Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into secure-ntp

docs/tpm-enrolment-design.md

@@ -348,8 +348,9 @@ exists. Enrolment is where it comes into being.
    `tpm-selftest.sh` capability check; step-ca + EAP-TLS bench.
 2. **Broker — BUILT (2026-06-28): [`serving/enrol-broker/`](../serving/enrol-broker/).**
    Go, stdlib-only. Public unauth listener (`POST /request`, `GET /status/{id}`)
-   behind the serving nginx `/enrol/`; admin **mTLS web UI** (`/`, `/pending`,
+   behind the serving nginx `/enrol/`; admin **mTLS JSON API** (`/pending`,
-   `/approve|deny/{id}`) on the mgmt network; wordlist fingerprint = `H(CSR-pubkey ‖
+   `/approve|deny/{id}`) on the mgmt network — driven by the fleet-manager passkey
+   SPA (the broker's own HTML console was retired 2026-07-11); wordlist fingerprint = `H(CSR-pubkey ‖
    server-nonce)`; time-boxed in-memory store + per-IP rate limit; signs via
    `step ca token`+`step ca sign` (broker holds the provisioner password) with a
    dev `mock` signer. **Fingerprint-only assurance.** Admin client CA is a

files/ssh-hostcert/main.go

@@ -77,9 +77,15 @@ func main() {
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Fatalf("read host key %s: %v", *hostKey, err)
 	}
-	princ := splitPrincipals(*principals)
+	// Principals are the names admins connect by. Default to this host's
+	// (DHCP-assigned) hostname AND its FQDN <hostname>.<domain> derived from the
+	// DHCP search domain at runtime (never baked — invariant #1); any explicit
+	// -principals are added on top. Without the FQDN a `@cert-authority *.<domain>`
+	// line rejects the cert with "name is not a listed principal" on FQDN logins
+	// (bench-confirmed on comet-beacon-54, 2026-07-11).
+	princ := appendUnique(defaultPrincipals(), splitPrincipals(*principals)...)
 	if len(princ) == 0 {
-		princ = defaultPrincipals()
+		princ = []string{"localhost"}
 	}
 	keyID := ""
 	if id.cert.Leaf != nil {
@@ -175,12 +181,58 @@ func splitPrincipals(s string) []string {
 	return out
 }
 
+// defaultPrincipals returns the names admins connect to this host by: the
+// (DHCP-assigned) hostname and, when a DHCP search domain is known, the FQDN
+// <hostname>.<domain>. The FQDN is derived at runtime (never baked — invariant
+// #1), mirroring how the NTS dispatcher derives ntp.<domain>: an admin's
+// `@cert-authority *.<domain>` line only matches the host if the FQDN is a cert
+// principal, so a short-name-only cert fails FQDN logins.
 func defaultPrincipals() []string {
 	h, err := os.Hostname()
 	if err != nil || h == "" {
-		return []string{"localhost"}
+		return nil
 	}
-	return []string{h}
+	out := []string{h}
+	if !strings.Contains(h, ".") {
+		if dom := dhcpDomain(); dom != "" {
+			out = append(out, h+"."+dom)
+		}
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+// resolvConf is the file dhcpDomain reads (a var so tests can point elsewhere).
+var resolvConf = "/etc/resolv.conf"
+
+// dhcpDomain returns the first DHCP-provided search/domain from resolv.conf
+// (NetworkManager writes it from DHCP option 15/119). Empty if none is set.
+func dhcpDomain() string {
+	b, err := os.ReadFile(resolvConf)
+	if err != nil {
+		return ""
+	}
+	for ln := range strings.SplitSeq(string(b), "\n") {
+		f := strings.Fields(ln)
+		if len(f) >= 2 && (f[0] == "search" || f[0] == "domain") {
+			return f[1]
+		}
+	}
+	return ""
+}
+
+// appendUnique appends to base each of extra not already present (order-preserving).
+func appendUnique(base []string, extra ...string) []string {
+	seen := make(map[string]bool, len(base))
+	for _, s := range base {
+		seen[s] = true
+	}
+	for _, s := range extra {
+		if s != "" && !seen[s] {
+			seen[s] = true
+			base = append(base, s)
+		}
+	}
+	return base
 }
 
