Recent work added telemetry fields and a cert path not yet in the docs:
- files/agent/README.md: add uptime to the health list; document that chrony is
read from /var/log/chrony/tracking.log (not the command socket) and needs BOTH
the chrony supplementary group (DAC) and the fleet_agent_chronylog SELinux allow
(TE), plus a reachable lab NTP (123/udp firewall); note the chrony group on the
unit row.
- serving/fleet-manager/README.md: add uptime + chrony detail to the health list;
note the cert-auto agent-cert-renewer sidecar + GetCertificate hot-reload
(certreload.go) in the bring-up and checkpoint 7.
- docs/TODO.md #14: probe list gains uptime + chrony-from-tracking.log; new dated
block records uptime/reboot-pending, the 4-layer chrony-access chase (all
silent-failing; inventory.json is the isolator), and the agent-plane cert
auto-renewal, all bench-verified 2026-07-10.
- docs/fleet-management-design.md: health record gains uptime + chrony
source/stratum/offset detail.
The tracking.log read was still returning empty under enforcing with NO AVC —
the tell of a DAC (not SELinux) denial. Root cause: /var/log/chrony is mode
0750 chrony:chrony (others have no access), so the agent's DynamicUser (group
tss only) can't even traverse the directory to reach the 0644 tracking.log —
EACCES on open, which produces no audit record. Manager confirmed genuinely on
fleet-manager-1db3977 (chrony-capable), and uptime flowed while chrony didn't,
proving the agent was sending empty chrony (failed read), not a manager gap.
Earlier manual reads worked only as root (sudo) or because fleetadmin had been
usermod'd into chrony during the socket test (reverted on reboot — /etc/group
is on the volatile overlay).
Fix: SupplementaryGroups=tss chrony on the unit — the chrony group has r-x on
the 0750 dir so the agent can traverse it; the log file is world-readable. This
is the DAC half; the fleet_agent_chronylog SELinux module (02a6621) is the TE
half — BOTH are required (verified: group-only -> TE-denied; module-only ->
DAC-denied silently). Corrected the now-stale 'no group' code comment; recorded
the two-layer requirement in the .te and stig-deviations #16. Needs a
workstation image rebuild + reboot.
The tracking.log approach (4ca0b6d) works in permissive but is blocked under
enforcing: chrony's log is labeled chronyd_var_log_t, confined by the shipped
policy to chronyd_t despite the 0644 mode. Verified on comet-beacon-54 — a
non-root read succeeds permissive, but under enforcing even a STIG-confined
admin (staff_t) gets Permission denied (ls -Z on the file is itself blocked).
The agent runs unconfined_service_t (confirmed via ps -eZ) and is denied the
same way.
Ship a minimal read-only allow module (files/stig/fleet-agent-chronylog.te):
allow unconfined_service_t chronyd_var_log_t:file { open read getattr } + dir
search to reach it. No write, no other chrony access, and no domain transition
(the agent reads a file; it does not exec chronyc) — narrower than the
abandoned nnp-transition module. Built + semodule -i'd in 2c-STIG alongside the
existing chrony_dhcp_dispatcher / fapolicyd_tmpfs modules. docs/stig-deviations
#16. Needs a workstation image rebuild + reboot; same policy-store-rebuild
reproducibility re-check as #14/#15.
Bench on comet-beacon-54 proved every command-socket route is blocked for the
hardened agent: chronyd's unix socket is owner-write-only (0755, so even a
chrony-group member can't connect), and STIG closes the UDP command port
(cmdport 0). Rather than re-open a port or expose chrony's privileged socket,
enable chronyd's tracking log and have the agent READ it — no port, no socket,
no group, no SELinux domain transition, full hardening intact.
- chrony.conf: enable 'log tracking' (idempotent) so chronyd appends
source/stratum/offset to /var/log/chrony/tracking.log. Write volume is a ~130B
line per clock update (backing off to ~maxpoll when stable) and capped by the
chrony RPM's logrotate — negligible on the RAM overlay. cmdport 0 stays, so no
STIG deviation.
- agent: chronyTracking() now reads the last data line of tracking.log via
parseTrackingLog() (source f[2], stratum f[3], offset f[6], leap/sync f[7]);
replaces the chronyc exec + parseChrony. Unit test swapped accordingly.
