ssh-hostcert + enrol-broker: fix defects surfaced by the F-02 bench
F-02/P-17 SSH host-cert flow was proven end-to-end on comet-beacon-54
(2026-07-11); these fix the correctness/scoping/cleanup defects the bench
surfaced:
- ssh-hostcert: derive the FQDN principal <hostname>.<domain> from the DHCP
search domain at runtime (resolv.conf), alongside the short hostname, so an
admin `@cert-authority *.<domain>` line accepts by-FQDN logins instead of
"name is not a listed principal". Never baked (invariant #1). + tests.
- ssh-ca-bootstrap.sh: export the SSH host CA public key in OpenSSH wire format
(ssh-keygen -i -m PKCS8), not the PEM/PKCS8 that `step crypto keypair` writes
-- a PEM @cert-authority anchor is unparseable and silently falls back to TOFU.
- ssh-ca-bootstrap.sh: fail loudly (and verify enableSSHCA=true) if the
provisioner SSH-enable step fails, instead of swallowing it and shipping a CA
that 502s every runtime sign.
- dot1x-bench: point the co-located broker at https://localhost:8443, not the
fleet dnsmasq name ca.fleet.lab (unresolvable from the broker's host netns ->
"no such host" at sign time). localhost is in the CA cert SAN.
- serving: remove the mock-signer enrol-broker copy -- two host-networked
brokers collide on 9090/9443 and the mock issued untrusted certs. The real
broker lives with step-ca (dot1x-bench); nginx /enrol/ still proxies to it on
loopback.
- enrol-broker: retire the HTML admin console; the fleet-manager passkey SPA now
drives the mTLS JSON API (/pending, /approve|deny). Removes a weaker,
client-cert-only parallel human-approve path.
Design-doc bench note deferred: docs/ssh-host-certificate-design.md lives on the
secure-ntp branch (fbb8100), not here -- to be added there / on reconcile.
This commit is contained in:
+7
-32
@@ -104,38 +104,13 @@ SUBNQN=nqn.2026-06.org.example.fleet:rootfs
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TARGET_PORT=4420
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SPDK_CPUMASK=0x1 # one polling core is plenty for a read-only boot fs
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# --- TPM enrolment broker (TEMPORARY in this stack — see docs/TODO.md #11) ---
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# The broker is the one unauthenticated pre-auth endpoint (nginx proxies /enrol/
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# to it). Defaults run the zero-dependency LAB path: a `mock` signer (ephemeral
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# CA; certs NOT trusted by RADIUS/NVMe) + plaintext loopback admin — enough to
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# exercise the request/approve/poll flow while the host side is built.
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#
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# For REAL enrolment: set ENROL_SIGNER=step, point ENROL_STEP_CA_URL at a
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# reachable step-ca (e.g. the one in serving/dot1x-bench/), drop its root +
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# provisioner password into ./enrol-pki/, generate the admin mTLS PKI
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# (./enrol-broker/admin-pki.sh ./enrol-pki/broker <admin>), and set
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# ENROL_ADMIN_INSECURE=false. Then it belongs in its own CA-co-located stack.
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ENROL_SIGNER=mock # mock (lab, no CA) | step (real, needs a CA)
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ENROL_ADMIN_INSECURE=true # true = plaintext loopback admin (LAB ONLY); false = mTLS
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ENROL_PENDING_TTL=10m # time-box on unapproved requests
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ENROL_WORDS=8 # fingerprint word count
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ENROL_HOSTNQN_BASE=nqn.2026-06.org.example.fleet:host-
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# step signer (only when ENROL_SIGNER=step) — paths are INSIDE the container
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# (./enrol-pki is mounted at /pki):
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ENROL_STEP_CA_URL= # e.g. https://ca.fleet.lab:8443
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ENROL_STEP_CA_ROOT=/pki/root_ca.crt
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ENROL_STEP_PROVISIONER=enrol
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ENROL_STEP_PASSWORD_FILE=/pki/password
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# Issued-cert lifetime. NOTE: the step-ca provisioner must ALLOW this — a stock
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# step-ca caps certs at 24h, so 720h is rejected ("requested duration ... more
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# than the authorized maximum certificate duration of 24h"). The bench
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# step-ca/bootstrap.sh now raises authority.claims.maxTLSCertDuration; a
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# different CA needs the same. Verified end-to-end against a real step-ca.