 func envOr(k, def string) string {

files/ssh-hostcert/main_test.go

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
+	"os"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 )
@@ -40,6 +41,64 @@ func TestSplitPrincipals(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestDhcpDomain(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	rc := dir + "/resolv.conf"
+	old := resolvConf
+	resolvConf = rc
+	defer func() { resolvConf = old }()
+
+	if err := os.WriteFile(rc, []byte("domain corp.example\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if d := dhcpDomain(); d != "corp.example" {
+		t.Errorf("domain line: got %q", d)
+	}
+	if err := os.WriteFile(rc, []byte("nameserver 1.1.1.1\nsearch a.lab b.lab\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if d := dhcpDomain(); d != "a.lab" {
+		t.Errorf("search line: got %q", d)
+	}
+	os.Remove(rc)
+	if d := dhcpDomain(); d != "" {
+		t.Errorf("missing file: got %q", d)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDefaultPrincipalsFQDN(t *testing.T) {
+	h, _ := os.Hostname()
+	if h == "" || strings.Contains(h, ".") {
+		t.Skip("host name unsuitable for this test")
+	}
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	rc := dir + "/resolv.conf"
+	if err := os.WriteFile(rc, []byte("nameserver 10.0.0.1\nsearch fleet.lab example.org\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	old := resolvConf
+	resolvConf = rc
+	defer func() { resolvConf = old }()
+
+	got := defaultPrincipals()
+	if len(got) != 2 || got[0] != h || got[1] != h+".fleet.lab" {
+		t.Errorf("defaultPrincipals = %v, want [%s %s.fleet.lab]", got, h, h)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAppendUnique(t *testing.T) {
+	got := appendUnique([]string{"a", "b"}, "b", "c", "", "a", "d")
+	want := []string{"a", "b", "c", "d"}
+	if len(got) != len(want) {
+		t.Fatalf("got %v want %v", got, want)
+	}
+	for i := range want {
+		if got[i] != want[i] {
+			t.Fatalf("got %v want %v", got, want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 func TestParseHandle(t *testing.T) {
 	h, err := parseHandle("0x81000100")
 	if err != nil || uint32(h) != 0x81000100 {

serving/defaults.env

@@ -109,38 +109,13 @@ SUBNQN=nqn.2026-06.org.example.fleet:rootfs
 TARGET_PORT=4420
 SPDK_CPUMASK=0x1           # one polling core is plenty for a read-only boot fs
 
-# --- TPM enrolment broker (TEMPORARY in this stack — see docs/TODO.md #11) ---
+# --- TPM enrolment broker — configured in the CA-co-located stack -----------
-# The broker is the one unauthenticated pre-auth endpoint (nginx proxies /enrol/
+# The broker no longer runs in this stack (a mock-signer copy here collided with
-# to it). Defaults run the zero-dependency LAB path: a `mock` signer (ephemeral
+# the real one on 9090/9443 and issued untrusted certs — removed 2026-07-11). It
-# CA; certs NOT trusted by RADIUS/NVMe) + plaintext loopback admin — enough to
+# lives in serving/dot1x-bench/ alongside step-ca (real signing needs the CA), and
-# exercise the request/approve/poll flow while the host side is built.
+# the `http` nginx here still proxies /enrol/ -> 127.0.0.1:9090 to reach it on the
-#
+# same host. Configure the broker (signer, provisioner, admin mTLS) in
-# For REAL enrolment: set ENROL_SIGNER=step, point ENROL_STEP_CA_URL at a
+# serving/dot1x-bench/.env, not here.
-# reachable step-ca (e.g. the one in serving/dot1x-bench/), drop its root +
-# provisioner password into ./enrol-pki/, generate the admin mTLS PKI
-# (./enrol-broker/admin-pki.sh ./enrol-pki/broker <admin>), and set
-# ENROL_ADMIN_INSECURE=false. Then it belongs in its own CA-co-located stack.
-ENROL_SIGNER=mock                 # mock (lab, no CA) | step (real, needs a CA)
-ENROL_ADMIN_INSECURE=true         # true = plaintext loopback admin (LAB ONLY); false = mTLS
-ENROL_PENDING_TTL=10m             # time-box on unapproved requests
-ENROL_WORDS=8                     # fingerprint word count
-ENROL_HOSTNQN_BASE=nqn.2026-06.org.example.fleet:host-
-# step signer (only when ENROL_SIGNER=step) — paths are INSIDE the container
-# (./enrol-pki is mounted at /pki):
-ENROL_STEP_CA_URL=                # e.g. https://ca.fleet.lab:8443
-ENROL_STEP_CA_ROOT=/pki/root_ca.crt
-ENROL_STEP_PROVISIONER=enrol
-ENROL_STEP_PASSWORD_FILE=/pki/password
-# Issued-cert lifetime. NOTE: the step-ca provisioner must ALLOW this — a stock
-# step-ca caps certs at 24h, so 720h is rejected ("requested duration ... more
-# than the authorized maximum certificate duration of 24h"). The bench
-# step-ca/bootstrap.sh now raises authority.claims.maxTLSCertDuration; a
-# different CA needs the same. Verified end-to-end against a real step-ca.
-ENROL_CERT_NOT_AFTER=720h
-# admin mTLS (only when ENROL_ADMIN_INSECURE=false):
-ENROL_ADMIN_CERT=/pki/broker/server.crt
-ENROL_ADMIN_KEY=/pki/broker/server.key
-ENROL_ADMIN_CLIENT_CA=/pki/broker/admin-ca.crt
 
