enrol-broker: run in serving stack + fix step signer path end-to-end
Verifying the step signer against a real step-ca surfaced two real bugs the mock signer had hidden, plus made the bench CA actually initialise: - signer.go: move --not-after from `step ca token` (validity caps ~1h -> "token validity too long") to `step ca sign` (it is the CERT lifetime). Without this the step signer never issues a cert. - dot1x-bench compose: DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_PASSWORD_FILE pointed at a file that does not exist at first init (it is an INPUT path), so `step ca init` failed and never wrote secrets/password. Use DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_PASSWORD (the value) which the entrypoint writes to secrets/password, where bootstrap + broker read. - bootstrap.sh: self-heal the root-owned ./pki Docker auto-creates; detect the CA password at $STEPPATH/password or secrets/password (varies by image version); raise authority.claims.maxTLSCertDuration so 720h fleet certs are allowed (stock cap 24h, which also blocked bootstrap's own RADIUS cert); fix RADIUS cert paths to write via the /export mount (were host paths run inside the container, so they never resolved). - serving stack: add the enrol-broker service (temporary home; nginx already proxies /enrol/) defaulting to the zero-dependency lab path (mock signer + insecure loopback admin), with ENROL_* knobs to switch to step + mTLS. - verify-serving.sh: exercise request -> approve -> cert through the deployed nginx /enrol/ proxy. - TODO #11: record the step-signer verification + the two fixes. Step signer VERIFIED end-to-end against a real step-ca: issued cert chains to the fleet root, EKU clientAuth, hostnqn derived from serial.
This commit is contained in:
Audiobuzz
@@ -85,6 +85,39 @@ SUBNQN=nqn.2026-06.org.example.fleet:rootfs
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TARGET_PORT=4420
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SPDK_CPUMASK=0x1 # one polling core is plenty for a read-only boot fs
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# --- TPM enrolment broker (TEMPORARY in this stack — see docs/TODO.md #11) ---
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# The broker is the one unauthenticated pre-auth endpoint (nginx proxies /enrol/
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# to it). Defaults run the zero-dependency LAB path: a `mock` signer (ephemeral
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# CA; certs NOT trusted by RADIUS/NVMe) + plaintext loopback admin — enough to
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# exercise the request/approve/poll flow while the host side is built.
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#
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# For REAL enrolment: set ENROL_SIGNER=step, point ENROL_STEP_CA_URL at a
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# reachable step-ca (e.g. the one in serving/dot1x-bench/), drop its root +
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# provisioner password into ./enrol-pki/, generate the admin mTLS PKI
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# (./enrol-broker/admin-pki.sh ./enrol-pki/broker <admin>), and set
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# ENROL_ADMIN_INSECURE=false. Then it belongs in its own CA-co-located stack.
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ENROL_SIGNER=mock # mock (lab, no CA) | step (real, needs a CA)
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ENROL_ADMIN_INSECURE=true # true = plaintext loopback admin (LAB ONLY); false = mTLS
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ENROL_PENDING_TTL=10m # time-box on unapproved requests
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ENROL_WORDS=8 # fingerprint word count
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ENROL_HOSTNQN_BASE=nqn.2026-06.org.example.fleet:host-
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# step signer (only when ENROL_SIGNER=step) — paths are INSIDE the container
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# (./enrol-pki is mounted at /pki):
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ENROL_STEP_CA_URL= # e.g. https://ca.fleet.lab:8443
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ENROL_STEP_CA_ROOT=/pki/root_ca.crt
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ENROL_STEP_PROVISIONER=enrol
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ENROL_STEP_PASSWORD_FILE=/pki/password
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# Issued-cert lifetime. NOTE: the step-ca provisioner must ALLOW this — a stock
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# step-ca caps certs at 24h, so 720h is rejected ("requested duration ... more
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# than the authorized maximum certificate duration of 24h"). The bench
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# step-ca/bootstrap.sh now raises authority.claims.maxTLSCertDuration; a
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# different CA needs the same. Verified end-to-end against a real step-ca.
