The SSP (v0.2, 2026-06-27) and annex predated the entire management/enrolment
plane and the July hardening work. Bring both to v0.3 (2026-07-10):
SSP:
- Scope/boundary: on-host fleet-agent now IN scope; server-side manager/broker/
step-ca/InfluxDB named as connected systems; new host interface (g) = outbound
mTLS to the management plane. Boot chain gains step 8 (post-switch-root agent).
- Data: management telemetry (operational metadata, mTLS-encrypted, no per-host
secret); the agent stream is the one non-plaintext transit path.
- §5.2 Protect: agent reuses the TPM identity for mTLS; WebAuthn-passkey admin
MFA (first human-admin MFA); 3 local SELinux modules; the 2026-07-04 fapolicyd
overlay watch_fs fix (app-control was inactive on the root until then).
- §5.3 Detect: operational health telemetry signal (distinct from auditd/Wazuh).
- §6 Essential Eight: MFA + admin rows updated (passkeys now enforced on mgmt UI).
- §7: new R-14 (mgmt plane = connected system pending authorisation) + R-15
(deferred agent actuators = future remote-mutation channel); R-05 MFA clause met.
Annex:
- §2.3 hardening: fapolicyd overlay-effectiveness fix + residual; 3 local SELinux
allow modules on the MAC row.
- §2.4 auth: agent mTLS on the machine-auth row; MFA row now Implemented for the
mgmt UI (passkeys), Partial for host SSH.
- §2.5 mgmt: new rows for TPM enrolment lifecycle (broker) and server-authoritative
management plane. §2.6: operational health-monitoring row. §2.7: mgmt-plane
segmentation (OPNsense L3, outbound-only). §2.9: agent mTLS, fleet CA (step-ca),
cert-lifecycle auto-renewal.
- §3 register: R-14, R-15 added; R-05 updated; heatmap + note + 3 new assessor
notes (scope the mgmt plane, witness fapolicyd deny, confirm actuators inert).
Bench (Proxmox vTPM, host cygnus-cruiser-99) confirmed via tpm2_readpublic that
0x81010001 — the handle our design used for the fleet signing key — is the
TCG-standard RSA Endorsement Key slot: the object there is the swtpm-provisioned
EK (restricted|decrypt|adminwithpolicy, RSA-2048/AES128CFB, canonical EK
authPolicy 837197…, EK cert at NV 0x1c00002). Most firmware/swtpm TPMs occupy
that slot, so EnsureKey could never create our key there — it errored reading
the EK as ECC and enrolment died before the CSR/POST.
Move the fleet signing key to 0x81000100, a non-reserved owner persistent
handle (clear of EK 0x81010001/2 and SRK 0x81000001/2). Threaded through:
- fleet-enrol -handle default + new rd.dot1x.handle= cmdline knob (baked by
extract-artifacts.sh, overridable via SMBIOS)
- files/etc/dot1x/wpa_supplicant-dot1x.conf private_key handle
- the dracut hook, bench tpm-provision.sh / tpm-selftest.sh
- CLAUDE.md invariant #1 + design/SSP docs + TODO #11
NV index 0x01800001 (owner range) is unchanged.
EnsureKey hardening: refuse to evict any restricted-decrypt object (EK/SRK) as
a safety net — never clobber the TPM endorsement/storage identity (also
protects the future EK/AK attestation path). Still self-heals a genuine stale
signing key. New regression TestEnsureKeyRefusesToEvictProtectedKey; the
stale-key regression and handle constants moved to 0x81000100.
Design note records the IDevID (0x81020001) option for the later EK/AK
attestation work. Follow-up items logged: content-aware NV presence check
(verify the cert chains to the fleet CA, so leftover/foreign NV can't suppress
enrolment) and a de-enrol/TPM-reset procedure.
Audiobuzz