- revert the two abandoned approaches: drop the bindcmdaddress line (394ad10)
and the fleet_agent_chronyc SELinux nnp_transition module + provisioner block
(e6fd4a2, .te deleted) — no chronyc exec means no transition to allow. Removed
stig-deviations #16 and #17 (both waivers no longer needed).
Needs a workstation image rebuild + reboot. BENCH-VERIFY: tracking.log is
world-readable so the DynamicUser agent can read it; under enforcing
unconfined_service_t can read chronyd_var_log_t (add a minimal file-read allow
if denied); and the offset sign matches chronyc on a synced host.
Root cause of the blank chrony fields (found on comet-beacon-54): chrony 4.x
(RHEL 9) defaults its command interface to the UNIX socket only
(/run/chrony/chronyd.sock), usable by root or the chrony group with a writable
/run/chrony. The fleet-agent unit is hardened — DynamicUser (group tss, not
chrony) + ProtectSystem=strict (/run read-only) — so it cannot open the unix
socket nor create chronyc's reply socket. Bench proof: normal-user 'chronyc
tracking' -> 506 Cannot talk to daemon; only sudo worked; 'chronyc -h 127.0.0.1'
failed and ss showed no UDP :323. So the probe always failed and every chrony_*
field stayed empty. SELinux permissive did NOT help — it was never (only) an
SELinux problem; the nnp_transition module (prev commit) is still needed for the
enforcing exec transition.
Fix: bind chronyd's command socket on 127.0.0.1 (bindcmdaddress in chrony.conf,
idempotent in the 2c provisioner) and point the probe at it (chronyc -n -h
127.0.0.1 tracking). UDP needs no fs write or group and rides the unit's
already-allowed AF_INET. Loopback + monitoring-only (state changes still need the
root unix socket), so exposure is minimal. Rejected the unix-socket route (chrony
group + ReadWritePaths=/run/chrony) because /run/chrony is 0750 (group has no
write). Documented in docs/stig-deviations.md #17; .te bench note updated for the
enforcing UDP path. Needs a workstation image rebuild + reboot.
fleet-agent reports clock health via 'chronyc -n tracking', but the hardened
unit runs with NoNewPrivileges (explicit + forced by DynamicUser/SystemCallFilter/
MemoryDenyWriteExecute). SELinux transitions the exec'd chronyc into chronyc_t,
and NNP forbids that domain change without process2:nnp_transition — which the
base policy doesn't grant for unconfined_service_t -> chronyc_t. Under enforcing
the exec is denied (avc: denied { nnp_transition } comm=fleet-agent, seen on
comet-beacon-54), so chronyc never runs and every chrony_* health field stays
empty (Monitor chrony row shows '—'). uptime/cpu/mem are unaffected (no exec).
Ship a minimal local module (files/stig/fleet-agent-chronyc.te) granting only
that one nnp_transition to the MORE-confined chronyc_t domain — the safe
direction the permission exists to gate — loosening nothing else in the agent
sandbox. Built + semodule -i'd in 2c-STIG alongside the existing
chrony_dhcp_dispatcher / fapolicyd_tmpfs modules. Justified in
docs/stig-deviations.md #16. Needs a workstation image rebuild + reboot; same
policy-store-rebuild reproducibility re-check as #14/#15.
The agent only reported chrony as synced|unsynced — nothing about how well the
clock tracks. Parse `chronyc tracking` for the source-relative metrics.
- proto: HealthSnapshot.chrony_offset_seconds (16, signed system-time offset,
fast=+), chrony_source (17, reference name/IP), chrony_stratum (18); regenerated.
- agent: replace chronyState() with chronyTracking()/parseChrony() — one exec,
parses Leap status + Reference ID + Stratum + System time offset (+ test).
- manager: Health.{ChronyOffset,ChronySource,ChronyStratum}; snapshotToHealth maps
them; influx writes chrony_offset_seconds/_stratum/_source and whitelists the
offset + stratum as graphable fields.
- UI: chronySummary() + offsetMs() — the chrony row now shows
"synced · 192.168.50.10 · s3 · +0.01ms" instead of just "synced".
The manager lets an admin schedule a reboot (desired.reboot_at) but never showed
whether it had happened. Add host uptime to the health snapshot and derive a
reboot status from it.
- proto: HealthSnapshot.uptime_seconds (15); regenerated pb.go (manager + agent copy).
- agent: probe /proc/uptime -> uptime_seconds (with parser + test).