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ENROL_CERT_NOT_AFTER=720h
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# admin mTLS (only when ENROL_ADMIN_INSECURE=false):
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ENROL_ADMIN_CERT=/pki/broker/server.crt
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ENROL_ADMIN_KEY=/pki/broker/server.key
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ENROL_ADMIN_CLIENT_CA=/pki/broker/admin-ca.crt
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# --- SPDK version loader / reaper (declarative rolling updates) -------------
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# The spdk-loader service stages + adds ${IMAGE_VERSION} to the long-lived target
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# on `compose up`, then auto-removes OLD versions once they drain. Migration =
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@@ -189,6 +189,51 @@ services:
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# For HTTPS boot (production), terminate TLS here with the boot-infra CA's
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# cert and switch the dhcp-boot URL above to https://. Left HTTP for the lab.
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# --- TPM enrolment broker (TEMPORARY home — see docs/TODO.md #11) -----------
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# The `http` nginx already reverse-proxies /enrol/ -> 127.0.0.1:9090 (this
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# broker's public listener), so an empty-NV host can POST its CSR and poll for
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# the signed cert via the normal serving host. For now the broker runs HERE so
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# a single `compose up` in serving/ brings the enrolment endpoint up.
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#
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# ⚠ PROPER HOME is its own stack co-located with step-ca (the fleet CA), i.e.
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# serving/dot1x-bench/, since REAL signing needs that CA. SPLIT THIS BACK OUT
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# once the CA lives beside it. Do NOT run this AND dot1x-bench's enrol-broker on
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# the same host — they collide on 9090/9443.
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#
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# Defaults below are the zero-dependency LAB path: `mock` signer (ephemeral
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# in-process CA — certs are NOT trusted by RADIUS/NVMe) + plaintext loopback
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# admin. For REAL enrolment, in .env set ENROL_SIGNER=step + point
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# ENROL_STEP_CA_* at a reachable step-ca, and set ENROL_ADMIN_INSECURE=false
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# after generating the admin mTLS PKI (a DEDICATED admin CA, not the fleet root):
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# ./enrol-broker/admin-pki.sh ./enrol-pki/broker <admin-name>
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# then import enrol-pki/broker/clients/<admin>.p12 and open https://127.0.0.1:9443/
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enrol-broker:
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build: ./enrol-broker
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network_mode: host # public on 127.0.0.1:9090 (nginx proxies /enrol/)
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restart: unless-stopped
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environment:
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BROKER_PUBLIC_ADDR: "127.0.0.1:9090" # nginx /enrol/ proxies here
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BROKER_ADMIN_ADDR: "127.0.0.1:9443" # mgmt/loopback ONLY — never the boot LAN
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BROKER_SIGNER: ${ENROL_SIGNER:-mock}
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BROKER_PENDING_TTL: ${ENROL_PENDING_TTL:-10m}
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BROKER_WORDS: ${ENROL_WORDS:-8}
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HOSTNQN_BASE: ${ENROL_HOSTNQN_BASE:-nqn.2026-06.org.example.fleet:host-}
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# --- step signer (only consulted when ENROL_SIGNER=step) ---
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STEP_CA_URL: ${ENROL_STEP_CA_URL:-}
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STEP_CA_ROOT: ${ENROL_STEP_CA_ROOT:-/pki/root_ca.crt}
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STEP_PROVISIONER: ${ENROL_STEP_PROVISIONER:-enrol}
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STEP_PROVISIONER_PASSWORD_FILE: ${ENROL_STEP_PASSWORD_FILE:-/pki/password}
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STEP_CERT_NOT_AFTER: ${ENROL_CERT_NOT_AFTER:-720h}
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# --- admin mTLS (set ENROL_ADMIN_INSECURE=false for real mTLS) ---
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BROKER_ADMIN_INSECURE: ${ENROL_ADMIN_INSECURE:-true}
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BROKER_ADMIN_CERT: ${ENROL_ADMIN_CERT:-/pki/broker/server.crt}
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BROKER_ADMIN_KEY: ${ENROL_ADMIN_KEY:-/pki/broker/server.key}
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BROKER_ADMIN_CLIENT_CA: ${ENROL_ADMIN_CLIENT_CA:-/pki/broker/admin-ca.crt}
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volumes:
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# CA root + provisioner password (step signer) and admin mTLS certs live
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# here; unused/empty for the default mock+insecure path. Gitignored.
