists to prevent.
Remove the /artifacts image-volume and IMAGE_VERSION env from nvmeof so its
config no longer depends on the version — compose leaves it running across a
bump. Bootstrap and rolling updates are already fully covered by spdk-loader
(stages the current release into ./spdk/releases and adds it online via
JSON-RPC); spdk-target.sh's seed block is guarded, so it just no-ops when
/artifacts isn't mounted. Verified nvmeof no longer references IMAGE_VERSION
(only spdk-loader does); compose YAML validates.
BENCH-VERIFY: bump IMAGE_VERSION + up -d with a host connected -> nvmeof
container not recreated, host root survives, loader adds the new version.
The enrol trigger keyed on "is NV 0x01800001 defined/readable", so leftover
state (an earlier tpm-provision run — bench-seen on the 820: "cert present —
normal boot" with no real identity) or random bytes (tpm-selftest) silently
suppressed enrolment. Now content-aware:
- tpmkey.ReadNVCert reads the full NV contents (chunked).
- classifyNVCert (TPM-agnostic, unit-tested): parses X.509, checks validity
window, and when a real fleet CA bundle is present verifies the cert chains
to it. Only a valid fleet cert = enrolled.
- New `fleet-enrol -check-only` (no network/no key-gen) exits 0=valid cert,
20=enrol needed, 1=error. The full enrol path uses the same classification
instead of NVPresent.
- The dracut hook calls -check-only as the single gate, replacing the blind
tpm2_nvread (and its now-dead TPM2TOOLS_TCTI export). tpm2_nvread stays in
the initramfs for the secure path (dot1x-macsec-up.sh).
Lab fallback: the shipped radius-ca.pem is a placeholder (not a cert) ->
loadCAPool returns nil -> chain-less "parseable + unexpired" acceptance, so
reboot-converge doesn't loop; production replaces radius-ca.pem with the real
fleet CA for strict chaining.
Tests: classifyNVCert table (valid/expired/garbage/foreign/no-CA) + simtest
ReadNVCert roundtrip across the 512B chunk. All pass; packer validate clean.
Bench (Proxmox vTPM, host cygnus-cruiser-99) confirmed via tpm2_readpublic that
0x81010001 — the handle our design used for the fleet signing key — is the
TCG-standard RSA Endorsement Key slot: the object there is the swtpm-provisioned
EK (restricted|decrypt|adminwithpolicy, RSA-2048/AES128CFB, canonical EK
authPolicy 837197…, EK cert at NV 0x1c00002). Most firmware/swtpm TPMs occupy
that slot, so EnsureKey could never create our key there — it errored reading
the EK as ECC and enrolment died before the CSR/POST.
Move the fleet signing key to 0x81000100, a non-reserved owner persistent
handle (clear of EK 0x81010001/2 and SRK 0x81000001/2). Threaded through:
- fleet-enrol -handle default + new rd.dot1x.handle= cmdline knob (baked by
extract-artifacts.sh, overridable via SMBIOS)
- files/etc/dot1x/wpa_supplicant-dot1x.conf private_key handle
- the dracut hook, bench tpm-provision.sh / tpm-selftest.sh
- CLAUDE.md invariant #1 + design/SSP docs + TODO #11
NV index 0x01800001 (owner range) is unchanged.
EnsureKey hardening: refuse to evict any restricted-decrypt object (EK/SRK) as
a safety net — never clobber the TPM endorsement/storage identity (also
protects the future EK/AK attestation path). Still self-heals a genuine stale
signing key. New regression TestEnsureKeyRefusesToEvictProtectedKey; the
stale-key regression and handle constants moved to 0x81000100.
Design note records the IDevID (0x81020001) option for the later EK/AK
attestation work. Follow-up items logged: content-aware NV presence check
(verify the cert chains to the fleet CA, so leftover/foreign NV can't suppress
enrolment) and a de-enrol/TPM-reset procedure.
Captures the design + quantified STIG payoff (~21 mount/partition rules
notapplicable/waived -> pass, per reports/stig-arf.xml), the writable-set +
noexec/nosuid/nodev flag matrix, the kiosk-/tmp-noexec prerequisite, the
fstab-vs-runtime OVAL note, and that it's bench-gated after TPM enrolment (#11).
Removes the hard no-op on the test path so the enrolment flow can be exercised
on a host with a TPM + a reachable broker WITHOUT standing up 802.1X/MACsec/
RADIUS. Networking is now mode-aware: in test mode ip=dhcp already owns the NIC
(and wrote resolv.conf), so the hook uses the existing lease instead of running
its own nmcli DHCP — avoiding the dracut "address already assigned" race
(CLAUDE.md "don't double-configure the NIC in test mode"). Secure mode still does
the nm-unmanaged override for the pre-auth lease. rd.fleet.enrol=0 disables
enrolment in either mode; production intent stays secure-path-only.
Replaces the shell/openssl-provider host enrolment (a35f2d6) with a static
Go + go-tpm binary, and moves BOTH host Go binaries out of the Packer VM.
fleet-enrol (files/enrol/, Go + go-tpm, no CGO):
- talks to /dev/tpmrm0 DIRECTLY via transport.FromReadWriter(os.File) — no
linuxtpm, so go-tpm is the only dep and there is NO tpm2-tools key-gen /
openssl tpm2 provider / curl in the image (removes the biggest bench risk,
the provider handle: key-ref).
- ensures the ECDSA key @0x81010001, builds the CSR (crypto.Signer over the
TPM key), POSTs CSR+context to the broker, shows the Plymouth fingerprint,
polls /status, writes the leaf cert to NV 0x01800001.
