First trim build confirmed firmware 678 MB -> 147 MB, but the initramfs came
out 97 MB and is now kernel-MODULE-bound, not firmware: --no-hostonly +
plymouth's drm dep instmods every GPU driver (amdgpu.ko etc.) though the fleet
is i915-only.
- omit_drivers += amdgpu radeon nouveau (90-diskless.conf): drop the discrete-GPU
kmods (amdgpu.ko is the biggest single module in the initramfs); keep i915 +
virtio-gpu/bochs for the splash. Shrinks the initramfs/UKI pulled over PXE on
every boot.
- Firmware keep-list tightened: drop mellanox/ (mlxsw_spectrum SWITCH-ASIC blobs,
not NIC fw — mlx5 NIC fw is on-card) and narrow intel/ to just ice (drop
ish/sof/ibt sensor-hub/audio/bluetooth, none loaded at boot per the audit).
- Add an 'initramfs largest files' diagnostic (sort lsinitrd.txt by size) so the
next build shows what dominates the .img.
BENCH-VERIFY: kiosk still renders on the 820 (i915 kept); watch the new initramfs
largest-files log line for the post-omit size.
Bench (Proxmox vTPM, host cygnus-cruiser-99) confirmed via tpm2_readpublic that
0x81010001 — the handle our design used for the fleet signing key — is the
TCG-standard RSA Endorsement Key slot: the object there is the swtpm-provisioned
EK (restricted|decrypt|adminwithpolicy, RSA-2048/AES128CFB, canonical EK
authPolicy 837197…, EK cert at NV 0x1c00002). Most firmware/swtpm TPMs occupy
that slot, so EnsureKey could never create our key there — it errored reading
the EK as ECC and enrolment died before the CSR/POST.
Move the fleet signing key to 0x81000100, a non-reserved owner persistent
handle (clear of EK 0x81010001/2 and SRK 0x81000001/2). Threaded through:
- fleet-enrol -handle default + new rd.dot1x.handle= cmdline knob (baked by
extract-artifacts.sh, overridable via SMBIOS)
- files/etc/dot1x/wpa_supplicant-dot1x.conf private_key handle
- the dracut hook, bench tpm-provision.sh / tpm-selftest.sh
- CLAUDE.md invariant #1 + design/SSP docs + TODO #11
NV index 0x01800001 (owner range) is unchanged.
EnsureKey hardening: refuse to evict any restricted-decrypt object (EK/SRK) as
a safety net — never clobber the TPM endorsement/storage identity (also
protects the future EK/AK attestation path). Still self-heals a genuine stale
signing key. New regression TestEnsureKeyRefusesToEvictProtectedKey; the
stale-key regression and handle constants moved to 0x81000100.
Design note records the IDevID (0x81020001) option for the later EK/AK
attestation work. Follow-up items logged: content-aware NV presence check
(verify the cert chains to the fleet CA, so leftover/foreign NV can't suppress
enrolment) and a de-enrol/TPM-reset procedure.