enrol-broker: run in serving stack + fix step signer path end-to-end

Verifying the step signer against a real step-ca surfaced two real bugs the
mock signer had hidden, plus made the bench CA actually initialise:

- signer.go: move --not-after from `step ca token` (validity caps ~1h ->
  "token validity too long") to `step ca sign` (it is the CERT lifetime).
  Without this the step signer never issues a cert.
- dot1x-bench compose: DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_PASSWORD_FILE pointed at a file that
  does not exist at first init (it is an INPUT path), so `step ca init` failed
  and never wrote secrets/password. Use DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_PASSWORD (the value)
  which the entrypoint writes to secrets/password, where bootstrap + broker read.
- bootstrap.sh: self-heal the root-owned ./pki Docker auto-creates; detect the
  CA password at $STEPPATH/password or secrets/password (varies by image
  version); raise authority.claims.maxTLSCertDuration so 720h fleet certs are
  allowed (stock cap 24h, which also blocked bootstrap's own RADIUS cert); fix
  RADIUS cert paths to write via the /export mount (were host paths run inside
  the container, so they never resolved).

- serving stack: add the enrol-broker service (temporary home; nginx already
  proxies /enrol/) defaulting to the zero-dependency lab path (mock signer +
  insecure loopback admin), with ENROL_* knobs to switch to step + mTLS.
- verify-serving.sh: exercise request -> approve -> cert through the deployed
  nginx /enrol/ proxy.
- TODO #11: record the step-signer verification + the two fixes.

Step signer VERIFIED end-to-end against a real step-ca: issued cert chains to
the fleet root, EKU clientAuth, hostnqn derived from serial.

docs/TODO.md

@@ -1003,6 +1003,32 @@ authenticates EAP-TLS. **REMAINING:** the host-side inline empty-NV dracut branc
 (generate key/CSR → POST → Plymouth fingerprint → poll → NV write → reboot) +
 `tpm2-openssl` in the image.
 
+**TEMPORARY (2026-06-28): broker also added to the MAIN serving stack**
+(`serving/docker-compose.yml`, `enrol-broker` service + `ENROL_*` in
+`serving/.env.example`) so a single `compose up` in `serving/` brings the
+`/enrol/` endpoint up while the host side is built. Defaults to the
+zero-dependency lab path — **`mock` signer** (ephemeral CA; certs NOT trusted by
+RADIUS/NVMe) + **plaintext loopback admin** (`ENROL_ADMIN_INSECURE=true`). The
+serving nginx already proxies `/enrol/`→`127.0.0.1:9090`. **SPLIT BACK OUT:** the
+broker's proper home is a CA-co-located stack (it's still defined in
+`dot1x-bench/` next to step-ca); real signing needs the fleet CA. Don't run both
+copies on one host (they collide on 9090/9443). To use real signing from the
+serving stack meanwhile: set `ENROL_SIGNER=step` + `ENROL_STEP_CA_URL` at a
+reachable step-ca, populate `serving/enrol-pki/`, and `ENROL_ADMIN_INSECURE=false`.
+
+**STEP SIGNER VERIFIED end-to-end 2026-06-28** (broker → real step-ca → signed
+cert that chains to the fleet root; hostnqn derived from serial; EKU clientAuth).
+Verification found + fixed two things the `mock` path had hidden:
+- **BUG FIXED (`signer.go`):** `--not-after` was passed to `step ca token`
+  (validity capped ~1h → "token validity too long") instead of `step ca sign`.
+  Moved to the sign step. Without it the step signer never issues a cert.
+- **CA CLAIM REQUIRED:** a stock step-ca caps certs at 24h, so 720h is rejected
+  ("authorized maximum certificate duration of 24h"). `dot1x-bench/step-ca/bootstrap.sh`
+  now raises `authority.claims.maxTLSCertDuration` (+restarts the CA) — this also
+  unblocks bootstrap's own 720h RADIUS cert. Any other CA needs the same claim.
+- **BENCH-VERIFY still open:** issued cert actually authenticates EAP-TLS through
+  FreeRADIUS (next, before host enrolment).
+
 How a host gets its **802.1X EAP-TLS client identity** the first time — the key at
 TPM handle `0x81010001` + cert at NV `0x01800001` that invariant #1 says must come
 from enrolment, never the image. Distinct from #10 (that enrols *Secure Boot*