- manager: Health.UptimeSeconds cached in inventory; snapshotToHealth maps it;
influx writes + whitelists uptime_seconds as a queryable field.
- UI: fmt.js dur() + rebootStatus() — boot_time = last_seen - uptime (manager clock
frame, no host/manager sync needed), compared to reboot_at. Monitor host detail
shows an "uptime" row and a "reboot" row: pending in X / overdue by X / rebooted.
Observability-only — works before the reboot ACTUATOR lands (deferred). Once a host
boots after the scheduled time (BMC/manual now, agent later), the badge flips to
"rebooted" automatically.
The agent's baked default pointed at the PUBLIC admin-UI name
(diskless-server.bitasylum.org), which resolves to the serving host's outbound IP
— unreachable from the fleet LAN. There's no split-horizon to "automate": the
manager agent plane is just another *.fleet.lab, served by the fleet dnsmasq like
boot/nvme/audit.
- serving/.env.example: MGMT_HOST=manager.fleet.lab.
- serving/docker-compose.yml: dnsmasq --address=/${MGMT_HOST}/${SERVER_IP}.
- files/agent/agent.env + main.go default: FLEET_AGENT_MANAGER=manager.fleet.lab:9600.
- server-pki.sh: AGENT_SANS default -> manager.fleet.lab (cert SAN matches the
baked name, so no FLEET_AGENT_SERVER_NAME override).
- docs/TODO #14 gotcha #4 updated: fleet name, not the IP+server-name workaround.
The public diskless-server.bitasylum.org stays the ADMIN-UI name (Traefik/:443).
Four fixes from the on-host agent bring-up:
1. Bake the real fleet CA into the image. New `fleet_ca` build var (default =
the committed placeholder) file-provisions the trust anchor to
/etc/dot1x/radius-ca.pem — used by wpa_supplicant (RADIUS) AND the fleet-agent
(verify the manager). CI materializes a FLEET_CA secret to a runner-temp file
and passes -var fleet_ca; unset => placeholder (lab). No CA material committed.
2. server-pki.sh installs the agent CLIENT CA as root+intermediate (not root
only). Host TPM certs are leaf-only in NV and signed by the step-ca
intermediate, so a root-only client CA makes the manager advertise only the
root in its CertificateRequest -> Go clients send no cert ("tls: certificate
required") and it couldn't verify a leaf-only cert anyway. bootstrap.sh now
exports intermediate_ca.crt so FLEET_CA_INTERMEDIATE resolves.
3. New `fleet-manager register-host <serial> [-name] [-hostnqn]` subcommand:
seeds/updates an inventory record for a host enrolled out of band (bench
broker, migrated fleet) through the real store, so its agent stream is
accepted. The manual counterpart to the authorise-approve flow.
4. The agent surfaces the authoritative recv-side gRPC status instead of the
bare io.EOF gRPC returns on the send side when the server ends the stream —
so "host is not enrolled" (PermissionDenied) shows up instead of "EOF".
The 2b-agent provisioner installed agent.env from /tmp/etc-stage, but the 2a
package step deletes /tmp/etc-stage before 2b runs, so the build failed with
"cannot stat '/tmp/etc-stage/fleet-agent/agent.env'". 2b-hostapi avoids this by
installing from its own upload dir; do the same: move agent.env into files/agent/
so it rides the agent's file upload (/tmp/agent), which survives until 2b-agent
cleans it. Runtime path (/etc/fleet-agent/agent.env) is unchanged.
Build the on-host agent that pairs with fleet-hostapi and feeds the
fleet-manager control plane (TODO #14 "STILL TO BUILD (a)"). Nothing on the
workstation talked to the manager before this; Monitor + InfluxDB stayed empty.
Scope: telemetry only. The agent reuses the host TPM identity for mTLS (read-only
tpmkey.LoadSigner at 0x81000100 + cert from NV 0x01800100; the private key never
leaves the TPM), opens the long-lived FleetAgent.Session bidi stream, sends Hello
+ periodic HealthSnapshot (load/cpu/temp/mem/tmpfs/nvme/auth/selinux/chrony/kiosk,
probed read-only from /proc+/sys plus hostapi facts), and LOGS but does not act on
the DesiredState/Command it receives. Reconcile actuators (kiosk URL, reboot,
drain) are deferred until the telemetry half is bench-verified.
- files/agent/: new module (go-tpm + grpc), static CGO_ENABLED=0 like enrol/hostapi.