 # --- SPDK version loader / reaper (declarative rolling updates) -------------
 # The spdk-loader service stages + adds ${IMAGE_VERSION} to the long-lived target

serving/docker-compose.yml

@@ -201,50 +201,15 @@ services:
     # For HTTPS boot (production), terminate TLS here with the boot-infra CA's
     # cert and switch the dhcp-boot URL above to https://. Left HTTP for the lab.
 
-  # --- TPM enrolment broker (TEMPORARY home — see docs/TODO.md #11) -----------
+  # --- TPM enrolment broker — NOT defined here (lives in the CA stack) --------
-  # The `http` nginx already reverse-proxies /enrol/ -> 127.0.0.1:9090 (this
+  # The broker's home is co-located with step-ca (the fleet CA), i.e.
-  # broker's public listener), so an empty-NV host can POST its CSR and poll for
+  # serving/dot1x-bench/, since real signing needs that CA. A `mock`-signer
-  # the signed cert via the normal serving host. For now the broker runs HERE so
+  # convenience copy used to run here too, but two host-networked brokers collide
-  # a single `compose up` in serving/ brings the enrolment endpoint up.
+  # on 9090/9443 and the mock copy issued certs RADIUS/NVMe don't trust — so it was
-  #
+  # removed (bench 2026-07-11; see docs/ssh-host-certificate-design.md). The `http`
-  # ⚠ PROPER HOME is its own stack co-located with step-ca (the fleet CA), i.e.
+  # nginx still reverse-proxies /enrol/ -> 127.0.0.1:9090; bring up
-  # serving/dot1x-bench/, since REAL signing needs that CA. SPLIT THIS BACK OUT
+  # serving/dot1x-bench on the same host (its broker binds that loopback port) to
-  # once the CA lives beside it. Do NOT run this AND dot1x-bench's enrol-broker on
+  # serve enrolment. Do NOT re-add a second broker here.
-  # the same host — they collide on 9090/9443.
-  #
-  # Defaults below are the zero-dependency LAB path: `mock` signer (ephemeral
-  # in-process CA — certs are NOT trusted by RADIUS/NVMe) + plaintext loopback
-  # admin. For REAL enrolment, in .env set ENROL_SIGNER=step + point
-  # ENROL_STEP_CA_* at a reachable step-ca, and set ENROL_ADMIN_INSECURE=false
-  # after generating the admin mTLS PKI (a DEDICATED admin CA, not the fleet root):
-  #   ./enrol-broker/admin-pki.sh ./enrol-pki/broker <admin-name>
-  # then import enrol-pki/broker/clients/<admin>.p12 and open https://127.0.0.1:9443/
-  enrol-broker:
-    build: ./enrol-broker
-    network_mode: host          # public on 127.0.0.1:9090 (nginx proxies /enrol/)