serving/.env.example

@@ -85,6 +85,39 @@ SUBNQN=nqn.2026-06.org.example.fleet:rootfs
 TARGET_PORT=4420
 SPDK_CPUMASK=0x1           # one polling core is plenty for a read-only boot fs
 
+# --- TPM enrolment broker (TEMPORARY in this stack — see docs/TODO.md #11) ---
+# The broker is the one unauthenticated pre-auth endpoint (nginx proxies /enrol/
+# to it). Defaults run the zero-dependency LAB path: a `mock` signer (ephemeral
+# CA; certs NOT trusted by RADIUS/NVMe) + plaintext loopback admin — enough to
+# exercise the request/approve/poll flow while the host side is built.
+#
+# For REAL enrolment: set ENROL_SIGNER=step, point ENROL_STEP_CA_URL at a
+# reachable step-ca (e.g. the one in serving/dot1x-bench/), drop its root +
+# provisioner password into ./enrol-pki/, generate the admin mTLS PKI
+# (./enrol-broker/admin-pki.sh ./enrol-pki/broker <admin>), and set
+# ENROL_ADMIN_INSECURE=false. Then it belongs in its own CA-co-located stack.
+ENROL_SIGNER=mock                 # mock (lab, no CA) | step (real, needs a CA)
+ENROL_ADMIN_INSECURE=true         # true = plaintext loopback admin (LAB ONLY); false = mTLS
+ENROL_PENDING_TTL=10m             # time-box on unapproved requests
+ENROL_WORDS=8                     # fingerprint word count
+ENROL_HOSTNQN_BASE=nqn.2026-06.org.example.fleet:host-
+# step signer (only when ENROL_SIGNER=step) — paths are INSIDE the container
+# (./enrol-pki is mounted at /pki):
+ENROL_STEP_CA_URL=                # e.g. https://ca.fleet.lab:8443
+ENROL_STEP_CA_ROOT=/pki/root_ca.crt
+ENROL_STEP_PROVISIONER=enrol
+ENROL_STEP_PASSWORD_FILE=/pki/password
+# Issued-cert lifetime. NOTE: the step-ca provisioner must ALLOW this — a stock
+# step-ca caps certs at 24h, so 720h is rejected ("requested duration ... more
+# than the authorized maximum certificate duration of 24h"). The bench
+# step-ca/bootstrap.sh now raises authority.claims.maxTLSCertDuration; a
+# different CA needs the same. Verified end-to-end against a real step-ca.
+ENROL_CERT_NOT_AFTER=720h
+# admin mTLS (only when ENROL_ADMIN_INSECURE=false):
+ENROL_ADMIN_CERT=/pki/broker/server.crt
+ENROL_ADMIN_KEY=/pki/broker/server.key
+ENROL_ADMIN_CLIENT_CA=/pki/broker/admin-ca.crt
+
 # --- SPDK version loader / reaper (declarative rolling updates) -------------
 # The spdk-loader service stages + adds ${IMAGE_VERSION} to the long-lived target
 # on `compose up`, then auto-removes OLD versions once they drain. Migration =

serving/docker-compose.yml

@@ -189,6 +189,51 @@ services:
     # For HTTPS boot (production), terminate TLS here with the boot-infra CA's
     # cert and switch the dhcp-boot URL above to https://. Left HTTP for the lab.
 