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- ./enrol-pki:/pki:ro
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# --- Kiosk SPA (spaceship terminal shown by the diskless kiosk) ------------
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# Svelte + Tailwind app built into a static bundle served by its own nginx.
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# Now an INDEPENDENT project — the `kiosk-app` git submodule (its own repo +
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@@ -25,7 +25,13 @@ services:
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DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_DNS_NAMES: "${CA_DNS:-ca.fleet.lab},localhost"
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DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_ADDRESS: ":${CA_PORT:-8443}"
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DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_PROVISIONER_NAME: "enrol"
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DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_PASSWORD_FILE: "/home/step/secrets/password"
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# Password to encrypt the CA keys + 'enrol' provisioner. Must be the VALUE
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# (_PASSWORD), not _PASSWORD_FILE: the latter is an INPUT path the entrypoint
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# reads FROM (for a mounted docker secret), which doesn't exist at first
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# init → `step ca init` fails → no CA, no secrets/password (the "CA not
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# initialised" error). With _PASSWORD the entrypoint WRITES it to
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# /home/step/secrets/password, where bootstrap.sh + the enrol-broker read it.
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DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_PASSWORD: "${CA_PASSWORD:-changeme-bench}"
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volumes:
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- ./pki/stepca:/home/step # CA state (root/intermediate/keys/db) — gitignored
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- ./pki:/export # bootstrap.sh drops root_ca.crt here for the image/radius
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@@ -1,12 +1,16 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# bootstrap.sh — one-time setup of the bench CA after `docker compose up -d step-ca`.
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#
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# 1. wait for step-ca, export its root to pki/root_ca.crt (-> image radius-ca.pem)
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# 1. export the CA root to pki/root_ca.crt (-> image radius-ca.pem)
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# 1b. raise the cert-duration claim (so 720h fleet certs are allowed)
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# 2. ensure an enrolment provisioner exists (signs each host's TPM CSR)
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# 3. issue the RADIUS server cert/key into pki/radius/ (FreeRADIUS mounts it)
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#
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# Runs the `step` CLI against the running CA. Flags vary a little across step
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# versions — BENCH-VERIFY against your `step version` and adjust. Reads .env.
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# `step` runs INSIDE the CA container (docker compose exec). Container paths:
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# /home/step = CA state (certs/root_ca.crt, secrets/password, config/ca.json)
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# /export = host ./pki (files written here appear on the host)
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# Flags vary a little across step versions — BENCH-VERIFY against your `step
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# version` and adjust. Reads .env.
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set -euo pipefail
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cd "$(dirname "$0")/.."
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@@ -15,29 +19,92 @@ CA_DNS=${CA_DNS:-ca.fleet.lab}
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CA_PORT=${CA_PORT:-8443}
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CA_URL="https://${CA_DNS}:${CA_PORT}"
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PKI=pki
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mkdir -p "$PKI/radius"
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# The CA's password (auto-init wrote it from this file in the container volume).
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PW="$PKI/stepca/secrets/password"
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[ -f "$PW" ] || { echo "CA not initialised yet ($PW missing) — is step-ca up?" >&2; exit 1; }
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# step-ca initialises its state into ./pki/stepca as uid 1000, but Docker created
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# the top-level ./pki as ROOT (it auto-creates a missing bind-mount source), so
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# the host user can't write into it ("mkdir: Permission denied"). Self-heal — LAB
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# ONLY: make the tree read/write for everyone, so BOTH your host user and the
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# uid-1000 CA container can use it. (Pre-creating ./pki owned by you before
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# `compose up` avoids this; once fixed it stays fixed.)
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# The CA's password (auto-init wrote it here in the container volume). Also the
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# 'enrol' provisioner password the broker needs (copy to ../enrol-pki/password).
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# Location varies by smallstep image version: newer writes $STEPPATH/password,
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# older $STEPPATH/secrets/password — accept whichever exists.
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PW="$PKI/stepca/password"
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[ -e "$PW" ] || { [ -e "$PKI/stepca/secrets/password" ] && PW="$PKI/stepca/secrets/password"; }
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# same file as seen inside the container (/home/step is the ./pki/stepca mount).