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ENROL_CERT_NOT_AFTER=720h
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# admin mTLS (only when ENROL_ADMIN_INSECURE=false):
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ENROL_ADMIN_CERT=/pki/broker/server.crt
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ENROL_ADMIN_KEY=/pki/broker/server.key
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ENROL_ADMIN_CLIENT_CA=/pki/broker/admin-ca.crt
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# --- TPM enrolment broker — configured in the CA-co-located stack -----------
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# The broker no longer runs in this stack (a mock-signer copy here collided with
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# the real one on 9090/9443 and issued untrusted certs — removed 2026-07-11). It
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# lives in serving/dot1x-bench/ alongside step-ca (real signing needs the CA), and
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# the `http` nginx here still proxies /enrol/ -> 127.0.0.1:9090 to reach it on the
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# same host. Configure the broker (signer, provisioner, admin mTLS) in
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# serving/dot1x-bench/.env, not here.
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# --- SPDK version loader / reaper (declarative rolling updates) -------------
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# The spdk-loader service stages + adds ${IMAGE_VERSION} to the long-lived target
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@@ -193,50 +193,15 @@ services:
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# For HTTPS boot (production), terminate TLS here with the boot-infra CA's
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# cert and switch the dhcp-boot URL above to https://. Left HTTP for the lab.
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# --- TPM enrolment broker (TEMPORARY home — see docs/TODO.md #11) -----------
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# The `http` nginx already reverse-proxies /enrol/ -> 127.0.0.1:9090 (this
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# broker's public listener), so an empty-NV host can POST its CSR and poll for
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# the signed cert via the normal serving host. For now the broker runs HERE so
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# a single `compose up` in serving/ brings the enrolment endpoint up.
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#
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# ⚠ PROPER HOME is its own stack co-located with step-ca (the fleet CA), i.e.
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# serving/dot1x-bench/, since REAL signing needs that CA. SPLIT THIS BACK OUT
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# once the CA lives beside it. Do NOT run this AND dot1x-bench's enrol-broker on
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# the same host — they collide on 9090/9443.
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#
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# Defaults below are the zero-dependency LAB path: `mock` signer (ephemeral
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# in-process CA — certs are NOT trusted by RADIUS/NVMe) + plaintext loopback
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# admin. For REAL enrolment, in .env set ENROL_SIGNER=step + point
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# ENROL_STEP_CA_* at a reachable step-ca, and set ENROL_ADMIN_INSECURE=false
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# after generating the admin mTLS PKI (a DEDICATED admin CA, not the fleet root):
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# ./enrol-broker/admin-pki.sh ./enrol-pki/broker <admin-name>
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# then import enrol-pki/broker/clients/<admin>.p12 and open https://127.0.0.1:9443/
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enrol-broker:
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build: ./enrol-broker
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network_mode: host # public on 127.0.0.1:9090 (nginx proxies /enrol/)
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restart: unless-stopped
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environment:
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BROKER_PUBLIC_ADDR: "127.0.0.1:9090" # nginx /enrol/ proxies here
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BROKER_ADMIN_ADDR: "127.0.0.1:9443" # mgmt/loopback ONLY — never the boot LAN
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BROKER_SIGNER: ${ENROL_SIGNER:-mock}
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BROKER_PENDING_TTL: ${ENROL_PENDING_TTL:-10m}
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BROKER_WORDS: ${ENROL_WORDS:-8}
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HOSTNQN_BASE: ${ENROL_HOSTNQN_BASE:-nqn.2026-06.org.example.fleet:host-}
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# --- step signer (only consulted when ENROL_SIGNER=step) ---
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STEP_CA_URL: ${ENROL_STEP_CA_URL:-}
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STEP_CA_ROOT: ${ENROL_STEP_CA_ROOT:-/pki/root_ca.crt}
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STEP_PROVISIONER: ${ENROL_STEP_PROVISIONER:-enrol}
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STEP_PROVISIONER_PASSWORD_FILE: ${ENROL_STEP_PASSWORD_FILE:-/pki/password}
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STEP_CERT_NOT_AFTER: ${ENROL_CERT_NOT_AFTER:-720h}
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# --- admin mTLS (set ENROL_ADMIN_INSECURE=false for real mTLS) ---
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BROKER_ADMIN_INSECURE: ${ENROL_ADMIN_INSECURE:-true}
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BROKER_ADMIN_CERT: ${ENROL_ADMIN_CERT:-/pki/broker/server.crt}
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BROKER_ADMIN_KEY: ${ENROL_ADMIN_KEY:-/pki/broker/server.key}
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BROKER_ADMIN_CLIENT_CA: ${ENROL_ADMIN_CLIENT_CA:-/pki/broker/admin-ca.crt}
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volumes:
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# CA root + provisioner password (step signer) and admin mTLS certs live
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# here; unused/empty for the default mock+insecure path. Gitignored.