-    restart: unless-stopped
-    environment:
-      BROKER_PUBLIC_ADDR: "127.0.0.1:9090"   # nginx /enrol/ proxies here
-      BROKER_ADMIN_ADDR: "127.0.0.1:9443"    # mgmt/loopback ONLY — never the boot LAN
-      BROKER_SIGNER: ${ENROL_SIGNER:-mock}
-      BROKER_PENDING_TTL: ${ENROL_PENDING_TTL:-10m}
-      BROKER_WORDS: ${ENROL_WORDS:-8}
-      HOSTNQN_BASE: ${ENROL_HOSTNQN_BASE:-nqn.2026-06.org.example.fleet:host-}
-      # --- step signer (only consulted when ENROL_SIGNER=step) ---
-      STEP_CA_URL: ${ENROL_STEP_CA_URL:-}
-      STEP_CA_ROOT: ${ENROL_STEP_CA_ROOT:-/pki/root_ca.crt}
-      STEP_PROVISIONER: ${ENROL_STEP_PROVISIONER:-enrol}
-      STEP_PROVISIONER_PASSWORD_FILE: ${ENROL_STEP_PASSWORD_FILE:-/pki/password}
-      STEP_CERT_NOT_AFTER: ${ENROL_CERT_NOT_AFTER:-720h}
-      # --- admin mTLS (set ENROL_ADMIN_INSECURE=false for real mTLS) ---
-      BROKER_ADMIN_INSECURE: ${ENROL_ADMIN_INSECURE:-true}
-      BROKER_ADMIN_CERT: ${ENROL_ADMIN_CERT:-/pki/broker/server.crt}
-      BROKER_ADMIN_KEY: ${ENROL_ADMIN_KEY:-/pki/broker/server.key}
-      BROKER_ADMIN_CLIENT_CA: ${ENROL_ADMIN_CLIENT_CA:-/pki/broker/admin-ca.crt}
-    volumes:
-      # CA root + provisioner password (step signer) and admin mTLS certs live
-      # here; unused/empty for the default mock+insecure path. Gitignored.
-      - ./enrol-pki:/pki:ro
 
   # --- Kiosk SPA (spaceship terminal shown by the diskless kiosk) ------------
   # Svelte + Tailwind app built into a static bundle served by its own nginx.

serving/dot1x-bench/docker-compose.yml

@@ -70,7 +70,12 @@ services:
       BROKER_PUBLIC_ADDR: "127.0.0.1:9090"
       BROKER_ADMIN_ADDR: "127.0.0.1:9443"
       BROKER_SIGNER: "step"
-      STEP_CA_URL: "https://${CA_DNS:-ca.fleet.lab}:${CA_PORT:-8443}"
+      # Co-located with step-ca (both network_mode: host), so reach it over
+      # loopback — NOT the fleet DNS name. ca.fleet.lab is a dnsmasq name for
+      # boot-LAN clients; the broker's host resolver doesn't know it, so signing
+      # died with "lookup ca.fleet.lab: no such host" (bench 2026-07-11). localhost
+      # is always in the CA cert SAN (DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_DNS_NAMES) so TLS verifies.
+      STEP_CA_URL: "https://localhost:${CA_PORT:-8443}"
       STEP_CA_ROOT: "/pki/root_ca.crt"
       STEP_PROVISIONER: "enrol"
       STEP_PROVISIONER_PASSWORD_FILE: "/pki/stepca/secrets/password"