- tpmkey/ is an exported package so the TPM ceremony is tested against the
go-tpm software simulator from a SEPARATE simtest/ module (CGO stays out of
the shipped build). Transaction logic (mock broker) tested in-package.
- deps pinned by go.sum (not vendored): the binary now builds on the CI
runner, which has network — reproducible via pinned Go 1.26.4 + go.sum.
Out-of-VM build (decision): both fleet-enrol AND fleet-hostapi compile in the
CI "Build host Go binaries" step (Go 1.26.4, CGO off, -trimpath) and Packer
FILE-PROVISIONS the static binaries in. Dropped the in-VM `dnf install golang`
+ the 2d removal — the Rocky build image carries no Go toolchain / go-tpm tree.
Wiring:
- tpm-enrol.sh: now a thin GATE (empty-NV check, pre-auth DHCP on en*,
exec /usr/sbin/fleet-enrol, reboot-to-converge). module-setup.sh bundles the
binary (asserted) + reverts the tpm2-openssl/curl installs.
- diskless.pkr.hcl: file provisioners for both binaries; enrol installed to
/usr/sbin before the initramfs build + fapolicyd-trusted; lsinitrd asserts
fleet-enrol; dnf reverted to baseline (no tpm2-openssl/curl).
- gitea-main-ci.yaml: Set up Go + build both binaries + run the simulator
ceremony test, before packer validate.
TESTED here: transaction unit tests + the full TPM ceremony (key-gen -> persist
-> ECDSA sign -> CSR verify -> chunked NV write -> re-enrol) against the go-tpm
simulator. BENCH-VERIFY (real/swtpm, empty owner auth, pre-auth DHCP, Plymouth,
reboot-converge, prod HTTPS) tracked in docs/TODO.md #11.
Builds the host side of TPM identity enrolment — the "inline single-UKI"
vehicle from docs/tpm-enrolment-design.md. A production (secure) UKI now
auto-enrols a fresh host with no client cert, then reboots into the normal
secure path.
New dracut hook files/dracut/95dot1x-macsec/tpm-enrol.sh (initqueue/settled
prio 25, BEFORE dot1x-macsec-up at 30):
- no-op when a cert is already present in NV 0x01800001 (normal boot) or
under rd.dot1x=0 (test path has no trustworthy identity to enrol);
- on EMPTY NV: generate the signing key in the TPM @0x81010001 (openssl tpm2
provider builds the CSR; key never leaves the TPM), pre-auth DHCP on the
PHYSICAL NIC (nmcli re-manages en*, overriding the secure-mode unmanaged
drop-in), POST CSR+context to rd.fleet.enrol_url, show the broker
fingerprint on Plymouth, poll /status, write the issued leaf cert (DER) to
NV, and reboot to converge.
- Empty-NV and the secure path are mutually exclusive, so this never reorders
the load-bearing boot sequence (invariant #2).
Wiring:
- module-setup.sh: require+install the tpm2 key-gen/NV tools, curl, awk, and
the openssl tpm2 PROVIDER (ossl-modules/tpm2.so, asserted present — tpm2-tss
alone can't sign with a handle: key); install the hook.
- diskless.pkr.hcl: install tpm2-openssl + curl; assert hook/tools/provider in
the initramfs (invariant #9). New enrol_url var threaded to extract-artifacts.
- extract-artifacts.sh: bake rd.fleet.enrol_url into the cmdline.
- fleet.script: enrol-active/enrol-wait/enrol-done banner; fingerprint on the
message line (public — states only, invariant #1).
Shell JSON build/parse/cert-extract pipeline (no jq in the initramfs) verified
end-to-end against a live broker. BENCH-VERIFY list in docs/TODO.md #11 (tpm2
provider key-ref on real/swtpm, empty-NV detect, pre-auth DHCP override, Plymouth
render, NV write + reboot convergence, prod HTTPS).
Verifying the step signer against a real step-ca surfaced two real bugs the
mock signer had hidden, plus made the bench CA actually initialise:
- signer.go: move --not-after from `step ca token` (validity caps ~1h ->
"token validity too long") to `step ca sign` (it is the CERT lifetime).
Without this the step signer never issues a cert.
- dot1x-bench compose: DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_PASSWORD_FILE pointed at a file that
does not exist at first init (it is an INPUT path), so `step ca init` failed
and never wrote secrets/password. Use DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_PASSWORD (the value)
which the entrypoint writes to secrets/password, where bootstrap + broker read.
- bootstrap.sh: self-heal the root-owned ./pki Docker auto-creates; detect the
CA password at $STEPPATH/password or secrets/password (varies by image
version); raise authority.claims.maxTLSCertDuration so 720h fleet certs are
allowed (stock cap 24h, which also blocked bootstrap's own RADIUS cert); fix
RADIUS cert paths to write via the /export mount (were host paths run inside
the container, so they never resolved).
- serving stack: add the enrol-broker service (temporary home; nginx already
proxies /enrol/) defaulting to the zero-dependency lab path (mock signer +
insecure loopback admin), with ENROL_* knobs to switch to step + mTLS.
- verify-serving.sh: exercise request -> approve -> cert through the deployed
nginx /enrol/ proxy.
- TODO #11: record the step-signer verification + the two fixes.
Step signer VERIFIED end-to-end against a real step-ca: issued cert chains to
the fleet root, EKU clientAuth, hostnqn derived from serial.
Audiobuzz