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- ./enrol-pki:/pki:ro
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# --- TPM enrolment broker — NOT defined here (lives in the CA stack) --------
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# The broker's home is co-located with step-ca (the fleet CA), i.e.
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# serving/dot1x-bench/, since real signing needs that CA. A `mock`-signer
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# convenience copy used to run here too, but two host-networked brokers collide
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# on 9090/9443 and the mock copy issued certs RADIUS/NVMe don't trust — so it was
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# removed (bench 2026-07-11; see docs/ssh-host-certificate-design.md). The `http`
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# nginx still reverse-proxies /enrol/ -> 127.0.0.1:9090; bring up
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# serving/dot1x-bench on the same host (its broker binds that loopback port) to
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# serve enrolment. Do NOT re-add a second broker here.
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# --- Kiosk SPA (spaceship terminal shown by the diskless kiosk) ------------
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# Svelte + Tailwind app built into a static bundle served by its own nginx.
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@@ -70,7 +70,12 @@ services:
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BROKER_PUBLIC_ADDR: "127.0.0.1:9090"
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BROKER_ADMIN_ADDR: "127.0.0.1:9443"
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BROKER_SIGNER: "step"
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STEP_CA_URL: "https://${CA_DNS:-ca.fleet.lab}:${CA_PORT:-8443}"
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# Co-located with step-ca (both network_mode: host), so reach it over
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# loopback — NOT the fleet DNS name. ca.fleet.lab is a dnsmasq name for
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# boot-LAN clients; the broker's host resolver doesn't know it, so signing
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# died with "lookup ca.fleet.lab: no such host" (bench 2026-07-11). localhost
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# is always in the CA cert SAN (DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_DNS_NAMES) so TLS verifies.
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STEP_CA_URL: "https://localhost:${CA_PORT:-8443}"
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STEP_CA_ROOT: "/pki/root_ca.crt"
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STEP_PROVISIONER: "enrol"
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STEP_PROVISIONER_PASSWORD_FILE: "/pki/stepca/secrets/password"
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@@ -82,10 +82,33 @@ fi
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# The broker authenticates to step-ca with this JWK provisioner (signer.go). It
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# must be allowed to issue SSH HOST certs. BENCH-VERIFY the exact subcommand/flag
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# on your step version (some use `provisioner update <name> --ssh`).
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echo "==> enabling SSH on provisioner '${PROVISIONER}' (BENCH-VERIFY the flag)"
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incca step ca provisioner update "${PROVISIONER}" --ssh 2>/dev/null \
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&& restart_ca \
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|| echo " NOTE: could not auto-enable SSH on '${PROVISIONER}' — enable it by hand (step ca provisioner update ${PROVISIONER} --ssh) and restart step-ca."
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echo "==> enabling SSH host-cert issuance on provisioner '${PROVISIONER}'"
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# FAIL LOUDLY: a swallowed failure here leaves enableSSHCA=false, and every
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# `step ssh certificate` at runtime dies with a 502 whose cause the operator
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# can't see (bench 2026-07-11). If your `step` uses a different flag, fix it and
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# re-run rather than shipping a half-configured CA.
