Audiobuzz
4d6f038e3c
Bench (Proxmox vTPM, host cygnus-cruiser-99) confirmed via tpm2_readpublic that
0x81010001 — the handle our design used for the fleet signing key — is the
TCG-standard RSA Endorsement Key slot: the object there is the swtpm-provisioned
EK (restricted|decrypt|adminwithpolicy, RSA-2048/AES128CFB, canonical EK
authPolicy 837197…, EK cert at NV 0x1c00002). Most firmware/swtpm TPMs occupy
that slot, so EnsureKey could never create our key there — it errored reading
the EK as ECC and enrolment died before the CSR/POST.
Move the fleet signing key to 0x81000100, a non-reserved owner persistent
handle (clear of EK 0x81010001/2 and SRK 0x81000001/2). Threaded through:
- fleet-enrol -handle default + new rd.dot1x.handle= cmdline knob (baked by
extract-artifacts.sh, overridable via SMBIOS)
- files/etc/dot1x/wpa_supplicant-dot1x.conf private_key handle
- the dracut hook, bench tpm-provision.sh / tpm-selftest.sh
- CLAUDE.md invariant #1 + design/SSP docs + TODO #11
NV index 0x01800001 (owner range) is unchanged.
EnsureKey hardening: refuse to evict any restricted-decrypt object (EK/SRK) as
a safety net — never clobber the TPM endorsement/storage identity (also
protects the future EK/AK attestation path). Still self-heals a genuine stale
signing key. New regression TestEnsureKeyRefusesToEvictProtectedKey; the
stale-key regression and handle constants moved to 0x81000100.
Design note records the IDevID (0x81020001) option for the later EK/AK
attestation work. Follow-up items logged: content-aware NV presence check
(verify the cert chains to the fleet CA, so leftover/foreign NV can't suppress
enrolment) and a de-enrol/TPM-reset procedure.
130 lines
5.8 KiB
Bash
Executable File
130 lines
5.8 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# tpm-selftest.sh — non-destructive check that a workstation's TPM can do
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# everything the secure path needs, BEFORE turning on disable_dot1x=false.
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#
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# Run as root on a booted workstation (the open-port test image is fine — it
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# ships the same tooling). Uses SCRATCH handle/NV and cleans them up, so it never
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# touches the real 0x81000100 / 0x01800001. Pass --use-real-handles to exercise
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# the actual locations instead (still cleaned up unless --keep).
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#
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# It validates, in order:
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# 1. TPM present + tpm2-tools work
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# 2. persistent key create + evict (needed to put the EAP-TLS key at the handle)
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# 3. NV define/write/read roundtrip (the cert store the boot hook reads)
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# 4. an OpenSSL TPM2 provider/engine exists <-- the usual missing piece
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# 5. a CSR + signature USING the TPM key (proves EAP-TLS client auth can work)
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# 6. wpa_supplicant build info (macsec driver present?)
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set -u
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USE_REAL=0; KEEP=0
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for a in "$@"; do case "$a" in
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--use-real-handles) USE_REAL=1 ;;
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--keep) KEEP=1 ;;
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*) echo "usage: tpm-selftest.sh [--use-real-handles] [--keep]" >&2; exit 2 ;;
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esac; done
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export TPM2TOOLS_TCTI="${TPM2TOOLS_TCTI:-device:/dev/tpmrm0}"
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if [ "$USE_REAL" = 1 ]; then HANDLE=0x81000100; NV=0x01800001
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else HANDLE=0x81008000; NV=0x01500000; fi
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WORK=$(mktemp -d); PASS=0; FAIL=0; SKIP=0
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ok() { printf ' \033[32mPASS\033[0m %s\n' "$1"; PASS=$((PASS+1)); }
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no() { printf ' \033[31mFAIL\033[0m %s\n' "$1"; FAIL=$((FAIL+1)); }
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skip() { printf ' \033[33mSKIP\033[0m %s\n' "$1"; SKIP=$((SKIP+1)); }
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# shellcheck disable=SC2329 # invoked indirectly via trap
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cleanup() {
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[ "$KEEP" = 1 ] && { echo "(--keep: leaving $HANDLE / $NV / $WORK in place)"; return; }
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tpm2_evictcontrol -C o -c "$HANDLE" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
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tpm2_nvundefine "$NV" -C o >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
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rm -rf "$WORK"
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}
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trap cleanup EXIT
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echo "== TPM self-test (handle=$HANDLE nv=$NV) =="
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# --- 1. TPM present ---------------------------------------------------------
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if [ -c /dev/tpmrm0 ] || [ -c /dev/tpm0 ]; then ok "TPM device present"; else
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no "no /dev/tpmrm0 or /dev/tpm0 — VM needs a vTPM (qm set <id> --tpmstate0 <stor>:1,version=v2.0)"
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echo; echo "Cannot continue without a TPM."; exit 1
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fi
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if command -v tpm2_getcap >/dev/null && tpm2_getcap properties-fixed >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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ok "tpm2-tools talk to the TPM"
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else
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no "tpm2-tools / TPM access failed"; exit 1
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fi
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# pre-clean the scratch locations in case a previous run aborted
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tpm2_evictcontrol -C o -c "$HANDLE" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