serving/dot1x-bench/step-ca/ssh-ca-bootstrap.sh

@@ -82,10 +82,33 @@ fi
 # The broker authenticates to step-ca with this JWK provisioner (signer.go). It
 # must be allowed to issue SSH HOST certs. BENCH-VERIFY the exact subcommand/flag
 # on your step version (some use `provisioner update <name> --ssh`).
-echo "==> enabling SSH on provisioner '${PROVISIONER}' (BENCH-VERIFY the flag)"
+echo "==> enabling SSH host-cert issuance on provisioner '${PROVISIONER}'"
-incca step ca provisioner update "${PROVISIONER}" --ssh 2>/dev/null \
+# FAIL LOUDLY: a swallowed failure here leaves enableSSHCA=false, and every
-  && restart_ca \
+# `step ssh certificate` at runtime dies with a 502 whose cause the operator
-  || echo "   NOTE: could not auto-enable SSH on '${PROVISIONER}' — enable it by hand (step ca provisioner update ${PROVISIONER} --ssh) and restart step-ca."
+# can't see (bench 2026-07-11). If your `step` uses a different flag, fix it and
+# re-run rather than shipping a half-configured CA.
+if ! incca step ca provisioner update "${PROVISIONER}" --ssh; then
+  echo "ERROR: 'step ca provisioner update ${PROVISIONER} --ssh' failed. Your step" >&2
+  echo "       version may use a different flag — check: step ca provisioner update --help" >&2
+  echo "       Aborting so SSH host-cert signing isn't silently left disabled." >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+restart_ca
+# Verify it actually took — the CA only issues SSH host certs if enableSSHCA=true.
+if ! python3 - "$CA_JSON" "$PROVISIONER" <<'PY'
+import json,sys
+c=json.load(open(sys.argv[1])); name=sys.argv[2]
+for p in c["authority"]["provisioners"]:
+    if p.get("name")==name and p.get("claims",{}).get("enableSSHCA") is True:
+        sys.exit(0)
+sys.exit(1)
+PY
+then
+  echo "ERROR: provisioner '${PROVISIONER}' still not SSH-enabled (enableSSHCA != true)" >&2
+  echo "       after the update + restart. SSH host-cert signing would fail at runtime; aborting." >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+echo "   SSH host-cert issuance enabled on '${PROVISIONER}' (enableSSHCA=true)."
 
 # --- 3. broker host-plane server cert + fleet client-CA bundle --------------
 # The host plane is mTLS: its SERVER cert must be FLEET-signed (the booted host
@@ -104,8 +127,19 @@ cat "$PKI/root_ca.crt" > "$PKI/broker/fleet-client-ca.crt"
 [ -f "$PKI/intermediate_ca.crt" ] && cat "$PKI/intermediate_ca.crt" >> "$PKI/broker/fleet-client-ca.crt"
 
 # --- 4. export the SSH host CA public key (admin trust anchor) ---------------
-echo "==> exporting SSH host CA public key -> $PKI/ssh_host_ca.pub"
+# `step crypto keypair` writes the public key in PEM/PKCS8, but a known_hosts
-incca cp /home/step/secrets/ssh_host_ca_key.pub /export/ssh_host_ca.pub
+# `@cert-authority` line needs the single-line OpenSSH wire format
+# (`ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAA…`). Emitting the PEM verbatim yields an unparseable
+# anchor → ssh silently falls back to TOFU (bench 2026-07-11). Convert it.
+echo "==> exporting SSH host CA public key (OpenSSH format) -> $PKI/ssh_host_ca.pub"
+incca cp /home/step/secrets/ssh_host_ca_key.pub /export/ssh_host_ca_key.pem
+command -v ssh-keygen >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
+  echo "ERROR: ssh-keygen not found — cannot convert the CA key to OpenSSH format." >&2
+  echo "       Install openssh-clients; the raw PKCS8 key is at $PKI/ssh_host_ca_key.pem." >&2
+  exit 1
+}
+ssh-keygen -i -m PKCS8 -f "$PKI/ssh_host_ca_key.pem" > "$PKI/ssh_host_ca.pub"
+rm -f "$PKI/ssh_host_ca_key.pem"
 echo
 echo "Admin rollout — add ONE line to each admin's ~/.ssh/known_hosts (or a system"
 echo "known_hosts), so every fleet host is trusted via the CA instead of TOFU:"

serving/enrol-broker/README.md

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ PUBLIC  (plain HTTP, behind the serving nginx /enrol/)   UNAUTHENTICATED
   GET  /healthz
 
