tpm-enrol: pivot host enrolment to a Go binary, built out-of-VM
Replaces the shell/openssl-provider host enrolment (a35f2d6) with a static
Go + go-tpm binary, and moves BOTH host Go binaries out of the Packer VM.
fleet-enrol (files/enrol/, Go + go-tpm, no CGO):
- talks to /dev/tpmrm0 DIRECTLY via transport.FromReadWriter(os.File) — no
linuxtpm, so go-tpm is the only dep and there is NO tpm2-tools key-gen /
openssl tpm2 provider / curl in the image (removes the biggest bench risk,
the provider handle: key-ref).
- ensures the ECDSA key @0x81010001, builds the CSR (crypto.Signer over the
TPM key), POSTs CSR+context to the broker, shows the Plymouth fingerprint,
polls /status, writes the leaf cert to NV 0x01800001.
- tpmkey/ is an exported package so the TPM ceremony is tested against the
go-tpm software simulator from a SEPARATE simtest/ module (CGO stays out of
the shipped build). Transaction logic (mock broker) tested in-package.
- deps pinned by go.sum (not vendored): the binary now builds on the CI
runner, which has network — reproducible via pinned Go 1.26.4 + go.sum.
Out-of-VM build (decision): both fleet-enrol AND fleet-hostapi compile in the
CI "Build host Go binaries" step (Go 1.26.4, CGO off, -trimpath) and Packer
FILE-PROVISIONS the static binaries in. Dropped the in-VM `dnf install golang`
+ the 2d removal — the Rocky build image carries no Go toolchain / go-tpm tree.
Wiring:
- tpm-enrol.sh: now a thin GATE (empty-NV check, pre-auth DHCP on en*,
exec /usr/sbin/fleet-enrol, reboot-to-converge). module-setup.sh bundles the
binary (asserted) + reverts the tpm2-openssl/curl installs.
- diskless.pkr.hcl: file provisioners for both binaries; enrol installed to
/usr/sbin before the initramfs build + fapolicyd-trusted; lsinitrd asserts
fleet-enrol; dnf reverted to baseline (no tpm2-openssl/curl).
- gitea-main-ci.yaml: Set up Go + build both binaries + run the simulator
ceremony test, before packer validate.
TESTED here: transaction unit tests + the full TPM ceremony (key-gen -> persist
-> ECDSA sign -> CSR verify -> chunked NV write -> re-enrol) against the go-tpm
simulator. BENCH-VERIFY (real/swtpm, empty owner auth, pre-auth DHCP, Plymouth,
reboot-converge, prod HTTPS) tracked in docs/TODO.md #11.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
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// fleet-enrol — inline empty-NV first-boot TPM enrolment client.
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//
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// Invoked from the dracut hook (95dot1x-macsec/tpm-enrol.sh) ONLY when the
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// secure build boots a host whose TPM NV 0x01800001 is empty. It:
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// 1. ensures an ECDSA signing key exists at TPM handle 0x81010001,
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// 2. builds a CSR with it (key never leaves the TPM),
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// 3. submits CSR + device context to the enrolment broker, shows the returned
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// fingerprint on the Plymouth splash, and polls until an admin approves,
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// 4. writes the issued cert (DER) to NV 0x01800001.
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//
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// The hook then reboots into the normal secure path. Everything host-specific
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// (key, cert, hostnqn) is created here at runtime — nothing is baked (invariant #1).
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//
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// Exit codes: 0 = enrolled (cert written to NV; caller should reboot);
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//
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// 10 = cert already present (normal boot — caller proceeds);
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// 1 = failure (caller leaves NV empty -> boot fails -> emergency).
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package main
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/x509"
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"flag"
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"fmt"
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"log"
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"os"
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"os/exec"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"fleet-enrol/tpmkey"
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"github.com/google/go-tpm/tpm2"
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"github.com/google/go-tpm/tpm2/transport"
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)
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const exitAlreadyEnrolled = 10
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func main() {
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var (
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url = flag.String("url", "http://boot.fleet.lab/enrol", "enrolment broker base URL")
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tpmPath = flag.String("tpm", "/dev/tpmrm0", "TPM device path")
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nvHex = flag.String("nvindex", "0x01800001", "TPM NV index for the client cert")
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handleHex = flag.String("handle", "0x81010001", "TPM persistent handle for the signing key")
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cn = flag.String("cn", "fleet-host", "CSR CommonName (generic; identity is the cert serial)")
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iface = flag.String("iface", "", "network interface for the device-context MAC")
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caFile = flag.String("cacert", "/etc/dot1x/radius-ca.pem", "CA bundle for an https broker URL")
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waitFor = flag.Duration("timeout", 30*time.Minute, "max wait for admin approval")
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pollEvery = flag.Duration("poll", 5*time.Second, "status poll interval")
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)
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flag.Parse()
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log.SetFlags(0)
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log.SetPrefix("fleet-enrol: ")
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nvIndex, err := parseHandle(*nvHex)
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if err != nil {
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log.Fatalf("bad -nvindex %q: %v", *nvHex, err)
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}
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keyHandle, err := parseHandle(*handleHex)
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if err != nil {
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log.Fatalf("bad -handle %q: %v", *handleHex, err)
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}
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// /dev/tpmrm0 (the kernel TPM resource manager) is a simple command/response
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// char device: write one command, read one complete response. Wrapping the
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// *os.File with transport.FromReadWriter (as the simulator tests do) avoids
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// the linuxtpm transport and its golang.org/x/sys dependency, keeping the
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// vendored, reproducible initramfs binary tiny (go-tpm only).