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if ! incca step ca provisioner update "${PROVISIONER}" --ssh; then
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echo "ERROR: 'step ca provisioner update ${PROVISIONER} --ssh' failed. Your step" >&2
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echo " version may use a different flag — check: step ca provisioner update --help" >&2
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echo " Aborting so SSH host-cert signing isn't silently left disabled." >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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restart_ca
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# Verify it actually took — the CA only issues SSH host certs if enableSSHCA=true.
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if ! python3 - "$CA_JSON" "$PROVISIONER" <<'PY'
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import json,sys
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c=json.load(open(sys.argv[1])); name=sys.argv[2]
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for p in c["authority"]["provisioners"]:
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if p.get("name")==name and p.get("claims",{}).get("enableSSHCA") is True:
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sys.exit(0)
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sys.exit(1)
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PY
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then
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echo "ERROR: provisioner '${PROVISIONER}' still not SSH-enabled (enableSSHCA != true)" >&2
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echo " after the update + restart. SSH host-cert signing would fail at runtime; aborting." >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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echo " SSH host-cert issuance enabled on '${PROVISIONER}' (enableSSHCA=true)."
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# --- 3. broker host-plane server cert + fleet client-CA bundle --------------
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# The host plane is mTLS: its SERVER cert must be FLEET-signed (the booted host
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@@ -104,8 +127,19 @@ cat "$PKI/root_ca.crt" > "$PKI/broker/fleet-client-ca.crt"
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[ -f "$PKI/intermediate_ca.crt" ] && cat "$PKI/intermediate_ca.crt" >> "$PKI/broker/fleet-client-ca.crt"
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# --- 4. export the SSH host CA public key (admin trust anchor) ---------------
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echo "==> exporting SSH host CA public key -> $PKI/ssh_host_ca.pub"
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incca cp /home/step/secrets/ssh_host_ca_key.pub /export/ssh_host_ca.pub
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# `step crypto keypair` writes the public key in PEM/PKCS8, but a known_hosts
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# `@cert-authority` line needs the single-line OpenSSH wire format
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# (`ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAA…`). Emitting the PEM verbatim yields an unparseable
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# anchor → ssh silently falls back to TOFU (bench 2026-07-11). Convert it.
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echo "==> exporting SSH host CA public key (OpenSSH format) -> $PKI/ssh_host_ca.pub"
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incca cp /home/step/secrets/ssh_host_ca_key.pub /export/ssh_host_ca_key.pem
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command -v ssh-keygen >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
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echo "ERROR: ssh-keygen not found — cannot convert the CA key to OpenSSH format." >&2
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echo " Install openssh-clients; the raw PKCS8 key is at $PKI/ssh_host_ca_key.pem." >&2
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exit 1
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}
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ssh-keygen -i -m PKCS8 -f "$PKI/ssh_host_ca_key.pem" > "$PKI/ssh_host_ca.pub"
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rm -f "$PKI/ssh_host_ca_key.pem"
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echo
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echo "Admin rollout — add ONE line to each admin's ~/.ssh/known_hosts (or a system"
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echo "known_hosts), so every fleet host is trusted via the CA instead of TOFU:"
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@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ PUBLIC (plain HTTP, behind the serving nginx /enrol/) UNAUTHENTICATED
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GET /healthz
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ADMIN (mTLS, management network / loopback ONLY) admin client cert
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GET / the pending-queue web UI (fingerprint + approve/deny)
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GET / plaintext pointer (API only; human UI is the fleet-manager SPA)
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GET /pending JSON queue
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POST /approve/{id} OOB-approve -> step ca sign -> store cert
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POST /deny/{id} reject
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@@ -74,9 +74,11 @@ docker compose up -d step-ca && ./step-ca/bootstrap.sh # CA + root_ca.crt + en
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docker compose up -d enrol-broker
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```
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Then import `pki/broker/clients/alice.p12` (empty password) into your browser and
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open `https://127.0.0.1:9443/`. Hosts reach the public side via the serving
|
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stack's nginx: `http://boot.fleet.lab/enrol/`.
|
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Approve/deny is driven by the **fleet-manager SPA** (passkey-gated), which calls
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this plane's JSON API over mTLS; the broker no longer serves its own HTML console.