Copies the enrol tpmkey (+ read-only LoadSigner) and the generated fleet.agent.v1
proto so it stays self-contained without importing the initramfs enrol module.
- files/agent/simtest/: proves the TPM-signed cert completes a real mTLS client-auth
handshake (RequireAndVerifyClientCert) against the go-tpm software simulator.
- files/etc/fleet-agent/agent.env: fleet-generic config (manager DNS name, fleet CA
reused from radius-ca.pem, TPM handle/nvindex, interval). No per-host state.
- fleet-agent.service: hardened unit (tss group for /dev/tpmrm0, INET egress).
- CI builds fleet-agent out-of-VM + runs vet/test + the simulator handshake test.
- Packer: enable_agent flag (default on) + 2b-agent provisioner + fapolicyd trust.
Post-switch-root only, so no dracut/initramfs changes.
- docs: TODO #14 + fleet-management-design as-built updated.
Requires the host already enrolled (broker approve births the inventory row) —
else the manager returns PermissionDenied, the correct "not enrolled yet" signal.
fapolicyd is the app-allowlisting exec guard for the writable RAM overlay
(dm-verity covers only the read-only erofs lower). It statfs's mounts to decide
which to watch, and tmpfs is in its default watch_fs. This image's root is
systemd.volatile=overlay, so statfs("/") returns the overlay upper — a tmpfs —
and the shipped policy has no 'fapolicyd_t tmpfs_t:filesystem getattr' (no
ordinary host roots on tmpfs). Under enforcing the getattr is DENIED (audit:
dev=tmpfs ino=1 name="/", permissive=0, seen 2026-07-03 on comet-beacon-54),
so fapolicyd can't fully mark the tmpfs mounts (/, /tmp, /dev/shm) and its guard
over the writable overlay is incomplete — a real exec-guard gap, not just SIEM
noise.
Ship a minimal local allow module (allow, not dontaudit — we want fapolicyd to
see the tmpfs), compiled + semodule -i'd in 2c-STIG right after the chrony one.
Registered as deviation #15.
BENCH-VERIFY: the AVC is gone on an enforcing boot AND fapolicyd blocks a non-RPM
executable dropped in /tmp (proves the guard now covers the overlay), trusted
kiosk/appliance binaries still run, and the verity hash is reproducible across
two builds (semodule rebuilds the policy store).
First trim build confirmed firmware 678 MB -> 147 MB, but the initramfs came
out 97 MB and is now kernel-MODULE-bound, not firmware: --no-hostonly +
plymouth's drm dep instmods every GPU driver (amdgpu.ko etc.) though the fleet
is i915-only.
- omit_drivers += amdgpu radeon nouveau (90-diskless.conf): drop the discrete-GPU
kmods (amdgpu.ko is the biggest single module in the initramfs); keep i915 +
virtio-gpu/bochs for the splash. Shrinks the initramfs/UKI pulled over PXE on
every boot.
- Firmware keep-list tightened: drop mellanox/ (mlxsw_spectrum SWITCH-ASIC blobs,
not NIC fw — mlx5 NIC fw is on-card) and narrow intel/ to just ice (drop
ish/sof/ibt sensor-hub/audio/bluetooth, none loaded at boot per the audit).
- Add an 'initramfs largest files' diagnostic (sort lsinitrd.txt by size) so the
next build shows what dominates the .img.
BENCH-VERIFY: kiosk still renders on the 820 (i915 kept); watch the new initramfs
largest-files log line for the post-omit size.
Hosts connected with 'nvme connect-all', which attaches EVERY subsystem in the
discovery log. Each host then mounts only its own by-UUID verity namespaces but
leaves a live controller on every other served version's subsystem. Observed via
spdk-release list: more controllers than workstations, each box on every version
(1/3/3/1/3 across 5 versions for ~3 boxes). Beyond wasted connections
(O(hosts x versions)), it defeated the rolling-update drain/reap: no version ever
reached 0 connections while any host was up, so spdk-loader's auto-reap could
never fire and old versions accumulated without bound.
Fix — targeted connect to this build's subsystem only:
- extract-artifacts.sh bakes the per-version SUBNQN (already in verity.json
.subnqn, matched by the serving side) into the signed UKI cmdline as
rd.nvmf.nqn=. NQN is version identity, not per-host state, and the cmdline is
already per-version + immutable-per-signed-UKI, so invariant #1 holds.
