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docs/TODO #11: Dell 820 TPM enrolment bench-verified on real hardware

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Test-path enrolment (rd.dot1x=0) succeeded end-to-end on the Dell 820 — the
hard case that previously found the un-clearable OEM platform NV at 0x01800001
and silently bypassed enrolment every boot. Confirms BOTH the NV-index move
(0x01800001 -> 0x01800100) and the signing-key handle move (EK slot -> 0x81000100)
on a physical TPM, not just the Proxmox swtpm: ensure ECDSA key -> CSR -> broker
fingerprint -> approve -> leaf cert -> NV write all run on the metal.

Mark #11 in-progress ([~]). Still to verify: the enrolled cert authenticating
EAP-TLS on the secure 802.1X/MACsec path (this run was test-mode), and
tpm2_nvreadpublic on other fleet hardware models to confirm 0x01800100 is free
fleet-wide.
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Audiobuzz
2026-07-03 04:55:08 +00:00
parent 796dfe9f4e
commit db0bb28ebd
1 changed files with 17 additions and 6 deletions
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@@ -1006,7 +1006,7 @@ reasonable for a controlled fleet; the highest-assurance path is attended/firmwa
or manufacturer pre-provisioning. Default recommendation: **separate provisioning
UKI + isolated VLAN + read-back verify.**
## [ ] 11. (DESIGN) TPM 802.1X identity enrolment (TOFU + OOB fingerprint)
## [~] 11. (DESIGN) TPM 802.1X identity enrolment (TOFU + OOB fingerprint)
**Authoritative design consolidated 2026-06-28:
[tpm-enrolment-design.md](tpm-enrolment-design.md)** — unifies this item with the
@@ -1031,7 +1031,9 @@ approve → cert). **BENCH-VERIFY:** run against real step-ca (`bootstrap.sh` ro
`enrol` provisioner password readable by the broker) and confirm an issued cert
authenticates EAP-TLS.
**HOST SIDE BUILT 2026-07-02 — Go binary (`fleet-enrol`), awaiting bench.**
**HOST SIDE BUILT 2026-07-02 — Go binary (`fleet-enrol`); TEST-PATH ENROLMENT
BENCH-VERIFIED ON REAL HARDWARE (Dell 820, `rd.dot1x=0`, 2026-07-03).** Secure-path
(802.1X/MACsec) enrolment still to verify — see the NV-index bench finding below.
Pivoted from a shell hook to a static **Go + go-tpm** binary (`files/enrol/`):
it talks to `/dev/tpmrm0` DIRECTLY (via `transport.FromReadWriter` on an
`os.File` — no `linuxtpm`, so go-tpm is the only vendored dep), so the enrolment
@@ -1126,7 +1128,7 @@ have their EK there), so enrolment could never create our key.
(+ `tpm2_evictcontrol -C o -c 0x81000100` for a stale *app* key — never the EK), or
BIOS "Clear TPM". Document in the bench README.
**BENCH FINDING 2026-07-03 (FIXED) — NV index `0x01800001` collided with OEM
**BENCH FINDING 2026-07-03 (FIXED + BENCH-VERIFIED) — NV index `0x01800001` collided with OEM
platform NV; moved to `0x01800100`.** The Dell 820 kept "finding a cert" and
bypassing enrolment even after repeated BIOS TPM clears. `tpm2_nvreadpublic`
showed the truth: `0x01800001` on that hardware is a **firmware/platform** index
@@ -1142,9 +1144,18 @@ through the cmdline (`extract-artifacts.sh`), `fleet-enrol -nvindex`, the dracut
hooks, bench scripts, invariant #1, and docs. Also **hardened `WriteNVCert`** to
refuse a `platformcreate` index with a clear "pick a free owner index" error
instead of a confusing undefine failure (regression `simtest/
TestWriteNVCertRefusesPlatformIndex`). **BENCH-VERIFY:** 820 now enrols at
`0x01800100`; and check `tpm2_nvreadpublic` on any OTHER hardware model in the
fleet — if a vendor also squats `0x018001xx`, pick a value free on all of them.
TestWriteNVCertRefusesPlatformIndex`). **BENCH-VERIFIED 2026-07-03 — the Dell 820
enrols end-to-end at `0x01800100`.** First success on REAL TPM hardware (past the
un-clearable OEM platform-NV at `0x01800001`): validates BOTH the NV-index move
AND the `0x81000100` key-handle move on a physical TPM, not just the Proxmox
swtpm — the full host ceremony (ensure ECDSA key → CSR → broker fingerprint →
approve → leaf cert → NV write) runs on the metal. This was the hard case (the
820 previously "found a cert" and silently bypassed enrolment every boot). **STILL
BENCH-VERIFY:** (a) `tpm2_nvreadpublic` on any OTHER hardware model in the fleet —
if a vendor also squats `0x018001xx`, pick a value free on all of them; (b) the
enrolled cert actually **authenticates EAP-TLS on the secure path** (this run was
test-mode `rd.dot1x=0`; 802.1X/MACsec enrolment still unverified — see the
test-mode note above).
**BENCH-VERIFY (host side, before trusting):** (a) go-tpm against a REAL TPM +
swtpm on the target (the simulator proves the ceremony, not the device) — **the