Files
diskless-workstation/files/enrol/main.go
T
Audiobuzz 4d6f038e3c tpm-enrol: move signing key off the EK slot 0x81010001 → 0x81000100
Bench (Proxmox vTPM, host cygnus-cruiser-99) confirmed via tpm2_readpublic that
0x81010001 — the handle our design used for the fleet signing key — is the
TCG-standard RSA Endorsement Key slot: the object there is the swtpm-provisioned
EK (restricted|decrypt|adminwithpolicy, RSA-2048/AES128CFB, canonical EK
authPolicy 837197…, EK cert at NV 0x1c00002). Most firmware/swtpm TPMs occupy
that slot, so EnsureKey could never create our key there — it errored reading
the EK as ECC and enrolment died before the CSR/POST.

Move the fleet signing key to 0x81000100, a non-reserved owner persistent
handle (clear of EK 0x81010001/2 and SRK 0x81000001/2). Threaded through:
  - fleet-enrol -handle default + new rd.dot1x.handle= cmdline knob (baked by
    extract-artifacts.sh, overridable via SMBIOS)
  - files/etc/dot1x/wpa_supplicant-dot1x.conf private_key handle
  - the dracut hook, bench tpm-provision.sh / tpm-selftest.sh
  - CLAUDE.md invariant #1 + design/SSP docs + TODO #11
NV index 0x01800001 (owner range) is unchanged.

EnsureKey hardening: refuse to evict any restricted-decrypt object (EK/SRK) as
a safety net — never clobber the TPM endorsement/storage identity (also
protects the future EK/AK attestation path). Still self-heals a genuine stale
signing key. New regression TestEnsureKeyRefusesToEvictProtectedKey; the
stale-key regression and handle constants moved to 0x81000100.

Design note records the IDevID (0x81020001) option for the later EK/AK
attestation work. Follow-up items logged: content-aware NV presence check
(verify the cert chains to the fleet CA, so leftover/foreign NV can't suppress
enrolment) and a de-enrol/TPM-reset procedure.
2026-07-02 12:19:59 +00:00