- nvmf-connect.sh (test path) uses 'nvme connect -n <nqn>'; legacy UKIs without
rd.nvmf.nqn fall back to connect-all with a warning so they still boot.
- dot1x-macsec-up.sh (secure path) gains an explicit step-6 targeted connect over
macsec0 (after it's addressed, per invariant #2), replacing the delegation to
the dracut nvmf module's discovery connect-all.
Now each host = 1 controller on its own subsystem; versions drain to 0 when their
hosts migrate, so auto-reap works and connections scale O(hosts). Requires a
rebuild + re-sign (cmdline change, invariant #6). BENCH-VERIFY both paths;
confirm the dracut nvmf module isn't also connect-all-ing on the secure path.
CLAUDE.md invariant #2 + TODO #6 updated.
The build failed: checkmodule rejected `policy_module(chrony_dhcp_dispatcher,
1.0.0)` with "Building a policy module, but no module specification found".
policy_module() is a refpolicy m4 macro expanded only by the refpolicy Makefile
(/usr/share/selinux/devel), not by checkmodule. Use the raw module-policy
declaration `module chrony_dhcp_dispatcher 1.0.0;`, which is exactly what
checkmodule -M -m parses. require{} + allow rule unchanged.
The Dell 820 kept "finding a cert" and bypassing enrolment despite repeated BIOS
TPM clears. tpm2_nvreadpublic revealed 0x01800001 on that hardware is a FIRMWARE
platform index (platformcreate|policydelete|writelocked, 70 bytes — not our
cert; siblings at 0x01800003/4 + 0x01810000). platformcreate survives TPM2_Clear
and policydelete needs the platform's secret policy, so it's permanent and
unusable by us — the blind check false-positived on it, and enrolment could
never write there anyway. Same class of bug as the EK-handle collision.
Move the NV cert index default 0x01800001 -> 0x01800100 (free on the 820, owner
range, overridable via rd.dot1x.nvindex): cmdline (extract-artifacts.sh),
fleet-enrol -nvindex, the dracut hooks, bench scripts, CLAUDE.md invariant #1,
and design/SSP docs. The signing-key handle (0x81000100) is unchanged.
Harden WriteNVCert: refuse a platformcreate index with a clear "pick a free
owner index via rd.dot1x.nvindex" error instead of a confusing undefine
failure. Regression simtest/TestWriteNVCertRefusesPlatformIndex; NV roundtrip +
ReadNVCert tests moved to 0x01800100. All go tests + packer validate pass.
The NM dispatcher 10-chrony-dhcp-ntp runs `chronyc reload sources` to load DHCP
option-42 NTP servers. That chronyc runs in the confined custom-dispatcher
domain (NetworkManager_dispatcher_custom_t), so its reply socket carries that
label and the shipped policy has no rule for chronyd_t to sendto it. Under
enforcing, chronyd does the reload but its ack is denied — chronyc reports
failure and the AVC floods the SIEM (seen 2026-07-03; permissive=1 only because
the box was booted enforcing=0).
Ship a minimal local allow module (files/stig/chrony-dhcp-dispatcher.te):
allow chronyd_t NetworkManager_dispatcher_custom_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
Built + semodule -i'd in the 2c-STIG provisioner (checkpolicy installed if
absent), with an install assertion. `allow` not `dontaudit` — it also lets the
reload ack succeed so chronyc returns cleanly. Documented as
docs/stig-deviations.md #14 (not a rule waiver — a local functional allow).
BENCH-VERIFY: enforcing boot shows no AVC, chronyc reload returns 0, a
DHCP-handed NTP server appears in `chronyc sources`; and re-check verity-hash
reproducibility (semodule rebuilds the policy store, like the semanage step).
The enrol trigger keyed on "is NV 0x01800001 defined/readable", so leftover
state (an earlier tpm-provision run — bench-seen on the 820: "cert present —
normal boot" with no real identity) or random bytes (tpm-selftest) silently
suppressed enrolment. Now content-aware:
- tpmkey.ReadNVCert reads the full NV contents (chunked).
- classifyNVCert (TPM-agnostic, unit-tested): parses X.509, checks validity
window, and when a real fleet CA bundle is present verifies the cert chains
to it. Only a valid fleet cert = enrolled.