+  # --- TPM enrolment broker (TEMPORARY home — see docs/TODO.md #11) -----------
+  # The `http` nginx already reverse-proxies /enrol/ -> 127.0.0.1:9090 (this
+  # broker's public listener), so an empty-NV host can POST its CSR and poll for
+  # the signed cert via the normal serving host. For now the broker runs HERE so
+  # a single `compose up` in serving/ brings the enrolment endpoint up.
+  #
+  # ⚠ PROPER HOME is its own stack co-located with step-ca (the fleet CA), i.e.
+  # serving/dot1x-bench/, since REAL signing needs that CA. SPLIT THIS BACK OUT
+  # once the CA lives beside it. Do NOT run this AND dot1x-bench's enrol-broker on
+  # the same host — they collide on 9090/9443.
+  #
+  # Defaults below are the zero-dependency LAB path: `mock` signer (ephemeral
+  # in-process CA — certs are NOT trusted by RADIUS/NVMe) + plaintext loopback
+  # admin. For REAL enrolment, in .env set ENROL_SIGNER=step + point
+  # ENROL_STEP_CA_* at a reachable step-ca, and set ENROL_ADMIN_INSECURE=false
+  # after generating the admin mTLS PKI (a DEDICATED admin CA, not the fleet root):
+  #   ./enrol-broker/admin-pki.sh ./enrol-pki/broker <admin-name>
+  # then import enrol-pki/broker/clients/<admin>.p12 and open https://127.0.0.1:9443/
+  enrol-broker:
+    build: ./enrol-broker
+    network_mode: host          # public on 127.0.0.1:9090 (nginx proxies /enrol/)
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    environment:
+      BROKER_PUBLIC_ADDR: "127.0.0.1:9090"   # nginx /enrol/ proxies here
+      BROKER_ADMIN_ADDR: "127.0.0.1:9443"    # mgmt/loopback ONLY — never the boot LAN
+      BROKER_SIGNER: ${ENROL_SIGNER:-mock}
+      BROKER_PENDING_TTL: ${ENROL_PENDING_TTL:-10m}
+      BROKER_WORDS: ${ENROL_WORDS:-8}
+      HOSTNQN_BASE: ${ENROL_HOSTNQN_BASE:-nqn.2026-06.org.example.fleet:host-}
+      # --- step signer (only consulted when ENROL_SIGNER=step) ---
+      STEP_CA_URL: ${ENROL_STEP_CA_URL:-}
+      STEP_CA_ROOT: ${ENROL_STEP_CA_ROOT:-/pki/root_ca.crt}
+      STEP_PROVISIONER: ${ENROL_STEP_PROVISIONER:-enrol}
+      STEP_PROVISIONER_PASSWORD_FILE: ${ENROL_STEP_PASSWORD_FILE:-/pki/password}
+      STEP_CERT_NOT_AFTER: ${ENROL_CERT_NOT_AFTER:-720h}
+      # --- admin mTLS (set ENROL_ADMIN_INSECURE=false for real mTLS) ---
+      BROKER_ADMIN_INSECURE: ${ENROL_ADMIN_INSECURE:-true}
+      BROKER_ADMIN_CERT: ${ENROL_ADMIN_CERT:-/pki/broker/server.crt}
+      BROKER_ADMIN_KEY: ${ENROL_ADMIN_KEY:-/pki/broker/server.key}
+      BROKER_ADMIN_CLIENT_CA: ${ENROL_ADMIN_CLIENT_CA:-/pki/broker/admin-ca.crt}
+    volumes:
+      # CA root + provisioner password (step signer) and admin mTLS certs live
+      # here; unused/empty for the default mock+insecure path. Gitignored.
+      - ./enrol-pki:/pki:ro
+
   # --- Kiosk SPA (spaceship terminal shown by the diskless kiosk) ------------
   # Svelte + Tailwind app built into a static bundle served by its own nginx.
   # Now an INDEPENDENT project — the `kiosk-app` git submodule (its own repo +

