tpm-enrol: inline empty-NV first-boot enrolment (host side, TODO #11)
Builds the host side of TPM identity enrolment — the "inline single-UKI"
vehicle from docs/tpm-enrolment-design.md. A production (secure) UKI now
auto-enrols a fresh host with no client cert, then reboots into the normal
secure path.
New dracut hook files/dracut/95dot1x-macsec/tpm-enrol.sh (initqueue/settled
prio 25, BEFORE dot1x-macsec-up at 30):
- no-op when a cert is already present in NV 0x01800001 (normal boot) or
under rd.dot1x=0 (test path has no trustworthy identity to enrol);
- on EMPTY NV: generate the signing key in the TPM @0x81010001 (openssl tpm2
provider builds the CSR; key never leaves the TPM), pre-auth DHCP on the
PHYSICAL NIC (nmcli re-manages en*, overriding the secure-mode unmanaged
drop-in), POST CSR+context to rd.fleet.enrol_url, show the broker
fingerprint on Plymouth, poll /status, write the issued leaf cert (DER) to
NV, and reboot to converge.
- Empty-NV and the secure path are mutually exclusive, so this never reorders
the load-bearing boot sequence (invariant #2).
Wiring:
- module-setup.sh: require+install the tpm2 key-gen/NV tools, curl, awk, and
the openssl tpm2 PROVIDER (ossl-modules/tpm2.so, asserted present — tpm2-tss
alone can't sign with a handle: key); install the hook.
- diskless.pkr.hcl: install tpm2-openssl + curl; assert hook/tools/provider in
the initramfs (invariant #9). New enrol_url var threaded to extract-artifacts.
- extract-artifacts.sh: bake rd.fleet.enrol_url into the cmdline.
- fleet.script: enrol-active/enrol-wait/enrol-done banner; fingerprint on the
message line (public — states only, invariant #1).
Shell JSON build/parse/cert-extract pipeline (no jq in the initramfs) verified
end-to-end against a live broker. BENCH-VERIFY list in docs/TODO.md #11 (tpm2
provider key-ref on real/swtpm, empty-NV detect, pre-auth DHCP override, Plymouth
render, NV write + reboot convergence, prod HTTPS).
This commit is contained in:
@@ -322,9 +322,14 @@ exists. Enrolment is where it comes into being.
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**dedicated** CA (`admin-pki.sh`), separate from the fleet CA, so host certs
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can't authenticate to the admin plane. End-to-end smoke-tested (CSR → mTLS
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approve → cert; pubkey match). Ships in `serving/dot1x-bench/docker-compose.yml`.
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3. **Host side (next build):** the **inline empty-NV trigger** — dracut early-boot
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branch that generates key/CSR, POSTs to the broker, shows the fingerprint on
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Plymouth, polls, writes NV, reboots; plus `tpm2-openssl` in the image.
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3. **Host side — BUILT 2026-07-02 (awaiting bench):** the **inline empty-NV
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trigger** — dracut hook `95dot1x-macsec/tpm-enrol.sh` (initqueue/settled prio
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25) generates key/CSR (openssl tpm2 provider), pre-auth-DHCPs the physical NIC,
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POSTs to the broker, shows the fingerprint on Plymouth, polls, writes the leaf
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cert to NV `0x01800001`, and reboots into the secure path. No-op when a cert is
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already present or under `rd.dot1x=0`. Ships `tpm2-openssl`+`curl` in the image
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(asserted in the initramfs); `enrol_url` Packer var → `rd.fleet.enrol_url`.
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BENCH-VERIFY list in `docs/TODO.md` #11.
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4. **Folds into fleet-manager:** the admin routes become the mgmt service's
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authenticated plane; approval writes the shared inventory record.
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5. **Provisioning-UKI variant** (`enrol_mode`) — move enrolment out of the production
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