fleet-enrol: content-aware NV check (-check-only), not blind "index defined"
The enrol trigger keyed on "is NV 0x01800001 defined/readable", so leftover state (an earlier tpm-provision run — bench-seen on the 820: "cert present — normal boot" with no real identity) or random bytes (tpm-selftest) silently suppressed enrolment. Now content-aware: - tpmkey.ReadNVCert reads the full NV contents (chunked). - classifyNVCert (TPM-agnostic, unit-tested): parses X.509, checks validity window, and when a real fleet CA bundle is present verifies the cert chains to it. Only a valid fleet cert = enrolled. - New `fleet-enrol -check-only` (no network/no key-gen) exits 0=valid cert, 20=enrol needed, 1=error. The full enrol path uses the same classification instead of NVPresent. - The dracut hook calls -check-only as the single gate, replacing the blind tpm2_nvread (and its now-dead TPM2TOOLS_TCTI export). tpm2_nvread stays in the initramfs for the secure path (dot1x-macsec-up.sh). Lab fallback: the shipped radius-ca.pem is a placeholder (not a cert) -> loadCAPool returns nil -> chain-less "parseable + unexpired" acceptance, so reboot-converge doesn't loop; production replaces radius-ca.pem with the real fleet CA for strict chaining. Tests: classifyNVCert table (valid/expired/garbage/foreign/no-CA) + simtest ReadNVCert roundtrip across the 512B chunk. All pass; packer validate clean.
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@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
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package simtest
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import (
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"bytes"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/sha256"
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@@ -85,7 +86,10 @@ func TestNVWriteAndPresence(t *testing.T) {
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if tpmkey.NVPresent(tpm, nv) {
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t.Fatalf("NV should be empty on a fresh TPM")
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}
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// realistic cert-sized payload that also crosses the 512B write chunk.
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if _, err := tpmkey.ReadNVCert(tpm, nv); err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("ReadNVCert should error on an undefined index")
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}
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// realistic cert-sized payload that also crosses the 512B read/write chunk.
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want := make([]byte, 700)
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rand.Read(want)
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if err := tpmkey.WriteNVCert(tpm, nv, want); err != nil {
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@@ -94,10 +98,21 @@ func TestNVWriteAndPresence(t *testing.T) {
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if !tpmkey.NVPresent(tpm, nv) {
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t.Fatalf("NV should be present after write")
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}
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// ReadNVCert must return exactly what was written (across the chunk boundary).
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got, err := tpmkey.ReadNVCert(tpm, nv)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("ReadNVCert: %v", err)
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}
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if !bytes.Equal(got, want) {
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t.Fatalf("ReadNVCert roundtrip mismatch: got %d bytes, want %d", len(got), len(want))
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}
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// re-write (re-enrolment) must succeed (undefine + redefine).
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if err := tpmkey.WriteNVCert(tpm, nv, want[:400]); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("WriteNVCert rewrite: %v", err)
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}
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if got, _ := tpmkey.ReadNVCert(tpm, nv); !bytes.Equal(got, want[:400]) {
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t.Fatalf("ReadNVCert after rewrite mismatch: got %d bytes, want 400", len(got))
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}
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}
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// Regression for the bench failure "key at handle is not ECC ... selector value
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