serving/dot1x-bench/docker-compose.yml

@@ -25,7 +25,13 @@ services:
       DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_DNS_NAMES: "${CA_DNS:-ca.fleet.lab},localhost"
       DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_ADDRESS: ":${CA_PORT:-8443}"
       DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_PROVISIONER_NAME: "enrol"
-      DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_PASSWORD_FILE: "/home/step/secrets/password"
+      # Password to encrypt the CA keys + 'enrol' provisioner. Must be the VALUE
+      # (_PASSWORD), not _PASSWORD_FILE: the latter is an INPUT path the entrypoint
+      # reads FROM (for a mounted docker secret), which doesn't exist at first
+      # init → `step ca init` fails → no CA, no secrets/password (the "CA not
+      # initialised" error). With _PASSWORD the entrypoint WRITES it to
+      # /home/step/secrets/password, where bootstrap.sh + the enrol-broker read it.
+      DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_PASSWORD: "${CA_PASSWORD:-changeme-bench}"
     volumes:
       - ./pki/stepca:/home/step          # CA state (root/intermediate/keys/db) — gitignored
       - ./pki:/export                     # bootstrap.sh drops root_ca.crt here for the image/radius

serving/dot1x-bench/step-ca/bootstrap.sh

@@ -1,12 +1,16 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
 # bootstrap.sh — one-time setup of the bench CA after `docker compose up -d step-ca`.
 #
-#   1. wait for step-ca, export its root to pki/root_ca.crt (-> image radius-ca.pem)
+#   1. export the CA root to pki/root_ca.crt (-> image radius-ca.pem)
+#  1b. raise the cert-duration claim (so 720h fleet certs are allowed)
 #   2. ensure an enrolment provisioner exists (signs each host's TPM CSR)
 #   3. issue the RADIUS server cert/key into pki/radius/ (FreeRADIUS mounts it)
 #
-# Runs the `step` CLI against the running CA. Flags vary a little across step
+# `step` runs INSIDE the CA container (docker compose exec). Container paths:
-# versions — BENCH-VERIFY against your `step version` and adjust. Reads .env.
+#   /home/step  = CA state  (certs/root_ca.crt, secrets/password, config/ca.json)
+#   /export     = host ./pki (files written here appear on the host)
+# Flags vary a little across step versions — BENCH-VERIFY against your `step
+# version` and adjust. Reads .env.
 set -euo pipefail
 
 cd "$(dirname "$0")/.."
@@ -15,29 +19,92 @@ CA_DNS=${CA_DNS:-ca.fleet.lab}
 CA_PORT=${CA_PORT:-8443}
 CA_URL="https://${CA_DNS}:${CA_PORT}"
 PKI=pki
-mkdir -p "$PKI/radius"
 
-# The CA's password (auto-init wrote it from this file in the container volume).
+# step-ca initialises its state into ./pki/stepca as uid 1000, but Docker created
-PW="$PKI/stepca/secrets/password"
+# the top-level ./pki as ROOT (it auto-creates a missing bind-mount source), so
-[ -f "$PW" ] || { echo "CA not initialised yet ($PW missing) — is step-ca up?" >&2; exit 1; }
+# the host user can't write into it ("mkdir: Permission denied"). Self-heal — LAB
+# ONLY: make the tree read/write for everyone, so BOTH your host user and the
+# uid-1000 CA container can use it. (Pre-creating ./pki owned by you before
+# `compose up` avoids this; once fixed it stays fixed.)
+# The CA's password (auto-init wrote it here in the container volume). Also the
+# 'enrol' provisioner password the broker needs (copy to ../enrol-pki/password).
+# Location varies by smallstep image version: newer writes $STEPPATH/password,
+# older $STEPPATH/secrets/password — accept whichever exists.
+PW="$PKI/stepca/password"
+[ -e "$PW" ] || { [ -e "$PKI/stepca/secrets/password" ] && PW="$PKI/stepca/secrets/password"; }
+# same file as seen inside the container (/home/step is the ./pki/stepca mount).
+CONTAINER_PW="/home/step/${PW#"$PKI/stepca/"}"
+
+# Two uid hazards, both self-healed here (LAB ONLY):
+#  - Docker auto-creates a missing ./pki as ROOT  -> host mkdir denied.
+#  - step-ca writes its state as uid 1000 mode 600 -> host user can't read $PW.
+# If we can't create the radius dir OR can't read the password, chmod the tree
+# readable/writable for everyone (your user AND the uid-1000 CA container).
+if ! mkdir -p "$PKI/radius" 2>/dev/null || { [ -e "$PKI/stepca" ] && [ ! -r "$PW" ]; }; then
+  echo "==> fixing $PKI perms with sudo (docker/uid-1000 owns it; lab)"
+  sudo chmod -R a+rwX "$PKI"
+  mkdir -p "$PKI/radius"
+fi
+
+if [ ! -r "$PW" ]; then
+  echo "ERROR: CA password $PW missing/unreadable — step-ca did not initialise." >&2
+  echo "  Check:  docker compose logs step-ca   (look for an init failure)." >&2
+  echo "  Common cause: DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_PASSWORD not set (see compose). To reset:" >&2
+  echo "    docker compose down && sudo rm -rf $PKI && docker compose up -d step-ca" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
 
