#!/usr/bin/env bash # tpm-selftest.sh — non-destructive check that a workstation's TPM can do # everything the secure path needs, BEFORE turning on disable_dot1x=false. # # Run as root on a booted workstation (the open-port test image is fine — it # ships the same tooling). Uses SCRATCH handle/NV and cleans them up, so it never # touches the real 0x81010001 / 0x01800001. Pass --use-real-handles to exercise # the actual locations instead (still cleaned up unless --keep). # # It validates, in order: # 1. TPM present + tpm2-tools work # 2. persistent key create + evict (needed to put the EAP-TLS key at the handle) # 3. NV define/write/read roundtrip (the cert store the boot hook reads) # 4. an OpenSSL TPM2 provider/engine exists <-- the usual missing piece # 5. a CSR + signature USING the TPM key (proves EAP-TLS client auth can work) # 6. wpa_supplicant build info (macsec driver present?) set -u USE_REAL=0; KEEP=0 for a in "$@"; do case "$a" in --use-real-handles) USE_REAL=1 ;; --keep) KEEP=1 ;; *) echo "usage: tpm-selftest.sh [--use-real-handles] [--keep]" >&2; exit 2 ;; esac; done export TPM2TOOLS_TCTI="${TPM2TOOLS_TCTI:-device:/dev/tpmrm0}" if [ "$USE_REAL" = 1 ]; then HANDLE=0x81010001; NV=0x01800001 else HANDLE=0x81008000; NV=0x01500000; fi WORK=$(mktemp -d); PASS=0; FAIL=0; SKIP=0 ok() { printf ' \033[32mPASS\033[0m %s\n' "$1"; PASS=$((PASS+1)); } no() { printf ' \033[31mFAIL\033[0m %s\n' "$1"; FAIL=$((FAIL+1)); } skip() { printf ' \033[33mSKIP\033[0m %s\n' "$1"; SKIP=$((SKIP+1)); } # shellcheck disable=SC2329 # invoked indirectly via trap cleanup() { [ "$KEEP" = 1 ] && { echo "(--keep: leaving $HANDLE / $NV / $WORK in place)"; return; } tpm2_evictcontrol -C o -c "$HANDLE" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true tpm2_nvundefine "$NV" -C o >/dev/null 2>&1 || true rm -rf "$WORK" } trap cleanup EXIT echo "== TPM self-test (handle=$HANDLE nv=$NV) ==" # --- 1. TPM present --------------------------------------------------------- if [ -c /dev/tpmrm0 ] || [ -c /dev/tpm0 ]; then ok "TPM device present"; else no "no /dev/tpmrm0 or /dev/tpm0 — VM needs a vTPM (qm set --tpmstate0 :1,version=v2.0)" echo; echo "Cannot continue without a TPM."; exit 1 fi if command -v tpm2_getcap >/dev/null && tpm2_getcap properties-fixed >/dev/null 2>&1; then ok "tpm2-tools talk to the TPM" else no "tpm2-tools / TPM access failed"; exit 1 fi # pre-clean the scratch locations in case a previous run aborted tpm2_evictcontrol -C o -c "$HANDLE" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true tpm2_nvundefine "$NV" -C o >/dev/null 2>&1 || true # --- 2. persistent signing key ---------------------------------------------- if tpm2_createprimary -C o -G ecc -g sha256 -c "$WORK/prim.ctx" >/dev/null 2>&1 \ && tpm2_create -C "$WORK/prim.ctx" -G ecc256:ecdsa-sha256 -u "$WORK/k.pub" -r "$WORK/k.priv" >/dev/null 2>&1 \ && tpm2_load -C "$WORK/prim.ctx" -u "$WORK/k.pub" -r "$WORK/k.priv" -c "$WORK/k.ctx" >/dev/null 2>&1 \ && tpm2_evictcontrol -C o -c "$WORK/k.ctx" "$HANDLE" >/dev/null 2>&1 \ && tpm2_readpublic -c "$HANDLE" >/dev/null 2>&1; then ok "created + persisted an ECC signing key at $HANDLE" else no "could not create/persist a key at $HANDLE" fi # --- 3. NV roundtrip (the cert store the boot hook reads) ------------------- echo "fleet-tpm-selftest-$(date +%s 2>/dev/null || echo x)" > "$WORK/blob" SZ=$(stat -c%s "$WORK/blob") if tpm2_nvdefine "$NV" -C o -s "$SZ" -a 'ownerread|ownerwrite|authread|authwrite' >/dev/null 2>&1 \ && tpm2_nvwrite "$NV" -C o -i "$WORK/blob" >/dev/null 2>&1 \ && tpm2_nvread "$NV" -C o -o "$WORK/blob.out" >/dev/null 2>&1 \ && cmp -s "$WORK/blob" "$WORK/blob.out"; then ok "NV define/write/read roundtrip at $NV (matches what the boot hook does)" else no "NV roundtrip at $NV failed" fi # --- 4. OpenSSL TPM2 provider / engine -------------------------------------- TPM_OSSL="" if openssl list -providers 2>/dev/null | grep -qi tpm2; then TPM_OSSL=provider; ok "OpenSSL TPM2 PROVIDER present (tpm2-openssl)" elif openssl engine -t tpm2tss 2>/dev/null | grep -qi available; then TPM_OSSL=engine; ok "OpenSSL TPM2 ENGINE present (tpm2-tss-engine)" else no "no OpenSSL TPM2 provider OR engine — install 'tpm2-openssl' (provider) in the image" echo " (this is the likely gap: tpm2-tss alone does NOT give openssl TPM access)" fi # --- 5. CSR + signature USING the TPM key (the EAP-TLS make-or-break) -------- if [ -n "$TPM_OSSL" ]; then CSR_OK=1 if [ "$TPM_OSSL" = provider ]; then openssl req -new -provider tpm2 -provider default -key "handle:$HANDLE" \ -subj "/O=fleet/CN=tpm-selftest" -out "$WORK/test.csr" >/dev/null 2>&1 || CSR_OK=0 else openssl req -new -engine tpm2tss -keyform engine -key "$HANDLE" \ -subj "/O=fleet/CN=tpm-selftest" -out "$WORK/test.csr" >/dev/null 2>&1 || CSR_OK=0 fi if [ "$CSR_OK" = 1 ] && openssl req -in "$WORK/test.csr" -verify -noout >/dev/null 2>&1; then ok "built + self-verified a CSR signed BY the TPM key ($TPM_OSSL) — EAP-TLS can use it" else no "openssl could not sign a CSR with the TPM key via the $TPM_OSSL" echo " -> the key reference method in wpa_supplicant-dot1x.conf needs adjusting" fi else skip "CSR/sign test (no openssl TPM integration to test with)" fi # --- 6. wpa_supplicant build info ------------------------------------------- if command -v wpa_supplicant >/dev/null; then V=$(wpa_supplicant -v 2>&1 | head -1) ok "wpa_supplicant present: $V" echo " NOTE: confirm it was built with macsec_linux + the matching TPM key" echo " backend; full EAP-TLS/MKA can only be proven against the authenticator." else no "wpa_supplicant not found" fi echo echo "== summary: $PASS pass, $FAIL fail, $SKIP skip ==" [ "$FAIL" = 0 ] && echo "TPM half looks ready — proceed to the authenticator/RADIUS bench." \ || echo "Fix the FAILs above before enabling disable_dot1x=false." exit "$FAIL"