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CONTAINER_PW="/home/step/${PW#"$PKI/stepca/"}"
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step() { docker compose exec -T step-ca step "$@"; }
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# Two uid hazards, both self-healed here (LAB ONLY):
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# - Docker auto-creates a missing ./pki as ROOT -> host mkdir denied.
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# - step-ca writes its state as uid 1000 mode 600 -> host user can't read $PW.
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# If we can't create the radius dir OR can't read the password, chmod the tree
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# readable/writable for everyone (your user AND the uid-1000 CA container).
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if ! mkdir -p "$PKI/radius" 2>/dev/null || { [ -e "$PKI/stepca" ] && [ ! -r "$PW" ]; }; then
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echo "==> fixing $PKI perms with sudo (docker/uid-1000 owns it; lab)"
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sudo chmod -R a+rwX "$PKI"
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mkdir -p "$PKI/radius"
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fi
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if [ ! -r "$PW" ]; then
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echo "ERROR: CA password $PW missing/unreadable — step-ca did not initialise." >&2
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echo " Check: docker compose logs step-ca (look for an init failure)." >&2
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echo " Common cause: DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_PASSWORD not set (see compose). To reset:" >&2
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echo " docker compose down && sudo rm -rf $PKI && docker compose up -d step-ca" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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step() { docker compose exec -T step-ca step "$@"; }
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incca() { docker compose exec -T step-ca "$@"; }
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# --- 1. export the root (becomes files/etc/dot1x/radius-ca.pem) --------------
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echo "==> exporting CA root"
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docker compose exec -T step-ca cat /home/step/certs/root_ca.crt > "$PKI/root_ca.crt"
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FP=$(step certificate fingerprint "$PKI/root_ca.crt" 2>/dev/null || \
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openssl x509 -in "$PKI/root_ca.crt" -noout -fingerprint -sha256 | cut -d= -f2)
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incca cp /home/step/certs/root_ca.crt /export/root_ca.crt
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FP=$(openssl x509 -in "$PKI/root_ca.crt" -noout -fingerprint -sha256 | cut -d= -f2)
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echo " root fingerprint: $FP"
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echo " copy to: files/etc/dot1x/radius-ca.pem (image trust anchor)"
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# --- 1b. raise the CA cert-duration claim (idempotent) ----------------------
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# A stock step-ca caps issued certs at 24h. Both the RADIUS server cert below
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# AND the enrol-broker (--not-after 720h) need longer-lived fleet certs, so the
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# CA rejects them with "requested duration ... more than the authorized maximum
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# certificate duration of 24h". Patch authority.claims in the mounted ca.json
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# and restart the CA. Set CA_MAX_CERT_DUR / CA_DEFAULT_CERT_DUR in .env to tune.
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CA_JSON="$PKI/stepca/config/ca.json"
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CA_MAX_CERT_DUR=${CA_MAX_CERT_DUR:-2160h}
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CA_DEFAULT_CERT_DUR=${CA_DEFAULT_CERT_DUR:-720h}
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if [ -f "$CA_JSON" ]; then
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if python3 - "$CA_JSON" "$CA_MAX_CERT_DUR" "$CA_DEFAULT_CERT_DUR" <<'PY'
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import json,sys
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p,maxd,defd=sys.argv[1],sys.argv[2],sys.argv[3]
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c=json.load(open(p))
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claims=c.setdefault("authority",{}).setdefault("claims",{})
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if claims.get("maxTLSCertDuration")==maxd and claims.get("defaultTLSCertDuration")==defd:
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sys.exit(1) # already set — no restart needed
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claims["maxTLSCertDuration"]=maxd
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claims["defaultTLSCertDuration"]=defd
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json.dump(c,open(p,"w"),indent=2)
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PY
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then
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echo "==> raised CA claims (max=$CA_MAX_CERT_DUR default=$CA_DEFAULT_CERT_DUR); restarting step-ca"
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docker compose restart step-ca >/dev/null
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for _ in $(seq 1 50); do
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curl -fsS -k "$CA_URL/health" >/dev/null 2>&1 && break; sleep 0.2
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done
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else
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echo "==> CA claims already set (max=$CA_MAX_CERT_DUR)"
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fi
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else
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echo "WARNING: $CA_JSON not found — cannot raise cert-duration claim; 720h certs will be REJECTED." >&2
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fi
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# --- 2. enrolment provisioner (idempotent) ----------------------------------
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# JWK provisioner 'enrol' is created by auto-init (DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_PROVISIONER_NAME).