 ADMIN   (mTLS, management network / loopback ONLY)        admin client cert
-  GET  /              the pending-queue web UI (fingerprint + approve/deny)
+  GET  /              plaintext pointer (API only; human UI is the fleet-manager SPA)
   GET  /pending       JSON queue
   POST /approve/{id}  OOB-approve -> step ca sign -> store cert
   POST /deny/{id}     reject
@@ -74,9 +74,11 @@ docker compose up -d step-ca && ./step-ca/bootstrap.sh   # CA + root_ca.crt + en
 docker compose up -d enrol-broker
 ```
 
-Then import `pki/broker/clients/alice.p12` (empty password) into your browser and
+Approve/deny is driven by the **fleet-manager SPA** (passkey-gated), which calls
-open `https://127.0.0.1:9443/`. Hosts reach the public side via the serving
+this plane's JSON API over mTLS; the broker no longer serves its own HTML console.
-stack's nginx: `http://boot.fleet.lab/enrol/`.
+For a scripted/manual approve, use the admin client cert directly against the API,
+e.g. `curl --cert/--key … https://127.0.0.1:9443/pending`. Hosts reach the public
+side via the serving stack's nginx: `http://boot.fleet.lab/enrol/`.
 
 ### Admin mTLS PKI — important
 

serving/enrol-broker/admin.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-// admin.go — the mTLS admin plane: the pending-queue web UI + approve/deny.
+// admin.go — the mTLS admin plane: the pending-queue + approve/deny JSON API.
 //
 // This listener is the AUTHENTICATED half of the broker and must live on the
 // management network / loopback only — NEVER the boot LAN (docs invariant: the
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ package main
 import (
 	"crypto/tls"
 	"crypto/x509"
-	"html/template"
 	"log"
 	"net/http"
 	"os"
@@ -21,7 +20,7 @@ import (
 
 func (b *broker) serveAdmin() {
 	mux := http.NewServeMux()
-	mux.HandleFunc("GET /", b.handleAdminIndex)
+	mux.HandleFunc("GET /", b.handleAdminRoot)
 	mux.HandleFunc("GET /pending", b.handleAdminPending)
 	mux.HandleFunc("POST /approve/{id}", b.handleApprove)
 	mux.HandleFunc("POST /deny/{id}", b.handleDeny)
@@ -121,94 +120,32 @@ func (b *broker) handleDeny(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	respondDecision(w, r, e)
 }
 
-// respondDecision replies to an approve/deny. A browser form gets redirected back
+// respondDecision replies to an approve/deny. A caller that asks for JSON
-// to the queue; a caller that asks for JSON (Accept: application/json — e.g. the
+// (Accept: application/json — the fleet-manager driving the broker as its
-// fleet-manager driving the broker as its authorise plane) gets the decided
+// authorise plane) gets the decided Enrolment (cert_serial, hostnqn, context,
-// Enrolment (cert_serial, hostnqn, context, fingerprint — NOT the cert PEM, which
+// fingerprint — NOT the cert PEM, which is unexported and only reaches the
-// is unexported and only reaches the requesting host); any other API caller keeps
+// requesting host); any other API caller keeps the original 204 (so
-// the original 204 (so verify-serving.sh and existing scripts are unaffected).
+// verify-serving.sh and existing scripts are unaffected).
 func respondDecision(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, e *Enrolment) {
-	switch {
+	if wantsJSON(r) {
-	case isBrowser(r):
-		http.Redirect(w, r, "/", http.StatusSeeOther)
-	case wantsJSON(r):
 		writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, e)
-	default:
+		return
-		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
 	}
+	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
 }
 
 func wantsJSON(r *http.Request) bool {
 	return strings.Contains(r.Header.Get("Accept"), "application/json")
 }
 
-func isBrowser(r *http.Request) bool {
