The manager is the ONLY thing that talks to InfluxDB, both directions; hosts hold
no token and never reach it.
- influx.go: influxSink implements MetricsSink — each agent HealthSnapshot is
written as a fleet_health point, identity (serial/hostnqn/starship) as TAGS
from the AUTHENTICATED stream (a host can only write its own series), telemetry
as fields. QueryField answers the SPA's read: a Flux query built with a strict
FIELD WHITELIST + hex-serial guard + parsed-duration range, so no caller input
is interpolated raw (injection-safe). Server-side influxdb-client-go/v2.
- admin.go: GET /api/hosts/{serial}/metrics?field=&range= -> time-series JSON;
503 when InfluxDB isn't wired, 400 on a bad range, 404 for unknown host.
- main.go: sink created when FLEET_MGR_INFLUX_URL+_TOKEN set, fed to the agent
hub; nil -> no-op sink so the manager runs without metrics.
Tests: snapshotPoint tags/fields/time, fluxQuery contents + %q quoting, and
QueryField rejects a non-hex serial + non-whitelisted field. build/test/vet/gofmt
clean. Live InfluxDB path validated in the compose bench (ckpt 6).
fleet-manager — server-side fleet control plane
The management service for the diskless kiosk fleet, and the backend for the
admin SPA. It is the central place to monitor, authorise, and
lifecycle-control enrolled hosts. See
docs/fleet-management-design.md and
docs/tpm-enrolment-design.md §5.
Unlike fleet-hostapi / fleet-enrol (baked into the reproducible verity image,
stdlib-only), this runs server-side as its own container on the management
network, so external deps are fine (grpc-go, influxdb-client-go).
Two mTLS planes (distinct trust anchors)
| Plane | Transport | Verifies | Who | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| admin | HTTPS + mTLS | dedicated admin CA (admin-pki.sh) |
admin browsers | JSON API + SPA (monitor / authorise / lifecycle) |
| agent | gRPC + mTLS | fleet CA (host TPM cert) | enrolled hosts | bidi stream: health/metrics up, desired-state down |
The split is load-bearing: the agent plane uses the host's reused TPM identity
cert (the same one used for 802.1X EAP-TLS and from which the NVMe hostnqn
derives — "one identity, three stages"), while the admin plane uses a separate
CA so an enrolled host can never reach approve/deny/lifecycle. See the identity
discussion in the enrolment design §5.
Monitoring path (no host ever touches InfluxDB)
host agent ──gRPC bidi (mTLS, TPM cert)──▶ fleet-manager ──line protocol──▶ InfluxDB
◀──── desired-state (target ver / kiosk_url / reboot / drain) ──┘ (+ inventory health)
SPA ──GET /api/hosts/{serial}/metrics──▶ fleet-manager ──Flux──▶ InfluxDB ──JSON──▶ SPA renders charts
Hosts hold no InfluxDB credential and never reach it; the manager is the only writer/reader, holding the Influx token server-side. Identity is taken from the mTLS cert (anti-spoofing: a host can only write its own series). Push-only, no inbound host port. Graphs are rendered in the SPA, not Grafana.
Inventory record
Keyed by TPM cert serial (= hostnqn key). Born at enrolment approval, filled by the agent stream and admin action:
Host (cert_serial)
├─ identity : cert_serial, hostnqn, mac, ek_hash, starship_name
├─ binding : asset_tag, switch_port, location (recorded at approval)
├─ enrolled : approver, at, fingerprint
├─ version : image_version, rootfs_digest, kernel (agent-reported)
├─ health : load, cpu, temp, tmpfs%, nvme_root, auth, selinux, chrony, kiosk (latest snapshot; series in InfluxDB)
├─ usage : kiosk_url, session_uptime, chromium_crashes, display
└─ desired : target_version, kiosk_url, reboot_at, drain (SERVER-AUTHORITATIVE)
Persisted as a single JSON file (atomic writes) on a mounted volume — stdlib-only,
inspectable, reproducible; a DB swap is a drop-in behind the Store interface.
API (admin plane)
| Route | Status |
|---|---|
GET /healthz |
✅ ckpt 1 |
GET /api/hosts |
✅ ckpt 1 — fleet overview |
GET /api/hosts/{serial} |
✅ ckpt 1 — host detail |
PUT /api/hosts/{serial}/desired |
✅ ckpt 1 — set desired-state (audited to admin CN) |
GET /api/enrol/pending |
✅ ckpt 3 — proxies the broker queue |
POST /api/enrol/{id}/approve |
✅ ckpt 3 — signs via broker + births inventory (identity/binding/enrolled) |
POST /api/enrol/{id}/deny |
✅ ckpt 3 |
GET /api/hosts/{serial}/metrics?field=&range= |
✅ ckpt 4 — Flux time-series (field whitelist) |
The authorise pillar drives the enrol-broker's admin plane over mTLS (the manager is a service client, gated by the dedicated admin CA) asking for JSON, so an approve returns the decided enrolment; the manager records the human approver (its own admin mTLS CN) and births the inventory record. The broker stays the enrolment state machine + step-ca signer (v1 "alongside" fold-in).