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# Enrolment authorizes a CSR with a one-time token:
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# step ca token <host-id> --provisioner enrol → passed to `step ca sign`
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# That token-gated sign is what enrol/tpm-provision.sh uses.
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# That token-gated sign is what the enrol-broker and enrol/tpm-provision.sh use.
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echo "==> provisioners:"
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step ca provisioner list --ca-url "$CA_URL" --root "$PKI/root_ca.crt" \
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step ca provisioner list --ca-url "$CA_URL" --root /export/root_ca.crt \
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| grep -E '"(name|type)"' || true
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# To UPGRADE to TPM attestation later, add an ACME attestation provisioner and
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@@ -49,13 +116,16 @@ step ca provisioner list --ca-url "$CA_URL" --root "$PKI/root_ca.crt" \
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# (then `step ca acme` / an ACME client on the host instead of `step ca sign`.)
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# --- 3. RADIUS server cert (FreeRADIUS serves this; supplicant validates it) --
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# Written via /export so the files land in the host's pki/radius/ that FreeRADIUS
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# mounts. Uses the in-container CA root + provisioner password (no host copies).
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echo "==> issuing RADIUS server cert (radius.${CA_DNS#ca.})"
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RADIUS_CN="radius.${CA_DNS#ca.}"
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incca mkdir -p /export/radius
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step ca certificate "$RADIUS_CN" \
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"$PKI/radius/server.pem" "$PKI/radius/server.key" \
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--ca-url "$CA_URL" --root "$PKI/root_ca.crt" \
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--provisioner enrol --provisioner-password-file "$PW" \
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/export/radius/server.pem /export/radius/server.key \
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--ca-url "$CA_URL" --root /export/root_ca.crt \
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--provisioner enrol --provisioner-password-file "$CONTAINER_PW" \
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--not-after 720h --force
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cp "$PKI/root_ca.crt" "$PKI/radius/ca.pem"
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incca cp /export/root_ca.crt /export/radius/ca.pem
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echo "==> done. FreeRADIUS will read pki/radius/{server.pem,server.key,ca.pem}."
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echo " Next: cp $PKI/root_ca.crt ../../files/etc/dot1x/radius-ca.pem && rebuild secure-path image."
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@@ -66,30 +66,35 @@ func (s *stepSigner) Sign(ctx context.Context, csrPEM, cn string) (string, strin
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}
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// 1. one-time token (subject MUST equal the CSR CN for the JWK provisioner).
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tokArgs := []string{
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// NOTE: token validity is the short-lived authorization window (a JWK
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// provisioner caps it at ~1h), NOT the issued cert's lifetime — do not put
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// s.notAfter here or a multi-day value fails "token validity too long".
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token, err := s.run(ctx,
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"ca", "token", cn,
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"--provisioner", s.provisioner,
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"--ca-url", s.caURL,
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"--root", s.root,
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"--provisioner-password-file", s.passwordFile,
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}
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if s.notAfter != "" {
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tokArgs = append(tokArgs, "--not-after", s.notAfter)
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}
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token, err := s.run(ctx, tokArgs...)
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)
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if err != nil {
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return "", "", fmt.Errorf("step ca token: %w", err)
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}
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token = strings.TrimSpace(token)
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// 2. sign the CSR with that token.
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if _, err := s.run(ctx,
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// 2. sign the CSR with that token. The issued CERT's lifetime is set HERE
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// (must be <= the provisioner's maxTLSCertDuration claim, else step-ca
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// rejects it — raise that claim on the CA for multi-day fleet certs).