- New `fleet-enrol -check-only` (no network/no key-gen) exits 0=valid cert,
20=enrol needed, 1=error. The full enrol path uses the same classification
instead of NVPresent.
- The dracut hook calls -check-only as the single gate, replacing the blind
tpm2_nvread (and its now-dead TPM2TOOLS_TCTI export). tpm2_nvread stays in
the initramfs for the secure path (dot1x-macsec-up.sh).
Lab fallback: the shipped radius-ca.pem is a placeholder (not a cert) ->
loadCAPool returns nil -> chain-less "parseable + unexpired" acceptance, so
reboot-converge doesn't loop; production replaces radius-ca.pem with the real
fleet CA for strict chaining.
Tests: classifyNVCert table (valid/expired/garbage/foreign/no-CA) + simtest
ReadNVCert roundtrip across the 512B chunk. All pass; packer validate clean.
Bench (Proxmox vTPM, host cygnus-cruiser-99) confirmed via tpm2_readpublic that
0x81010001 — the handle our design used for the fleet signing key — is the
TCG-standard RSA Endorsement Key slot: the object there is the swtpm-provisioned
EK (restricted|decrypt|adminwithpolicy, RSA-2048/AES128CFB, canonical EK
authPolicy 837197…, EK cert at NV 0x1c00002). Most firmware/swtpm TPMs occupy
that slot, so EnsureKey could never create our key there — it errored reading
the EK as ECC and enrolment died before the CSR/POST.
Move the fleet signing key to 0x81000100, a non-reserved owner persistent
handle (clear of EK 0x81010001/2 and SRK 0x81000001/2). Threaded through:
- fleet-enrol -handle default + new rd.dot1x.handle= cmdline knob (baked by
extract-artifacts.sh, overridable via SMBIOS)
- files/etc/dot1x/wpa_supplicant-dot1x.conf private_key handle
- the dracut hook, bench tpm-provision.sh / tpm-selftest.sh
- CLAUDE.md invariant #1 + design/SSP docs + TODO #11
NV index 0x01800001 (owner range) is unchanged.
EnsureKey hardening: refuse to evict any restricted-decrypt object (EK/SRK) as
a safety net — never clobber the TPM endorsement/storage identity (also
protects the future EK/AK attestation path). Still self-heals a genuine stale
signing key. New regression TestEnsureKeyRefusesToEvictProtectedKey; the
stale-key regression and handle constants moved to 0x81000100.
Design note records the IDevID (0x81020001) option for the later EK/AK
attestation work. Follow-up items logged: content-aware NV presence check
(verify the cert chains to the fleet CA, so leftover/foreign NV can't suppress
enrolment) and a de-enrol/TPM-reset procedure.
Bench boot failed with "fleet-enrol: ensure key at 0x81010001: key at handle
is not ECC: did not contain eccDetail (selector value was 1)": a real host had
an RSA key persisted at 0x81010001 (left by an older tpm2-tools/openssl
provisioning path), and EnsureKey fatally errored trying to read it as our ECC
signing key — so enrolment died before the CSR/POST and the host fell through
to a normal boot (no fingerprint, nothing at the broker).
EnsureKey now evicts a wrong-type/unusable key at the handle and creates a
fresh ECC key. Safe on the enrol path: it only runs on an empty-NV host, so no
issued cert references the old key. A valid ECC key is still reused (idempotent
retried enrol).
Regression: simtest TestEnsureKeyEvictsStaleNonECC pre-plants an RSA key and
asserts EnsureKey recreates a usable ECC signer (passes against the go-tpm
simulator).
Removes the hard no-op on the test path so the enrolment flow can be exercised
on a host with a TPM + a reachable broker WITHOUT standing up 802.1X/MACsec/
RADIUS. Networking is now mode-aware: in test mode ip=dhcp already owns the NIC
(and wrote resolv.conf), so the hook uses the existing lease instead of running
its own nmcli DHCP — avoiding the dracut "address already assigned" race
(CLAUDE.md "don't double-configure the NIC in test mode"). Secure mode still does
the nm-unmanaged override for the pre-auth lease. rd.fleet.enrol=0 disables
enrolment in either mode; production intent stays secure-path-only.
Replaces the shell/openssl-provider host enrolment (a35f2d6) with a static
Go + go-tpm binary, and moves BOTH host Go binaries out of the Packer VM.
fleet-enrol (files/enrol/, Go + go-tpm, no CGO):
- talks to /dev/tpmrm0 DIRECTLY via transport.FromReadWriter(os.File) — no
linuxtpm, so go-tpm is the only dep and there is NO tpm2-tools key-gen /
openssl tpm2 provider / curl in the image (removes the biggest bench risk,
the provider handle: key-ref).