 step()  { docker compose exec -T step-ca step "$@"; }
+incca() { docker compose exec -T step-ca "$@"; }
 
 # --- 1. export the root (becomes files/etc/dot1x/radius-ca.pem) --------------
 echo "==> exporting CA root"
-docker compose exec -T step-ca cat /home/step/certs/root_ca.crt > "$PKI/root_ca.crt"
+incca cp /home/step/certs/root_ca.crt /export/root_ca.crt
-FP=$(step certificate fingerprint "$PKI/root_ca.crt" 2>/dev/null || \
+FP=$(openssl x509 -in "$PKI/root_ca.crt" -noout -fingerprint -sha256 | cut -d= -f2)
-     openssl x509 -in "$PKI/root_ca.crt" -noout -fingerprint -sha256 | cut -d= -f2)
 echo "    root fingerprint: $FP"
 echo "    copy to: files/etc/dot1x/radius-ca.pem  (image trust anchor)"
 
+# --- 1b. raise the CA cert-duration claim (idempotent) ----------------------
+# A stock step-ca caps issued certs at 24h. Both the RADIUS server cert below
+# AND the enrol-broker (--not-after 720h) need longer-lived fleet certs, so the
+# CA rejects them with "requested duration ... more than the authorized maximum
+# certificate duration of 24h". Patch authority.claims in the mounted ca.json
+# and restart the CA. Set CA_MAX_CERT_DUR / CA_DEFAULT_CERT_DUR in .env to tune.
+CA_JSON="$PKI/stepca/config/ca.json"
+CA_MAX_CERT_DUR=${CA_MAX_CERT_DUR:-2160h}
+CA_DEFAULT_CERT_DUR=${CA_DEFAULT_CERT_DUR:-720h}
+if [ -f "$CA_JSON" ]; then
+  if python3 - "$CA_JSON" "$CA_MAX_CERT_DUR" "$CA_DEFAULT_CERT_DUR" <<'PY'
+import json,sys
+p,maxd,defd=sys.argv[1],sys.argv[2],sys.argv[3]
+c=json.load(open(p))
+claims=c.setdefault("authority",{}).setdefault("claims",{})
+if claims.get("maxTLSCertDuration")==maxd and claims.get("defaultTLSCertDuration")==defd:
+    sys.exit(1)  # already set — no restart needed
+claims["maxTLSCertDuration"]=maxd
+claims["defaultTLSCertDuration"]=defd
+json.dump(c,open(p,"w"),indent=2)
+PY
+  then
+    echo "==> raised CA claims (max=$CA_MAX_CERT_DUR default=$CA_DEFAULT_CERT_DUR); restarting step-ca"
+    docker compose restart step-ca >/dev/null
+    for _ in $(seq 1 50); do
+      curl -fsS -k "$CA_URL/health" >/dev/null 2>&1 && break; sleep 0.2
+    done
+  else
+    echo "==> CA claims already set (max=$CA_MAX_CERT_DUR)"
+  fi
+else
+  echo "WARNING: $CA_JSON not found — cannot raise cert-duration claim; 720h certs will be REJECTED." >&2
+fi
+
 # --- 2. enrolment provisioner (idempotent) ----------------------------------
 # JWK provisioner 'enrol' is created by auto-init (DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_PROVISIONER_NAME).
 # Enrolment authorizes a CSR with a one-time token:
 #     step ca token <host-id> --provisioner enrol  →  passed to `step ca sign`
-# That token-gated sign is what enrol/tpm-provision.sh uses.
+# That token-gated sign is what the enrol-broker and enrol/tpm-provision.sh use.
 echo "==> provisioners:"
-step ca provisioner list --ca-url "$CA_URL" --root "$PKI/root_ca.crt" \
+step ca provisioner list --ca-url "$CA_URL" --root /export/root_ca.crt \
   | grep -E '"(name|type)"' || true
 
