F-02/P-17 SSH host-cert flow was proven end-to-end on comet-beacon-54
(2026-07-11); these fix the correctness/scoping/cleanup defects the bench
surfaced:
- ssh-hostcert: derive the FQDN principal <hostname>.<domain> from the DHCP
search domain at runtime (resolv.conf), alongside the short hostname, so an
admin `@cert-authority *.<domain>` line accepts by-FQDN logins instead of
"name is not a listed principal". Never baked (invariant #1). + tests.
- ssh-ca-bootstrap.sh: export the SSH host CA public key in OpenSSH wire format
(ssh-keygen -i -m PKCS8), not the PEM/PKCS8 that `step crypto keypair` writes
-- a PEM @cert-authority anchor is unparseable and silently falls back to TOFU.
- ssh-ca-bootstrap.sh: fail loudly (and verify enableSSHCA=true) if the
provisioner SSH-enable step fails, instead of swallowing it and shipping a CA
that 502s every runtime sign.
- dot1x-bench: point the co-located broker at https://localhost:8443, not the
fleet dnsmasq name ca.fleet.lab (unresolvable from the broker's host netns ->
"no such host" at sign time). localhost is in the CA cert SAN.
- serving: remove the mock-signer enrol-broker copy -- two host-networked
brokers collide on 9090/9443 and the mock issued untrusted certs. The real
broker lives with step-ca (dot1x-bench); nginx /enrol/ still proxies to it on
loopback.
- enrol-broker: retire the HTML admin console; the fleet-manager passkey SPA now
drives the mTLS JSON API (/pending, /approve|deny). Removes a weaker,
client-cert-only parallel human-approve path.
Design-doc bench note deferred: docs/ssh-host-certificate-design.md lives on the
secure-ntp branch (fbb8100), not here -- to be added there / on reconcile.
The AUTHORISE pillar: the manager owns the enrolment queue UX, the enrol-broker
stays the state machine + step-ca signer (v1 'alongside' fold-in).
enrol-broker (minimal, backward-compatible change):
- admin approve/deny now return the decided Enrolment as JSON when the caller
sends Accept: application/json. Browsers still redirect; other API callers
(verify-serving.sh) still get 204. The cert PEM stays unexported (only the
requesting host gets it via /status) — the JSON carries cert_serial, hostnqn,
context, fingerprint, cn.
fleet-manager:
- broker.go: mTLS client for the broker admin plane (Pending/Approve/Deny),
nil when unconfigured so the manager runs standalone.
- admin.go: GET /api/enrol/pending (proxy), POST /api/enrol/{id}/approve
(drives broker, then BIRTHS the inventory record — identity from the returned
serial/hostnqn/context, binding from the operator's optional body, enrolled
with the HUMAN approver = the manager's admin mTLS CN), POST .../deny.
503 when the broker isn't wired.
Test: httptest mock broker asserts the Accept:application/json approve, pending
proxy, inventory birth (identity+binding+enrolled), and the disabled-503 path.
Broker + manager both build/vet/test/gofmt clean.
Verifying the step signer against a real step-ca surfaced two real bugs the
mock signer had hidden, plus made the bench CA actually initialise:
- signer.go: move --not-after from `step ca token` (validity caps ~1h ->
"token validity too long") to `step ca sign` (it is the CERT lifetime).
Without this the step signer never issues a cert.
- dot1x-bench compose: DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_PASSWORD_FILE pointed at a file that
does not exist at first init (it is an INPUT path), so `step ca init` failed
and never wrote secrets/password. Use DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_PASSWORD (the value)
which the entrypoint writes to secrets/password, where bootstrap + broker read.
- bootstrap.sh: self-heal the root-owned ./pki Docker auto-creates; detect the
CA password at $STEPPATH/password or secrets/password (varies by image
version); raise authority.claims.maxTLSCertDuration so 720h fleet certs are
allowed (stock cap 24h, which also blocked bootstrap's own RADIUS cert); fix
RADIUS cert paths to write via the /export mount (were host paths run inside
the container, so they never resolved).
- serving stack: add the enrol-broker service (temporary home; nginx already
proxies /enrol/) defaulting to the zero-dependency lab path (mock signer +
insecure loopback admin), with ENROL_* knobs to switch to step + mTLS.
- verify-serving.sh: exercise request -> approve -> cert through the deployed
nginx /enrol/ proxy.
- TODO #11: record the step-signer verification + the two fixes.
Step signer VERIFIED end-to-end against a real step-ca: issued cert chains to
the fleet root, EKU clientAuth, hostnqn derived from serial.
Audiobuzz