Add audit log sending

docs/TODO.md

@@ -107,10 +107,12 @@ keeps full STIG. Justified as register deviation #10. **Bench-verify on rebuild:
 kiosk renders + admin SSH works with hardening on.**
 
 Remaining (future hardening, currently waived — see the register): FIPS,
-firewall, per-host/rotatable admin access. **Remote audit offload — receiver
-DONE** (`serving/audit-collector/`, rsyslog over TCP/514, per-source-host files;
-DNS name `${AUDIT_HOST}`); the **image-side sender** (audisp-syslog + rsyslog
-forward to `audit.fleet.lab`) is still to wire — see that dir's README.
+firewall, per-host/rotatable admin access. **Remote audit offload — WIRED both
+ends** (2026-06-19): receiver `serving/audit-collector/` (rsyslog TCP/514,
+per-source-host files) + sender in the image (provisioner 2f, `audit_host` var:
+audisp-syslog→LOCAL6 + rsyslog `omfwd` to `audit.fleet.lab`). Lab is plaintext;
+TLS/RELP is the remaining hardening. **Bench-verify:** booted host's auditd AVCs
+land in `audit-collector/logs/<ip>/audit.log` and journal in `messages.log`.
 
 ### Original spec (retained for reference)
 

docs/stig-deviations.md

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Posture decisions (2026-06-18, lab phase):
 | 3 | **AIDE / file integrity** (`package_aide_installed`, `aide_build_database`, `aide_periodic_cron_checking`, `aide_scan_notification`, `aide_verify_*`) | The root is read-only and cryptographically verified; an on-disk AIDE db would also be non-deterministic and break the reproducible verity hash. | **dm-verity** verifies the whole root filesystem against a signed root hash on every read — continuous, hardware-backed integrity that supersedes AIDE's periodic scan. |
 | 4 | **Firewall** (`service_firewalld_enabled`, `package_firewalld_installed`, `set_firewalld_default_zone`) | Currently `firewall --disabled`; auto-enabling firewalld/nftables risks the NVMe/TCP (`:4420`) and NetworkManager paths during bring-up. | Isolated boot LAN; egress controlled at the serving-stack / network firewall layer. **Future hardening** — re-enable with explicit allow rules once the secure path is verified. |
 | 5 | **FIPS** (`enable_fips_mode`, `grub2_enable_fips_mode`, `package_dracut-fips_installed`) | Decision: off for the lab phase (interacts with the still-unsigned UKI / Secure Boot story). | Revisit with signing. No weakened crypto is configured in the meantime. |
-| 6 | **Remote audit offload** (`auditd_audispd_configure_remote_server`, `..._encrypt_sent_records`, `..._network_failure_action`, `rsyslog_remote_loghost`) | Decision: local-only for now; image not yet forwarding. | auditd enabled and recording locally. **Receiver now deployed** — `serving/audit-collector/` (rsyslog over TCP/514, per-source-host files, DNS name `${AUDIT_HOST}`). **Remaining hardening** — wire the image-side sender (audisp-syslog + rsyslog forward to the host-generic `audit.fleet.lab`, no per-host state); then this row's `rsyslog_remote_loghost` should pass. |
+| 6 | **Remote audit offload** (`auditd_audispd_configure_remote_server`, `..._encrypt_sent_records`, `..._network_failure_action`, `rsyslog_remote_loghost`) | The SSG `audisp-remote` native-protocol rules stay waived; offload is done via **rsyslog over TCP** instead (simpler, container-friendly receiver). Lab uses **plaintext** (mirrors the HTTP-boot stack); encryption/failure-action rules remain deviated until TLS/RELP. | **Now wired both ends.** Sender (image, provisioner 2f, `audit_host` var): audisp-syslog → LOCAL6 + rsyslog `omfwd` (disk-assisted queue) to the host-generic `audit.fleet.lab`. Receiver: `serving/audit-collector/` (rsyslog TCP/514, per-source-host files). No per-host state. **Future**: TLS (`gtls`) or RELP+TLS + a real collector — then the encrypt/failure-action rules can pass. |
 | 7 | **Smart card login** (`require_smart_card_login`, `sssd_enable_smartcard`, `install_smartcard_packages`) | Diskless hosts have no smartcard reader; admin access is SSH key-based. Enforcing smartcard login would lock the host out. | Admin auth is an SSH **key-only** account; root is locked; password auth disabled. |
 | 8 | **NOPASSWD sudo** (`sudo_remove_nopasswd`) | The baked admin is a **passwordless, key-only** account, so `sudo` cannot prompt for a password — NOPASSWD is required for it to function at all. | Single fleet-generic admin, key-only, `wheel`; no interactive password exists to protect. Tracked for the eventual per-host/rotatable access model (SSH CA / config-agent). |
 | 9 | **GUI / autologin / GDM** (gnome screensaver, GDM banner, automatic-login rules) | No GNOME/GDM is installed; the kiosk is an **intentional** autologin single-app (weston + Chromium) session on kiosk builds. | Kiosk user is unprivileged and passwordless; the session runs a single locked-down browser (no shell, no nav). Applies to kiosk builds only; non-kiosk builds don't install the GUI stack. |