 # To UPGRADE to TPM attestation later, add an ACME attestation provisioner and
@@ -49,13 +116,16 @@ step ca provisioner list --ca-url "$CA_URL" --root "$PKI/root_ca.crt" \
 # (then `step ca acme` / an ACME client on the host instead of `step ca sign`.)
 
 # --- 3. RADIUS server cert (FreeRADIUS serves this; supplicant validates it) --
+# Written via /export so the files land in the host's pki/radius/ that FreeRADIUS
+# mounts. Uses the in-container CA root + provisioner password (no host copies).
 echo "==> issuing RADIUS server cert (radius.${CA_DNS#ca.})"
 RADIUS_CN="radius.${CA_DNS#ca.}"
+incca mkdir -p /export/radius
 step ca certificate "$RADIUS_CN" \
-  "$PKI/radius/server.pem" "$PKI/radius/server.key" \
+  /export/radius/server.pem /export/radius/server.key \
-  --ca-url "$CA_URL" --root "$PKI/root_ca.crt" \
+  --ca-url "$CA_URL" --root /export/root_ca.crt \
-  --provisioner enrol --provisioner-password-file "$PW" \
+  --provisioner enrol --provisioner-password-file "$CONTAINER_PW" \
   --not-after 720h --force
-cp "$PKI/root_ca.crt" "$PKI/radius/ca.pem"
+incca cp /export/root_ca.crt /export/radius/ca.pem
 echo "==> done. FreeRADIUS will read pki/radius/{server.pem,server.key,ca.pem}."
 echo "    Next: cp $PKI/root_ca.crt ../../files/etc/dot1x/radius-ca.pem  &&  rebuild secure-path image."

serving/enrol-broker/signer.go

@@ -66,30 +66,35 @@ func (s *stepSigner) Sign(ctx context.Context, csrPEM, cn string) (string, strin
 	}
 
 	// 1. one-time token (subject MUST equal the CSR CN for the JWK provisioner).
-	tokArgs := []string{
+	// NOTE: token validity is the short-lived authorization window (a JWK
+	// provisioner caps it at ~1h), NOT the issued cert's lifetime — do not put
+	// s.notAfter here or a multi-day value fails "token validity too long".
+	token, err := s.run(ctx,
 		"ca", "token", cn,
 		"--provisioner", s.provisioner,
 		"--ca-url", s.caURL,
 		"--root", s.root,
 		"--provisioner-password-file", s.passwordFile,
-	}
+	)
-	if s.notAfter != "" {
-		tokArgs = append(tokArgs, "--not-after", s.notAfter)
-	}
-	token, err := s.run(ctx, tokArgs...)
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("step ca token: %w", err)
 	}
 	token = strings.TrimSpace(token)
 