+// handleAdminRoot: the human approval UI has moved to the fleet-manager SPA
-	a := r.Header.Get("Accept")
+// (WebAuthn-passkey gated), which drives this plane's JSON API over mTLS. This
-	return len(a) >= 9 && a[:9] == "text/html" || // explicit
+// listener is now API-only — the old embedded HTML console was retired to avoid a
-		r.Header.Get("Sec-Fetch-Mode") == "navigate"
+// second, weaker (client-cert-only) human approve path parallel to the passkey
+// UI. Kept as a plaintext pointer so a bookmark to the old console isn't a 404.
+func (b *broker) handleAdminRoot(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
+	_, _ = w.Write([]byte("enrol-broker admin plane — API only.\n" +
+		"  GET  /pending\n  POST /approve/{id}\n  POST /deny/{id}\n" +
+		"The human approval UI is the fleet-manager SPA (passkey-gated).\n"))
 }
-
-func (b *broker) handleAdminIndex(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-	data := struct {
-		Admin   string
-		Pending []*Enrolment
-		Now     time.Time
-	}{
-		Admin:   adminCN(r),
-		Pending: b.store.Pending(),
-		Now:     time.Now(),
-	}
-	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
-	if err := adminTmpl.Execute(w, data); err != nil {
-		log.Printf("admin template: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-var adminTmpl = template.Must(template.New("admin").Funcs(template.FuncMap{
-	"age": func(t time.Time) string { return time.Since(t).Round(time.Second).String() },
-}).Parse(adminHTML))
-
-const adminHTML = `<!doctype html>
-<html lang="en"><head><meta charset="utf-8">
-<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
-<title>fleet enrolment — pending</title>
-<style>
- :root{color-scheme:dark}
- body{background:#0b0f14;color:#cfe3ee;font:14px/1.5 ui-monospace,Menlo,Consolas,monospace;margin:0;padding:1.5rem}
- h1{font-size:1.1rem;color:#7fd1ff;margin:0 0 .25rem}
- .sub{color:#6b8294;margin:0 0 1.25rem}
- .empty{color:#6b8294;padding:2rem 0}
- .card{background:#111923;border:1px solid #1f2d3a;border-radius:8px;padding:1rem 1.1rem;margin:0 0 1rem}
- .fp{font-size:1.25rem;color:#aef9b0;letter-spacing:.5px;word-break:break-word}
- .meta{display:grid;grid-template-columns:max-content 1fr;gap:.1rem .8rem;margin:.6rem 0;color:#9fb6c4}
- .meta b{color:#6b8294;font-weight:400}
- .actions{margin-top:.7rem}
- button{font:inherit;border:0;border-radius:6px;padding:.45rem .9rem;cursor:pointer}
- .approve{background:#15602f;color:#d6ffe0}
- .deny{background:#5e1b1b;color:#ffd9d9;margin-left:.5rem}
- form{display:inline}
- code{color:#cfe3ee}
-</style></head><body>
-<h1>fleet enrolment — pending approvals</h1>
-<p class="sub">admin: <code>{{.Admin}}</code> · {{len .Pending}} pending · cross-check each fingerprint against the device's splash before approving</p>
-{{if not .Pending}}<div class="empty">no pending enrolments.</div>{{end}}
-{{range .Pending}}
-<div class="card">
-  <div class="fp">{{.Fingerprint}}</div>
-  <div class="meta">
-    <b>enrol-id</b><code>{{.ID}}</code>
-    <b>CN</b><code>{{.CN}}</code>
-    {{if .Context.MAC}}<b>MAC</b><code>{{.Context.MAC}}</code>{{end}}
-    {{if .Context.DMISerial}}<b>DMI serial</b><code>{{.Context.DMISerial}}</code>{{end}}
-    {{if .Context.DMIUUID}}<b>DMI uuid</b><code>{{.Context.DMIUUID}}</code>{{end}}
-    {{if .Context.EKHash}}<b>TPM EK</b><code>{{.Context.EKHash}}</code>{{end}}
-    <b>pubkey</b><code>{{.PubKeyHash}}</code>
-    <b>age</b><code>{{age .CreatedAt}}</code>
-  </div>
-  <div class="actions">
-    <form method="post" action="/approve/{{.ID}}"><button class="approve" type="submit">approve</button></form>
-    <form method="post" action="/deny/{{.ID}}"><button class="deny" type="submit">deny</button></form>
-  </div>
-</div>
-{{end}}
-</body></html>`