Lock down chromium policy
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@@ -155,6 +155,15 @@ Path to getting here (don't re-discover):
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avc`; the kiosk user is unconfined so likely none — but do NOT set permissive
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if they appear; add a policy module). Admin SSH (the key user) still works for
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debug even if the kiosk fails (it lands at graphical.target either way).
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- **Phone-home lockdown (done 2026-06-17):** Chromium was dialing Google
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(accounts/variations/optimization-guide/component+auto update/safe browsing —
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seen in dnsmasq logs). Stopped via a managed policy
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(`files/kiosk/chromium-kiosk-policy.json` → `/etc/chromium/policies/managed/`)
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plus hardening flags in `kiosk-session` (`--disable-background-networking`,
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`--disable-component-update`, `--disable-features=OptimizationHints,...`, etc.).
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Verify with the dnsmasq query log after a rebuild — only `boot.fleet.lab`
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(kiosk page) + chrony NTP should remain. NTP is the OS (chrony), not Chromium;
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optionally point it at the serving host to fully contain egress.
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- **Image size:** Chromium+Mesa add hundreds of MB to the *uncompressed* erofs —
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feeds the "shrink the rootfs" concern (and #7); reconsider whether a lighter
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browser/render path is viable.
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