-	// 2. sign the CSR with that token.
+	// 2. sign the CSR with that token. The issued CERT's lifetime is set HERE
-	if _, err := s.run(ctx,
+	// (must be <= the provisioner's maxTLSCertDuration claim, else step-ca
+	// rejects it — raise that claim on the CA for multi-day fleet certs).
+	signArgs := []string{
 		"ca", "sign", csrPath, outPath,
 		"--token", token,
 		"--ca-url", s.caURL,
 		"--root", s.root,
 		"--force",
-	); err != nil {
+	}
+	if s.notAfter != "" {
+		signArgs = append(signArgs, "--not-after", s.notAfter)
+	}
+	if _, err := s.run(ctx, signArgs...); err != nil {
 		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("step ca sign: %w", err)
 	}
 	certPEM, err := os.ReadFile(outPath)

serving/enrol-broker/verify-serving.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Verify the enrol-broker as deployed in the serving stack. Run ON THE SERVING
+# HOST. Exercises the FULL path: public side through the nginx /enrol/ proxy
+# (:80) + the admin plane on loopback :9443.
+#
+#   ./verify-serving.sh                       # admin insecure (ENROL_ADMIN_INSECURE=true)
+#   ADMIN_P12=enrol-pki/broker/clients/alice.p12 ./verify-serving.sh   # admin mTLS
+#
+# Stand-in for the (not-yet-built) host side: an openssl CSR plays the TPM key.
+set -euo pipefail
+
+PUB_BASE="${PUB_BASE:-http://127.0.0.1/enrol}"   # via nginx; use http://127.0.0.1:9090 to hit broker directly
+ADMIN_BASE="${ADMIN_BASE:-http://127.0.0.1:9443}"
+ADMIN_P12="${ADMIN_P12:-}"                        # set => admin is mTLS (https + client cert)
+
+WORK="$(mktemp -d)"; trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
+jqget() { python3 -c 'import json,sys;print(json.load(sys.stdin)["'"$1"'"])'; }
+
+# admin curl: plaintext by default, or mTLS if a .p12 is given.
+admin() {
+  if [ -n "$ADMIN_P12" ]; then
+    openssl pkcs12 -in "$ADMIN_P12" -clcerts -nokeys -passin pass: -out "$WORK/ac.pem" 2>/dev/null
+    openssl pkcs12 -in "$ADMIN_P12" -nocerts -nodes -passin pass: -out "$WORK/ak.pem" 2>/dev/null
+    curl -fsS --cert "$WORK/ac.pem" --key "$WORK/ak.pem" -k "${ADMIN_BASE/http:/https:}$1" "${@:2}"
+  else
+    curl -fsS "$ADMIN_BASE$1" "${@:2}"
+  fi
+}
+
+echo "== healthz (through nginx) =="
+curl -fsS "$PUB_BASE/healthz"; echo
+
+echo "== generate CSR (stand-in for the TPM key) =="
+openssl ecparam -name prime256v1 -genkey -noout -out "$WORK/h.key" 2>/dev/null
+openssl req -new -key "$WORK/h.key" -subj "/CN=fleet-host" -out "$WORK/h.csr" 2>/dev/null
+CSR_JSON=$(python3 -c 'import json,sys;print(json.dumps(open(sys.argv[1]).read()))' "$WORK/h.csr")
+
+echo "== POST /enrol/request =="
+REQ=$(curl -fsS -X POST "$PUB_BASE/request" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+  -d "{\"csr\": $CSR_JSON, \"context\": {\"mac\":\"de:ad:be:ef:00:01\",\"dmi_serial\":\"VERIFY-001\"}}")
+echo "$REQ"
+ID=$(echo "$REQ" | jqget enrol_id)
+echo "enrol_id=$ID  fingerprint=$(echo "$REQ" | jqget fingerprint)"
+
+echo "== admin /pending =="; admin /pending; echo
+echo "== approve $ID =="; admin "/approve/$ID" -X POST; echo
+echo "== /enrol/status/$ID (expect approved + cert) =="
+curl -fsS "$PUB_BASE/status/$ID" | python3 -m json.tool
+echo
+echo "PASS: request -> approve -> cert through the serving deployment."

serving/enrol-pki/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# enrol-broker PKI material (CA root, provisioner password, admin mTLS certs).
+# Mounted read-only at /pki. Keep the dir, never commit its contents.
+*
+!.gitignore