Update SSP

docs/secure-boot-keys.md

@@ -154,10 +154,14 @@ Mode failure (that surfaces as EACCES / "Permission denied"). Diagnose top-down:
   `pre-enrolled-keys=0` disk if the NUL bug is present. For a clean OVMF test bed:
   `qm set <vmid> --efidisk0 <storage>:1,efitype=4m,pre-enrolled-keys=0`.
 
-**Verified:** with the fix, a Proxmox VM enrols db→KEK→PK from the baked `.auth`
-files and boots the CI-signed UKI under **enforcing Secure Boot** over the HTTP
-boot path (`mokutil --sb-state` = enabled). The PXE/iPXE front-end additionally
-needs `snponly.efi` signed with `db` — see the iPXE section below.
+**Verified end-to-end on real hardware (2026-06-22):** `fleet-sb-enroll` (the
+baked, fixed script) enrols db→KEK→PK cleanly, and both boot transports verify
+under **enforcing Secure Boot** (`mokutil --sb-state` = enabled):
+- **Proxmox VM — HTTP boot:** firmware → signed UKI (2026-06-20).
+- **HP EliteBook 820 G4 — PXE boot:** firmware → signed `snponly.efi` (fleet-ipxe)
+  → signed UKI (2026-06-22).
+So the full signing pipeline (UKI + `fleet-ipxe`, both against the same enrolled
+`db`) is proven on real silicon, not just in the VM.
 
 ## 4. Wire `db` into the build