189 lines
6.2 KiB
Go

// fleet-enrol — inline empty-NV first-boot TPM enrolment client.
//
// Invoked from the dracut hook (95dot1x-macsec/tpm-enrol.sh) ONLY when the
// secure build boots a host whose TPM NV 0x01800001 is empty. It:
// 1. ensures an ECDSA signing key exists at a non-reserved owner handle
// (default 0x81000100 — deliberately NOT the EK slot 0x81010001),
// 2. builds a CSR with it (key never leaves the TPM),
// 3. submits CSR + device context to the enrolment broker, shows the returned
// fingerprint on the Plymouth splash, and polls until an admin approves,
// 4. writes the issued cert (DER) to NV 0x01800001.
//
// The hook then reboots into the normal secure path. Everything host-specific
// (key, cert, hostnqn) is created here at runtime — nothing is baked (invariant #1).
//
// Exit codes: 0 = enrolled (cert written to NV; caller should reboot);
//
// 10 = cert already present (normal boot — caller proceeds);
// 1 = failure (caller leaves NV empty -> boot fails -> emergency).
package main
import (
"context"
"crypto/x509"
"flag"
"fmt"
"log"
"os"
"os/exec"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"fleet-enrol/tpmkey"
"github.com/google/go-tpm/tpm2"
"github.com/google/go-tpm/tpm2/transport"
)
const exitAlreadyEnrolled = 10
func main() {
var (
url = flag.String("url", "http://boot.fleet.lab/enrol", "enrolment broker base URL")
tpmPath = flag.String("tpm", "/dev/tpmrm0", "TPM device path")
nvHex = flag.String("nvindex", "0x01800001", "TPM NV index for the client cert")
handleHex = flag.String("handle", "0x81000100", "TPM persistent handle for the signing key (non-reserved owner handle; NOT the EK slot 0x81010001)")
cn = flag.String("cn", "fleet-host", "CSR CommonName (generic; identity is the cert serial)")
iface = flag.String("iface", "", "network interface for the device-context MAC")
caFile = flag.String("cacert", "/etc/dot1x/radius-ca.pem", "CA bundle for an https broker URL")
waitFor = flag.Duration("timeout", 30*time.Minute, "max wait for admin approval")
pollEvery = flag.Duration("poll", 5*time.Second, "status poll interval")
)
flag.Parse()
log.SetFlags(0)
log.SetPrefix("fleet-enrol: ")
nvIndex, err := parseHandle(*nvHex)
if err != nil {
log.Fatalf("bad -nvindex %q: %v", *nvHex, err)
}
keyHandle, err := parseHandle(*handleHex)
if err != nil {
log.Fatalf("bad -handle %q: %v", *handleHex, err)
}
// /dev/tpmrm0 (the kernel TPM resource manager) is a simple command/response
// char device: write one command, read one complete response. Wrapping the
// *os.File with transport.FromReadWriter (as the simulator tests do) avoids
// the linuxtpm transport and its golang.org/x/sys dependency, keeping the
// vendored, reproducible initramfs binary tiny (go-tpm only).
f, err := os.OpenFile(*tpmPath, os.O_RDWR, 0)
if err != nil {
log.Fatalf("open TPM %s: %v", *tpmPath, err)
}
defer f.Close()
tpm := transport.FromReadWriter(f)
// Already enrolled? Then this is a normal boot; let the secure path run.
if tpmkey.NVPresent(tpm, nvIndex) {
log.Printf("cert already present at NV %s — normal boot", *nvHex)
os.Exit(exitAlreadyEnrolled)
}
ply("enrol-active")
plyMsg("TPM enrolment: contacting fleet…")
signer, created, err := tpmkey.EnsureKey(tpm, keyHandle)
if err != nil {
plyMsg("TPM enrolment FAILED (key)")
log.Fatalf("ensure key at %s: %v", *handleHex, err)
}
if created {
log.Printf("created persistent signing key at %s", *handleHex)
} else {
log.Printf("reusing persistent signing key at %s", *handleHex)
}
csrPEM, err := buildCSR(signer, *cn)
if err != nil {
plyMsg("TPM enrolment FAILED (CSR)")
log.Fatalf("build CSR: %v", err)
}
client, err := newBrokerClient(*url, *caFile)
if err != nil {
log.Fatalf("broker client: %v", err)
}
dctx := gatherContext(*iface)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), *waitFor)
defer cancel()
log.Printf("submitting CSR to %s (waiting up to %s for approval)", *url, *waitFor)
st, err := enrol(ctx, client, csrPEM, dctx, *pollEvery, func(fp string) {
ply("enrol-wait")
plyMsg("APPROVE THIS DEVICE — code: " + fp)
log.Printf("fingerprint: %s", fp)
})
if err != nil {
plyMsg("TPM enrolment FAILED — reboot to retry")
log.Fatalf("enrolment: %v", err)
}
der, err := leafDER(st.Cert)
if err != nil {
plyMsg("TPM enrolment FAILED (bad cert)")
log.Fatalf("issued cert: %v", err)
}
if err := tpmkey.WriteNVCert(tpm, nvIndex, der); err != nil {
plyMsg("TPM enrolment FAILED (NV write)")
log.Fatalf("write cert to NV %s: %v (TPM owner auth?)", *nvHex, err)
}
ply("enrol-done")
plyMsg("Enrolment complete — rebooting")
log.Printf("ENROLLED: hostnqn %s (serial %s); cert written to NV %s",
st.Hostnqn, st.CertSerial, *nvHex)
// The caller (dracut hook) reboots into the secure path.
os.Exit(0)
}
func parseHandle(s string) (tpm2.TPMHandle, error) {
v, err := strconv.ParseUint(strings.TrimPrefix(strings.ToLower(s), "0x"), 16, 32)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return tpm2.TPMHandle(v), nil
}
func newBrokerClient(url, caFile string) (*brokerClient, error) {
c := &brokerClient{baseURL: strings.TrimRight(url, "/"), http: httpClient(nil)}
if strings.HasPrefix(url, "https:") {
pem, err := os.ReadFile(caFile)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read CA %s: %w", caFile, err)
}
pool := x509.NewCertPool()
if !pool.AppendCertsFromPEM(pem) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no certs in %s", caFile)
}
c.http = httpClient(pool)
}
return c, nil
}
// gatherContext collects advisory device context for the admin to recognise the
// device. Best-effort — every field is optional.
func gatherContext(iface string) deviceContext {
d := deviceContext{
DMIUUID: strings.TrimSpace(readFile("/sys/class/dmi/id/product_uuid")),
DMISerial: strings.TrimSpace(readFile("/sys/class/dmi/id/product_serial")),
}
if iface != "" {
d.MAC = strings.TrimSpace(readFile("/sys/class/net/" + iface + "/address"))
}
return d
}
func readFile(p string) string {
b, err := os.ReadFile(p)
if err != nil {
return ""
}
return string(b)
}
// Plymouth best-effort splash updates (states only; the fingerprint is public).
func ply(status string) { _ = exec.Command("plymouth", "update", "--status="+status).Run() }
func plyMsg(text string) { _ = exec.Command("plymouth", "message", "--text="+text).Run() }