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signArgs := []string{
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"ca", "sign", csrPath, outPath,
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"--token", token,
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"--ca-url", s.caURL,
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"--root", s.root,
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"--force",
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); err != nil {
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}
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if s.notAfter != "" {
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signArgs = append(signArgs, "--not-after", s.notAfter)
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}
|
||||
if _, err := s.run(ctx, signArgs...); err != nil {
|
||||
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("step ca sign: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
certPEM, err := os.ReadFile(outPath)
|
||||
|
||||
Executable
+50
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||
# Verify the enrol-broker as deployed in the serving stack. Run ON THE SERVING
|
||||
# HOST. Exercises the FULL path: public side through the nginx /enrol/ proxy
|
||||
# (:80) + the admin plane on loopback :9443.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# ./verify-serving.sh # admin insecure (ENROL_ADMIN_INSECURE=true)
|
||||
# ADMIN_P12=enrol-pki/broker/clients/alice.p12 ./verify-serving.sh # admin mTLS
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Stand-in for the (not-yet-built) host side: an openssl CSR plays the TPM key.
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
PUB_BASE="${PUB_BASE:-http://127.0.0.1/enrol}" # via nginx; use http://127.0.0.1:9090 to hit broker directly
|
||||
ADMIN_BASE="${ADMIN_BASE:-http://127.0.0.1:9443}"
|
||||
ADMIN_P12="${ADMIN_P12:-}" # set => admin is mTLS (https + client cert)
|
||||
|
||||
WORK="$(mktemp -d)"; trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
|
||||
jqget() { python3 -c 'import json,sys;print(json.load(sys.stdin)["'"$1"'"])'; }
|
||||
|
||||
# admin curl: plaintext by default, or mTLS if a .p12 is given.
|
||||
admin() {
|
||||
if [ -n "$ADMIN_P12" ]; then
|
||||
openssl pkcs12 -in "$ADMIN_P12" -clcerts -nokeys -passin pass: -out "$WORK/ac.pem" 2>/dev/null
|
||||
openssl pkcs12 -in "$ADMIN_P12" -nocerts -nodes -passin pass: -out "$WORK/ak.pem" 2>/dev/null
|
||||
curl -fsS --cert "$WORK/ac.pem" --key "$WORK/ak.pem" -k "${ADMIN_BASE/http:/https:}$1" "${@:2}"
|
||||
else
|
||||
curl -fsS "$ADMIN_BASE$1" "${@:2}"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
echo "== healthz (through nginx) =="
|
||||
curl -fsS "$PUB_BASE/healthz"; echo
|
||||
|
||||
echo "== generate CSR (stand-in for the TPM key) =="
|
||||
openssl ecparam -name prime256v1 -genkey -noout -out "$WORK/h.key" 2>/dev/null
|
||||
openssl req -new -key "$WORK/h.key" -subj "/CN=fleet-host" -out "$WORK/h.csr" 2>/dev/null
|
||||
CSR_JSON=$(python3 -c 'import json,sys;print(json.dumps(open(sys.argv[1]).read()))' "$WORK/h.csr")
|
||||
|
||||
echo "== POST /enrol/request =="
|
||||
REQ=$(curl -fsS -X POST "$PUB_BASE/request" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
|
||||
-d "{\"csr\": $CSR_JSON, \"context\": {\"mac\":\"de:ad:be:ef:00:01\",\"dmi_serial\":\"VERIFY-001\"}}")
|
||||
echo "$REQ"
|
||||
ID=$(echo "$REQ" | jqget enrol_id)
|
||||
echo "enrol_id=$ID fingerprint=$(echo "$REQ" | jqget fingerprint)"
|
||||
|
||||
echo "== admin /pending =="; admin /pending; echo
|
||||
echo "== approve $ID =="; admin "/approve/$ID" -X POST; echo
|
||||
echo "== /enrol/status/$ID (expect approved + cert) =="
|
||||
curl -fsS "$PUB_BASE/status/$ID" | python3 -m json.tool
|
||||
echo
|
||||
echo "PASS: request -> approve -> cert through the serving deployment."
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
|
||||
# enrol-broker PKI material (CA root, provisioner password, admin mTLS certs).
|
||||
# Mounted read-only at /pki. Keep the dir, never commit its contents.
|
||||
*
|
||||
!.gitignore
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user