F-02/P-17 SSH host-cert flow was proven end-to-end on comet-beacon-54
(2026-07-11); these fix the correctness/scoping/cleanup defects the bench
surfaced:
- ssh-hostcert: derive the FQDN principal <hostname>.<domain> from the DHCP
search domain at runtime (resolv.conf), alongside the short hostname, so an
admin `@cert-authority *.<domain>` line accepts by-FQDN logins instead of
"name is not a listed principal". Never baked (invariant #1). + tests.
- ssh-ca-bootstrap.sh: export the SSH host CA public key in OpenSSH wire format
(ssh-keygen -i -m PKCS8), not the PEM/PKCS8 that `step crypto keypair` writes
-- a PEM @cert-authority anchor is unparseable and silently falls back to TOFU.
- ssh-ca-bootstrap.sh: fail loudly (and verify enableSSHCA=true) if the
provisioner SSH-enable step fails, instead of swallowing it and shipping a CA
that 502s every runtime sign.
- dot1x-bench: point the co-located broker at https://localhost:8443, not the
fleet dnsmasq name ca.fleet.lab (unresolvable from the broker's host netns ->
"no such host" at sign time). localhost is in the CA cert SAN.
- serving: remove the mock-signer enrol-broker copy -- two host-networked
brokers collide on 9090/9443 and the mock issued untrusted certs. The real
broker lives with step-ca (dot1x-bench); nginx /enrol/ still proxies to it on
loopback.
- enrol-broker: retire the HTML admin console; the fleet-manager passkey SPA now
drives the mTLS JSON API (/pending, /approve|deny). Removes a weaker,
client-cert-only parallel human-approve path.
Design-doc bench note deferred: docs/ssh-host-certificate-design.md lives on the
secure-ntp branch (fbb8100), not here -- to be added there / on reconcile.
153 lines
7.4 KiB
Bash
Executable File
153 lines
7.4 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# ssh-ca-bootstrap.sh — enable the fleet SSH host CA so booted hosts can get their
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# per-boot SSH HOST key signed VIA THE ENROL-BROKER (files/ssh-hostcert →
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# fleet-ssh-hostcert → broker host plane → step-ca), killing per-boot TOFU
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# (F-02 / POA&M P-17). Run ONCE after bootstrap.sh, from serving/dot1x-bench/.
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# Pairs with docs/ssh-host-certificate-design.md.
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#
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# 1. enable step-ca's SSH CA (generate host+user CA keys; add the ssh block)
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# 2. enable SSH host-cert issuance on the existing 'enrol' JWK provisioner
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# (the broker already authenticates to step-ca with it)
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# 3. issue the broker HOST-PLANE server cert (fleet-signed; the booted host
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# verifies it against radius-ca.pem) + a root+intermediate client-CA bundle
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# (verifies the host's TPM identity cert)
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# 4. export the SSH HOST CA public key (-> the admin @cert-authority line)
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#
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# The signing path is BROKER-mediated: step-ca stays behind the single front door;
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# hosts never reach it directly. `step` runs INSIDE the CA container. Flags vary
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# across step / step-ca versions — this is a BENCH-VERIFY scaffold. Reads .env.
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set -euo pipefail
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cd "$(dirname "$0")/.."
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[ -f .env ] && . ./.env
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CA_DNS=${CA_DNS:-ca.fleet.lab}
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CA_PORT=${CA_PORT:-8443}
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CA_CONNECT=${CA_CONNECT:-localhost}
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CA_URL="https://${CA_CONNECT}:${CA_PORT}"
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PKI=pki
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PROVISIONER=${PROVISIONER:-enrol}
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# The DNS name booted hosts dial for the broker host plane (must be in the server
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# cert SAN and resolve via the fleet dnsmasq). Reuses boot.fleet.lab by default.
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HOST_PLANE_CN=${HOST_PLANE_CN:-boot.fleet.lab}
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PW="$PKI/stepca/password"
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[ -e "$PW" ] || { [ -e "$PKI/stepca/secrets/password" ] && PW="$PKI/stepca/secrets/password"; }
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[ -r "$PW" ] || { echo "ERROR: CA password $PW missing — run bootstrap.sh first." >&2; exit 1; }
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CONTAINER_PW="/home/step/${PW#"$PKI/stepca/"}"
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step() { docker compose exec -T step-ca step "$@"; }
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incca() { docker compose exec -T step-ca "$@"; }
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CA_JSON="$PKI/stepca/config/ca.json"
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[ -f "$CA_JSON" ] || { echo "ERROR: $CA_JSON not found — is step-ca up?" >&2; exit 1; }
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restart_ca() {
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docker compose restart step-ca >/dev/null
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for _ in $(seq 1 50); do curl -fsS -k "$CA_URL/health" >/dev/null 2>&1 && break; sleep 0.2; done
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}
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# --- 1. SSH CA keys + ca.json ssh block -------------------------------------
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# step-ca signs SSH certs with dedicated SSH CA keys (separate from the X.509
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# root). `step ca init --ssh` creates them at init; to add them to an already-
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# initialised CA we generate two EC keypairs and reference them in ca.json.ssh.
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# BENCH-VERIFY: key format/password expectations vary by version.
