Add secure boot helper

docs/secure-boot-keys.md

@@ -82,28 +82,53 @@ where this is scripted into provisioning.
 > needed. If a host must also boot vendor-signed media, *add* your `db` alongside
 > Microsoft's UEFI CA instead of clearing it.
 
-### Manual enrollment on a fleet workstation (over SSH)
+### On a fleet workstation: read state over SSH, enrol via firmware
 
-The build bakes the EFI management tools into the image (`efitools` +
-`efivar`/`mokutil`/`efibootmgr`, installed in the main package provisioner), so
-you can enrol keys **manually over SSH** on a booted workstation that is in Setup
-Mode — handy for provisioning before the automated flow (TODO #10) exists. The
-tools write to `efivarfs` (`/sys/firmware/efi/efivars`), not the read-only root,
-so they work at runtime; they're RPM-installed so fapolicyd already trusts them.
+> **`efitools` (`efi-readvar`/`efi-updatevar`/`KeyTool`) is NOT packaged for EL9**
+> (confirmed on Rocky 9, 2026-06-20). The image therefore ships only
+> `efivar`/`mokutil`/`efibootmgr` (base repos). That's enough to **read** Secure
+> Boot state over SSH, but **enrolment of custom PK/KEK/db is done in the firmware
+> setup UI**, not from the OS.
+
+Read Secure Boot state over SSH (`mokutil` is the `efi-readvar` replacement; acts
+on efivarfs, works on the read-only root, RPM-installed so fapolicyd-trusted):
 
 ```bash
-# on the workstation (as the sudo admin):
-mokutil --sb-state                      # check Secure Boot / Setup Mode
-efi-readvar                             # dump current PK/KEK/db/dbx
-# copy your PK.auth/KEK.auth/db.auth (or .esl) onto the host, then in Setup Mode:
-sudo efi-updatevar -f db.auth  db
-sudo efi-updatevar -f KEK.auth KEK
-sudo efi-updatevar -f PK.auth  PK       # last — leaves Setup Mode
-efi-readvar                             # read back + confirm fingerprints match
+mokutil --sb-state     # enabled / setup mode
+mokutil --pk           # Platform Key
+mokutil --kek          # KEK
+mokutil --db           # signature db — your enrolled fleet db cert appears here
+mokutil --dbx          # revocations
 ```
 
-Only the **public** certs/`.esl`/`.auth` need to reach the workstation — never
-copy `PK.key`/`KEK.key`/`db.key` onto a host.
+**Enrol — two paths:**
+
+**(a) Baked helper over SSH (`fleet-sb-enroll`)** — the OS-side, efitools-free
+path. The build bakes `/usr/local/bin/fleet-sb-enroll` plus the public
+`PK/KEK/db.auth` at `/usr/share/fleet-secureboot/` (supplied via
+`files/secureboot/keys/` or the `SB_*_AUTH_B64` CI secrets). On a workstation in
+**Setup Mode**:
+```bash
+sudo fleet-sb-enroll --check     # show SB state + which keys are baked
+sudo fleet-sb-enroll             # enrol db -> KEK -> PK (PK last; exits Setup Mode)
+mokutil --db ; mokutil --sb-state   # verify
+```
+It writes the signed `.auth` updates to efivarfs directly (the EL9-native
+equivalent of `efi-updatevar`), refuses to run outside Setup Mode without
+`--force`, and is added to fapolicyd's trust DB at build (it's a non-RPM exec).
+⚠ This is a deliberate trust-bootstrap action — run it only on a host you control,
+on a trusted/isolated network (see TODO #10).
+
+**(b) Firmware UI** — no OS tooling, the most robust for one-off laptop bring-up:
+1. Put the public `db.crt` (and `KEK.crt`/`PK.crt`, or the `.esl`/`.auth`) on a
+   **FAT USB stick** (or the ESP).
+2. Firmware setup → Secure Boot → **Custom**, **Clear/Reset** keys (Setup Mode),
+   then **Enrol / Load key from file** for db, then KEK, then PK. On **HP
+   EliteBooks**: `F10` → *Security* → *Secure Boot Configuration*.
+3. Save & exit; re-check over SSH with `mokutil --db`.
+
+Only the **public** certs/`.esl`/`.auth` reach the workstation — never copy
+`PK.key`/`KEK.key`/`db.key` onto a host.
 
 ## 4. Wire `db` into the build