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tpm2_nvundefine "$NV" -C o >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
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# --- 2. persistent signing key ----------------------------------------------
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if tpm2_createprimary -C o -G ecc -g sha256 -c "$WORK/prim.ctx" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
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&& tpm2_create -C "$WORK/prim.ctx" -G ecc256:ecdsa-sha256 -u "$WORK/k.pub" -r "$WORK/k.priv" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
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&& tpm2_load -C "$WORK/prim.ctx" -u "$WORK/k.pub" -r "$WORK/k.priv" -c "$WORK/k.ctx" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
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&& tpm2_evictcontrol -C o -c "$WORK/k.ctx" "$HANDLE" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
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&& tpm2_readpublic -c "$HANDLE" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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ok "created + persisted an ECC signing key at $HANDLE"
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else
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no "could not create/persist a key at $HANDLE"
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fi
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# --- 3. NV roundtrip (the cert store the boot hook reads) -------------------
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echo "fleet-tpm-selftest-$(date +%s 2>/dev/null || echo x)" > "$WORK/blob"
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SZ=$(stat -c%s "$WORK/blob")
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if tpm2_nvdefine "$NV" -C o -s "$SZ" -a 'ownerread|ownerwrite|authread|authwrite' >/dev/null 2>&1 \
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&& tpm2_nvwrite "$NV" -C o -i "$WORK/blob" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
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&& tpm2_nvread "$NV" -C o -o "$WORK/blob.out" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
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&& cmp -s "$WORK/blob" "$WORK/blob.out"; then
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ok "NV define/write/read roundtrip at $NV (matches what the boot hook does)"
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else
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no "NV roundtrip at $NV failed"
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fi
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# --- 4. OpenSSL TPM2 provider / engine --------------------------------------
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TPM_OSSL=""
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if openssl list -providers 2>/dev/null | grep -qi tpm2; then
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TPM_OSSL=provider; ok "OpenSSL TPM2 PROVIDER present (tpm2-openssl)"
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elif openssl engine -t tpm2tss 2>/dev/null | grep -qi available; then
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TPM_OSSL=engine; ok "OpenSSL TPM2 ENGINE present (tpm2-tss-engine)"
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else
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no "no OpenSSL TPM2 provider OR engine — install 'tpm2-openssl' (provider) in the image"
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echo " (this is the likely gap: tpm2-tss alone does NOT give openssl TPM access)"
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fi
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# --- 5. CSR + signature USING the TPM key (the EAP-TLS make-or-break) --------
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if [ -n "$TPM_OSSL" ]; then
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CSR_OK=1
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if [ "$TPM_OSSL" = provider ]; then
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openssl req -new -provider tpm2 -provider default -key "handle:$HANDLE" \
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-subj "/O=fleet/CN=tpm-selftest" -out "$WORK/test.csr" >/dev/null 2>&1 || CSR_OK=0
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else
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openssl req -new -engine tpm2tss -keyform engine -key "$HANDLE" \
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-subj "/O=fleet/CN=tpm-selftest" -out "$WORK/test.csr" >/dev/null 2>&1 || CSR_OK=0
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fi
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if [ "$CSR_OK" = 1 ] && openssl req -in "$WORK/test.csr" -verify -noout >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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ok "built + self-verified a CSR signed BY the TPM key ($TPM_OSSL) — EAP-TLS can use it"
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else
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no "openssl could not sign a CSR with the TPM key via the $TPM_OSSL"
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echo " -> the key reference method in wpa_supplicant-dot1x.conf needs adjusting"
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fi
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else
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skip "CSR/sign test (no openssl TPM integration to test with)"
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fi
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# --- 6. wpa_supplicant build info -------------------------------------------
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if command -v wpa_supplicant >/dev/null; then
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V=$(wpa_supplicant -v 2>&1 | head -1)
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ok "wpa_supplicant present: $V"
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echo " NOTE: confirm it was built with macsec_linux + the matching TPM key"
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echo " backend; full EAP-TLS/MKA can only be proven against the authenticator."
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else
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no "wpa_supplicant not found"
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fi
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echo
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echo "== summary: $PASS pass, $FAIL fail, $SKIP skip =="
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[ "$FAIL" = 0 ] && echo "TPM half looks ready — proceed to the authenticator/RADIUS bench." \
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|| echo "Fix the FAILs above before enabling disable_dot1x=false."
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exit "$FAIL"
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