- ensures the ECDSA key @0x81010001, builds the CSR (crypto.Signer over the
TPM key), POSTs CSR+context to the broker, shows the Plymouth fingerprint,
polls /status, writes the leaf cert to NV 0x01800001.
- tpmkey/ is an exported package so the TPM ceremony is tested against the
go-tpm software simulator from a SEPARATE simtest/ module (CGO stays out of
the shipped build). Transaction logic (mock broker) tested in-package.
- deps pinned by go.sum (not vendored): the binary now builds on the CI
runner, which has network — reproducible via pinned Go 1.26.4 + go.sum.
Out-of-VM build (decision): both fleet-enrol AND fleet-hostapi compile in the
CI "Build host Go binaries" step (Go 1.26.4, CGO off, -trimpath) and Packer
FILE-PROVISIONS the static binaries in. Dropped the in-VM `dnf install golang`
+ the 2d removal — the Rocky build image carries no Go toolchain / go-tpm tree.
Wiring:
- tpm-enrol.sh: now a thin GATE (empty-NV check, pre-auth DHCP on en*,
exec /usr/sbin/fleet-enrol, reboot-to-converge). module-setup.sh bundles the
binary (asserted) + reverts the tpm2-openssl/curl installs.
- diskless.pkr.hcl: file provisioners for both binaries; enrol installed to
/usr/sbin before the initramfs build + fapolicyd-trusted; lsinitrd asserts
fleet-enrol; dnf reverted to baseline (no tpm2-openssl/curl).
- gitea-main-ci.yaml: Set up Go + build both binaries + run the simulator
ceremony test, before packer validate.
TESTED here: transaction unit tests + the full TPM ceremony (key-gen -> persist
-> ECDSA sign -> CSR verify -> chunked NV write -> re-enrol) against the go-tpm
simulator. BENCH-VERIFY (real/swtpm, empty owner auth, pre-auth DHCP, Plymouth,
reboot-converge, prod HTTPS) tracked in docs/TODO.md #11.
Builds the host side of TPM identity enrolment — the "inline single-UKI"
vehicle from docs/tpm-enrolment-design.md. A production (secure) UKI now
auto-enrols a fresh host with no client cert, then reboots into the normal
secure path.
New dracut hook files/dracut/95dot1x-macsec/tpm-enrol.sh (initqueue/settled
prio 25, BEFORE dot1x-macsec-up at 30):
- no-op when a cert is already present in NV 0x01800001 (normal boot) or
under rd.dot1x=0 (test path has no trustworthy identity to enrol);
- on EMPTY NV: generate the signing key in the TPM @0x81010001 (openssl tpm2
provider builds the CSR; key never leaves the TPM), pre-auth DHCP on the
PHYSICAL NIC (nmcli re-manages en*, overriding the secure-mode unmanaged
drop-in), POST CSR+context to rd.fleet.enrol_url, show the broker
fingerprint on Plymouth, poll /status, write the issued leaf cert (DER) to
NV, and reboot to converge.
- Empty-NV and the secure path are mutually exclusive, so this never reorders
the load-bearing boot sequence (invariant #2).
Wiring:
- module-setup.sh: require+install the tpm2 key-gen/NV tools, curl, awk, and
the openssl tpm2 PROVIDER (ossl-modules/tpm2.so, asserted present — tpm2-tss
alone can't sign with a handle: key); install the hook.
- diskless.pkr.hcl: install tpm2-openssl + curl; assert hook/tools/provider in
the initramfs (invariant #9). New enrol_url var threaded to extract-artifacts.
- extract-artifacts.sh: bake rd.fleet.enrol_url into the cmdline.
- fleet.script: enrol-active/enrol-wait/enrol-done banner; fingerprint on the
message line (public — states only, invariant #1).
Shell JSON build/parse/cert-extract pipeline (no jq in the initramfs) verified
end-to-end against a live broker. BENCH-VERIFY list in docs/TODO.md #11 (tpm2
provider key-ref on real/swtpm, empty-NV detect, pre-auth DHCP override, Plymouth
render, NV write + reboot convergence, prod HTTPS).
Audiobuzz