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echo "==> generating SSH host/user CA keys (if absent)"
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for kind in host user; do
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if ! incca test -f "/home/step/secrets/ssh_${kind}_ca_key"; then
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incca step crypto keypair \
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"/home/step/secrets/ssh_${kind}_ca_key.pub" \
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"/home/step/secrets/ssh_${kind}_ca_key" \
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--kty EC --curve P-256 --no-password --insecure --force
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fi
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done
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echo "==> patching ca.json ssh block (idempotent)"
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if python3 - "$CA_JSON" <<'PY'
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import json,sys
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p=sys.argv[1]
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c=json.load(open(p))
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want={"hostKey":"/home/step/secrets/ssh_host_ca_key",
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"userKey":"/home/step/secrets/ssh_user_ca_key"}
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if c.get("ssh")==want: sys.exit(1) # already set — no restart needed
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c["ssh"]=want
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json.dump(c,open(p,"w"),indent=2)
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PY
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then
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echo " ssh block added; restarting step-ca"; restart_ca
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else
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echo " ssh block already present"
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fi
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# --- 2. enable SSH host certs on the 'enrol' provisioner ---------------------
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# The broker authenticates to step-ca with this JWK provisioner (signer.go). It
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# must be allowed to issue SSH HOST certs. BENCH-VERIFY the exact subcommand/flag
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# on your step version (some use `provisioner update <name> --ssh`).
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echo "==> enabling SSH host-cert issuance on provisioner '${PROVISIONER}'"
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# FAIL LOUDLY: a swallowed failure here leaves enableSSHCA=false, and every
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# `step ssh certificate` at runtime dies with a 502 whose cause the operator
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# can't see (bench 2026-07-11). If your `step` uses a different flag, fix it and
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# re-run rather than shipping a half-configured CA.
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if ! incca step ca provisioner update "${PROVISIONER}" --ssh; then
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echo "ERROR: 'step ca provisioner update ${PROVISIONER} --ssh' failed. Your step" >&2
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echo " version may use a different flag — check: step ca provisioner update --help" >&2
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echo " Aborting so SSH host-cert signing isn't silently left disabled." >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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restart_ca
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# Verify it actually took — the CA only issues SSH host certs if enableSSHCA=true.
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if ! python3 - "$CA_JSON" "$PROVISIONER" <<'PY'
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import json,sys
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c=json.load(open(sys.argv[1])); name=sys.argv[2]
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for p in c["authority"]["provisioners"]:
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if p.get("name")==name and p.get("claims",{}).get("enableSSHCA") is True:
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sys.exit(0)
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sys.exit(1)
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PY
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then
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echo "ERROR: provisioner '${PROVISIONER}' still not SSH-enabled (enableSSHCA != true)" >&2
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echo " after the update + restart. SSH host-cert signing would fail at runtime; aborting." >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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echo " SSH host-cert issuance enabled on '${PROVISIONER}' (enableSSHCA=true)."
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# --- 3. broker host-plane server cert + fleet client-CA bundle --------------
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# The host plane is mTLS: its SERVER cert must be FLEET-signed (the booted host
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# verifies it against radius-ca.pem), and its CLIENT CA must verify the host's
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# TPM identity leaf (root + intermediate).
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echo "==> issuing broker host-plane server cert (CN ${HOST_PLANE_CN})"
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incca mkdir -p /export/broker
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step ca certificate "${HOST_PLANE_CN}" \
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/export/broker/host-server.crt /export/broker/host-server.key \
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--ca-url "$CA_URL" --root /export/root_ca.crt \
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--provisioner "${PROVISIONER}" --provisioner-password-file "$CONTAINER_PW" \
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--not-after 2160h --force
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echo "==> building fleet client-CA bundle (root + intermediate) -> $PKI/broker/fleet-client-ca.crt"
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mkdir -p "$PKI/broker"
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cat "$PKI/root_ca.crt" > "$PKI/broker/fleet-client-ca.crt"
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[ -f "$PKI/intermediate_ca.crt" ] && cat "$PKI/intermediate_ca.crt" >> "$PKI/broker/fleet-client-ca.crt"
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# --- 4. export the SSH host CA public key (admin trust anchor) ---------------
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# `step crypto keypair` writes the public key in PEM/PKCS8, but a known_hosts
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# `@cert-authority` line needs the single-line OpenSSH wire format
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# (`ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAA…`). Emitting the PEM verbatim yields an unparseable
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# anchor → ssh silently falls back to TOFU (bench 2026-07-11). Convert it.
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echo "==> exporting SSH host CA public key (OpenSSH format) -> $PKI/ssh_host_ca.pub"
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incca cp /home/step/secrets/ssh_host_ca_key.pub /export/ssh_host_ca_key.pem
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command -v ssh-keygen >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
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echo "ERROR: ssh-keygen not found — cannot convert the CA key to OpenSSH format." >&2
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echo " Install openssh-clients; the raw PKCS8 key is at $PKI/ssh_host_ca_key.pem." >&2
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exit 1
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}
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ssh-keygen -i -m PKCS8 -f "$PKI/ssh_host_ca_key.pem" > "$PKI/ssh_host_ca.pub"
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rm -f "$PKI/ssh_host_ca_key.pem"
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echo
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echo "Admin rollout — add ONE line to each admin's ~/.ssh/known_hosts (or a system"
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echo "known_hosts), so every fleet host is trusted via the CA instead of TOFU:"
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echo
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echo " @cert-authority *.${CA_DNS#ca.} $(cat "$PKI/ssh_host_ca.pub" 2>/dev/null || echo '<contents of pki/ssh_host_ca.pub>')"
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echo
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echo "Then enable the broker host plane (dot1x-bench compose already wires"
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echo "BROKER_HOST_ADDR + the certs issued above) and rebuild the secure-path image."
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echo "On a booted+enrolled host, ssh-hostcert.timer POSTs its host key to the broker"
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echo "and installs /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key-cert.pub."
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