Agent plane — gRPC FleetAgent.Session bidi over mTLS (fleet CA): ✅ ckpt 2.
Hello/HealthSnapshot/CommandResult up; DesiredState/Command down.
Identity is the peer cert serial (never self-asserted); an unenrolled serial is
refused. Desired-state is pushed live on connect + on change, and is durable in
inventory for offline delivery. Metrics writing is behind a MetricsSink
(no-op now; InfluxDB in ckpt 4).
Config (env)
| Var | Default | Notes |
|---|---|---|
FLEET_MGR_ADMIN_ADDR |
127.0.0.1:9500 |
admin listener |
FLEET_MGR_ADMIN_CERT / _KEY |
— | admin server cert/key (mTLS) |
FLEET_MGR_ADMIN_CLIENT_CA |
— | dedicated admin CA (NOT the fleet CA) |
FLEET_MGR_ADMIN_INSECURE |
false |
plaintext, no client-cert — dev only |
FLEET_MGR_AGENT_ADDR |
127.0.0.1:9600 |
gRPC agent listener |
FLEET_MGR_AGENT_CERT / _KEY |
— | agent-plane server cert/key |
FLEET_MGR_AGENT_CLIENT_CA |
— | fleet CA (verifies host TPM certs). Agent plane starts only when all three are set. |
FLEET_MGR_BROKER_URL |
— | enrol-broker admin base URL (e.g. https://127.0.0.1:9443). Authorise pillar enabled only when set. |
FLEET_MGR_BROKER_CLIENT_CERT / _KEY |
— | manager's client cert for the broker admin mTLS (admin CA) |
FLEET_MGR_BROKER_CA |
— | CA that signs the broker's admin server cert |
FLEET_MGR_INFLUX_URL |
— | InfluxDB URL (private mgmt net). Metrics enabled only when URL + token set. |
FLEET_MGR_INFLUX_TOKEN |
— | InfluxDB token — server-side only, never on hosts |
FLEET_MGR_INFLUX_ORG |
fleet |
InfluxDB org |
FLEET_MGR_INFLUX_BUCKET |
fleet_health |
InfluxDB bucket |
FLEET_MGR_INVENTORY |
/var/lib/fleet-manager/inventory.json |
inventory file (mount a volume) |
FLEET_MGR_SEED |
false |
inject demo hosts so the SPA has data — dev only |
HOSTNQN_BASE |
nqn.2026-06.org.example.fleet:host- |
hostnqn prefix (match the broker) |
InfluxDB env lands in checkpoint 4.
Dev run
FLEET_MGR_ADMIN_INSECURE=true FLEET_MGR_SEED=true \
FLEET_MGR_ADMIN_ADDR=127.0.0.1:9500 FLEET_MGR_INVENTORY=/tmp/inv.json \
go run .
curl -s localhost:9500/api/hosts | jq '.hosts[] | {name:.identity.starship_name, run:.version.image_version, want:.desired.target_version, online}'
Build status
- Checkpoint 1 (done): Go skeleton, JSON-file inventory
Store, admin JSON API (monitor + lifecycle), admin mTLS wiring, dev seed. Stdlib-only. - Checkpoint 2 (done): gRPC agent plane — proto contract, mTLS (fleet CA)
server, stream registry, identity-from-cert, snapshot→inventory, live
desired-state push,
MetricsSinkseam. Full mTLS integration test. - Checkpoint 3 (done): authorise pillar — the enrol-broker gained an
Accept-gated JSON approve response (browsers/verify-serving.shunchanged); the manager drives it over mTLS and births the inventory record on approve. httptest-mock-broker test. - Checkpoint 4 (done): InfluxDB metrics gateway — snapshots written as points
tagged with the authenticated identity (
MetricsSink→influxSink), and a read API (/api/hosts/{serial}/metrics) that runs a Flux query with a field whitelist + hex-serial guard (no caller input reaches the query raw). Unit tests for point construction, query building, and unsafe-input rejection. - Next: themed SPA (ckpt 5) → Docker/compose + PKI + docs (ckpt 6).