NTS authenticated time is now bench-verified end-to-end unattended on a clean
build (comet-beacon-54, 5294860): chronyc -N authdata shows ntp.fleet.lab in NTS
mode with cookies > 0, sources read under enforcing SELinux, no lo.sources, no
manual step. This clears the two dispatcher-integration defects found on the way
(distro 20-chrony-dhcp clobber; /run/chrony-dhcp SELinux label).
Flips F-03/P-18 / R-17 from "bench-verify pending" to bench-verified in the SSP
status line + register and the Annex §2.9 control row + R-17 register + summary,
mirroring the F-02 treatment. Rated Low. Residual (defence-in-depth, not blocking):
issue the per-environment NTS server cert, and exercise the cold-clock
nocerttimecheck bootstrap + active-spoof rejection.
F-02/P-17 SSH host certs re-verified on the rebuilt 28d31e4 image (not the
hand-fixed host): the auto-derived FQDN principal is baked, so by-FQDN no-TOFU
admin login survives a reboot with zero manual steps. Cite the digest in the
design-doc status + bench-outcome, SSP v0.4 status line + R-16 row, and Annex A
2.4 row + R-16 register row.
F-02/P-17 (SSH host certificates, R-16) bench-verified end-to-end on
comet-beacon-54: admin login by FQDN with no TOFU, per-boot auto-re-sign across
reboot, SELinux confinement clean. Updates the SSP v0.4 status line + R-16
summary row and Annex A version note, the 2.4 host-key-trust row, the R-16
register row (treatment -> roll anchor + broker-side principal validation TODO)
and the 3.1 narrative. F-03/P-18 (NTS, R-17) stays bench-verify pending -- not
yet tested. Bench-surfaced code fixes are on branch poam-hardening (28d31e4).
The SSP (v0.2, 2026-06-27) and annex predated the entire management/enrolment
plane and the July hardening work. Bring both to v0.3 (2026-07-10):
SSP:
- Scope/boundary: on-host fleet-agent now IN scope; server-side manager/broker/
step-ca/InfluxDB named as connected systems; new host interface (g) = outbound
mTLS to the management plane. Boot chain gains step 8 (post-switch-root agent).
- Data: management telemetry (operational metadata, mTLS-encrypted, no per-host
secret); the agent stream is the one non-plaintext transit path.
- §5.2 Protect: agent reuses the TPM identity for mTLS; WebAuthn-passkey admin
MFA (first human-admin MFA); 3 local SELinux modules; the 2026-07-04 fapolicyd
overlay watch_fs fix (app-control was inactive on the root until then).
- §5.3 Detect: operational health telemetry signal (distinct from auditd/Wazuh).
- §6 Essential Eight: MFA + admin rows updated (passkeys now enforced on mgmt UI).
- §7: new R-14 (mgmt plane = connected system pending authorisation) + R-15
(deferred agent actuators = future remote-mutation channel); R-05 MFA clause met.
Annex:
- §2.3 hardening: fapolicyd overlay-effectiveness fix + residual; 3 local SELinux
allow modules on the MAC row.
- §2.4 auth: agent mTLS on the machine-auth row; MFA row now Implemented for the
mgmt UI (passkeys), Partial for host SSH.
- §2.5 mgmt: new rows for TPM enrolment lifecycle (broker) and server-authoritative
management plane. §2.6: operational health-monitoring row. §2.7: mgmt-plane
segmentation (OPNsense L3, outbound-only). §2.9: agent mTLS, fleet CA (step-ca),
cert-lifecycle auto-renewal.
- §3 register: R-14, R-15 added; R-05 updated; heatmap + note + 3 new assessor
notes (scope the mgmt plane, witness fapolicyd deny, confirm actuators inert).
The Dell 820 kept "finding a cert" and bypassing enrolment despite repeated BIOS
TPM clears. tpm2_nvreadpublic revealed 0x01800001 on that hardware is a FIRMWARE
platform index (platformcreate|policydelete|writelocked, 70 bytes — not our
cert; siblings at 0x01800003/4 + 0x01810000). platformcreate survives TPM2_Clear
and policydelete needs the platform's secret policy, so it's permanent and
unusable by us — the blind check false-positived on it, and enrolment could
never write there anyway. Same class of bug as the EK-handle collision.
Move the NV cert index default 0x01800001 -> 0x01800100 (free on the 820, owner
range, overridable via rd.dot1x.nvindex): cmdline (extract-artifacts.sh),
fleet-enrol -nvindex, the dracut hooks, bench scripts, CLAUDE.md invariant #1,
and design/SSP docs. The signing-key handle (0x81000100) is unchanged.
Harden WriteNVCert: refuse a platformcreate index with a clear "pick a free
owner index via rd.dot1x.nvindex" error instead of a confusing undefine
failure. Regression simtest/TestWriteNVCertRefusesPlatformIndex; NV roundtrip +
ReadNVCert tests moved to 0x01800100. All go tests + packer validate pass.
Bench (Proxmox vTPM, host cygnus-cruiser-99) confirmed via tpm2_readpublic that
0x81010001 — the handle our design used for the fleet signing key — is the
TCG-standard RSA Endorsement Key slot: the object there is the swtpm-provisioned
EK (restricted|decrypt|adminwithpolicy, RSA-2048/AES128CFB, canonical EK
authPolicy 837197…, EK cert at NV 0x1c00002). Most firmware/swtpm TPMs occupy
that slot, so EnsureKey could never create our key there — it errored reading
the EK as ECC and enrolment died before the CSR/POST.
Move the fleet signing key to 0x81000100, a non-reserved owner persistent
handle (clear of EK 0x81010001/2 and SRK 0x81000001/2). Threaded through:
- fleet-enrol -handle default + new rd.dot1x.handle= cmdline knob (baked by
extract-artifacts.sh, overridable via SMBIOS)
- files/etc/dot1x/wpa_supplicant-dot1x.conf private_key handle
- the dracut hook, bench tpm-provision.sh / tpm-selftest.sh
- CLAUDE.md invariant #1 + design/SSP docs + TODO #11
NV index 0x01800001 (owner range) is unchanged.
EnsureKey hardening: refuse to evict any restricted-decrypt object (EK/SRK) as
a safety net — never clobber the TPM endorsement/storage identity (also
protects the future EK/AK attestation path). Still self-heals a genuine stale
signing key. New regression TestEnsureKeyRefusesToEvictProtectedKey; the
stale-key regression and handle constants moved to 0x81000100.
Design note records the IDevID (0x81020001) option for the later EK/AK
attestation work. Follow-up items logged: content-aware NV presence check
(verify the cert chains to the fleet CA, so leftover/foreign NV can't suppress
enrolment) and a de-enrol/TPM-reset procedure.
Audiobuzz