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f, err := os.OpenFile(*tpmPath, os.O_RDWR, 0)
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if err != nil {
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log.Fatalf("open TPM %s: %v", *tpmPath, err)
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}
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defer f.Close()
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tpm := transport.FromReadWriter(f)
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// Already enrolled? Then this is a normal boot; let the secure path run.
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if tpmkey.NVPresent(tpm, nvIndex) {
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log.Printf("cert already present at NV %s — normal boot", *nvHex)
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os.Exit(exitAlreadyEnrolled)
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}
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ply("enrol-active")
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plyMsg("TPM enrolment: contacting fleet…")
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signer, created, err := tpmkey.EnsureKey(tpm, keyHandle)
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if err != nil {
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plyMsg("TPM enrolment FAILED (key)")
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log.Fatalf("ensure key at %s: %v", *handleHex, err)
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}
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if created {
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log.Printf("created persistent signing key at %s", *handleHex)
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} else {
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log.Printf("reusing persistent signing key at %s", *handleHex)
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}
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csrPEM, err := buildCSR(signer, *cn)
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if err != nil {
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plyMsg("TPM enrolment FAILED (CSR)")
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log.Fatalf("build CSR: %v", err)
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}
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client, err := newBrokerClient(*url, *caFile)
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if err != nil {
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log.Fatalf("broker client: %v", err)
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}
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dctx := gatherContext(*iface)
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), *waitFor)
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defer cancel()
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log.Printf("submitting CSR to %s (waiting up to %s for approval)", *url, *waitFor)
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st, err := enrol(ctx, client, csrPEM, dctx, *pollEvery, func(fp string) {
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ply("enrol-wait")
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plyMsg("APPROVE THIS DEVICE — code: " + fp)
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log.Printf("fingerprint: %s", fp)
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})
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if err != nil {
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plyMsg("TPM enrolment FAILED — reboot to retry")
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log.Fatalf("enrolment: %v", err)
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}
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der, err := leafDER(st.Cert)
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if err != nil {
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plyMsg("TPM enrolment FAILED (bad cert)")
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log.Fatalf("issued cert: %v", err)
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}
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if err := tpmkey.WriteNVCert(tpm, nvIndex, der); err != nil {
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plyMsg("TPM enrolment FAILED (NV write)")
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log.Fatalf("write cert to NV %s: %v (TPM owner auth?)", *nvHex, err)
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}
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ply("enrol-done")
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plyMsg("Enrolment complete — rebooting")
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log.Printf("ENROLLED: hostnqn %s (serial %s); cert written to NV %s",
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st.Hostnqn, st.CertSerial, *nvHex)
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// The caller (dracut hook) reboots into the secure path.
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os.Exit(0)
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}
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func parseHandle(s string) (tpm2.TPMHandle, error) {
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v, err := strconv.ParseUint(strings.TrimPrefix(strings.ToLower(s), "0x"), 16, 32)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, err
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}
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return tpm2.TPMHandle(v), nil
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}
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func newBrokerClient(url, caFile string) (*brokerClient, error) {
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c := &brokerClient{baseURL: strings.TrimRight(url, "/"), http: httpClient(nil)}
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if strings.HasPrefix(url, "https:") {
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pem, err := os.ReadFile(caFile)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("read CA %s: %w", caFile, err)
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}
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pool := x509.NewCertPool()
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if !pool.AppendCertsFromPEM(pem) {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("no certs in %s", caFile)
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}
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c.http = httpClient(pool)
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}
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return c, nil
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}
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// gatherContext collects advisory device context for the admin to recognise the
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// device. Best-effort — every field is optional.
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func gatherContext(iface string) deviceContext {
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d := deviceContext{
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DMIUUID: strings.TrimSpace(readFile("/sys/class/dmi/id/product_uuid")),
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DMISerial: strings.TrimSpace(readFile("/sys/class/dmi/id/product_serial")),
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}
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if iface != "" {
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d.MAC = strings.TrimSpace(readFile("/sys/class/net/" + iface + "/address"))
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}
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return d
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}
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func readFile(p string) string {
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b, err := os.ReadFile(p)
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if err != nil {
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return ""
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}
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return string(b)
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}
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// Plymouth best-effort splash updates (states only; the fingerprint is public).
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func ply(status string) { _ = exec.Command("plymouth", "update", "--status="+status).Run() }
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func plyMsg(text string) { _ = exec.Command("plymouth", "message", "--text="+text).Run() }
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