|
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For a scripted/manual approve, use the admin client cert directly against the API,
|
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e.g. `curl --cert/--key … https://127.0.0.1:9443/pending`. Hosts reach the public
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side via the serving stack's nginx: `http://boot.fleet.lab/enrol/`.
|
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|
||||
### Admin mTLS PKI — important
|
||||
|
||||
|
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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
// admin.go — the mTLS admin plane: the pending-queue web UI + approve/deny.
|
||||
// admin.go — the mTLS admin plane: the pending-queue + approve/deny JSON API.
|
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//
|
||||
// This listener is the AUTHENTICATED half of the broker and must live on the
|
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// management network / loopback only — NEVER the boot LAN (docs invariant: the
|
||||
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ package main
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto/tls"
|
||||
"crypto/x509"
|
||||
"html/template"
|
||||
"log"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
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"os"
|
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@@ -21,7 +20,7 @@ import (
|
||||
|
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func (b *broker) serveAdmin() {
|
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mux := http.NewServeMux()
|
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mux.HandleFunc("GET /", b.handleAdminIndex)
|
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mux.HandleFunc("GET /", b.handleAdminRoot)
|
||||
mux.HandleFunc("GET /pending", b.handleAdminPending)
|
||||
mux.HandleFunc("POST /approve/{id}", b.handleApprove)
|
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mux.HandleFunc("POST /deny/{id}", b.handleDeny)
|
||||
@@ -121,94 +120,32 @@ func (b *broker) handleDeny(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
respondDecision(w, r, e)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// respondDecision replies to an approve/deny. A browser form gets redirected back
|
||||
// to the queue; a caller that asks for JSON (Accept: application/json — e.g. the
|
||||
// fleet-manager driving the broker as its authorise plane) gets the decided
|
||||
// Enrolment (cert_serial, hostnqn, context, fingerprint — NOT the cert PEM, which
|
||||
// is unexported and only reaches the requesting host); any other API caller keeps
|
||||
// the original 204 (so verify-serving.sh and existing scripts are unaffected).
|
||||
// respondDecision replies to an approve/deny. A caller that asks for JSON
|
||||
// (Accept: application/json — the fleet-manager driving the broker as its
|
||||
// authorise plane) gets the decided Enrolment (cert_serial, hostnqn, context,
|
||||
// fingerprint — NOT the cert PEM, which is unexported and only reaches the
|
||||
// requesting host); any other API caller keeps the original 204 (so
|
||||
// verify-serving.sh and existing scripts are unaffected).
|
||||
func respondDecision(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, e *Enrolment) {
|
||||
switch {
|
||||
case isBrowser(r):
|
||||
http.Redirect(w, r, "/", http.StatusSeeOther)
|
||||
case wantsJSON(r):
|
||||
if wantsJSON(r) {
|
||||
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, e)
|
||||
default:
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func wantsJSON(r *http.Request) bool {
|
||||
return strings.Contains(r.Header.Get("Accept"), "application/json")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func isBrowser(r *http.Request) bool {
|
||||
a := r.Header.Get("Accept")
|
||||
return len(a) >= 9 && a[:9] == "text/html" || // explicit
|
||||
r.Header.Get("Sec-Fetch-Mode") == "navigate"
|
||||
// handleAdminRoot: the human approval UI has moved to the fleet-manager SPA
|
||||
// (WebAuthn-passkey gated), which drives this plane's JSON API over mTLS. This
|
||||
// listener is now API-only — the old embedded HTML console was retired to avoid a
|
||||
// second, weaker (client-cert-only) human approve path parallel to the passkey
|
||||
// UI. Kept as a plaintext pointer so a bookmark to the old console isn't a 404.
|
||||
func (b *broker) handleAdminRoot(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
|
||||
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
|
||||
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("enrol-broker admin plane — API only.\n" +
|
||||
" GET /pending\n POST /approve/{id}\n POST /deny/{id}\n" +
|
||||
"The human approval UI is the fleet-manager SPA (passkey-gated).\n"))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (b *broker) handleAdminIndex(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
data := struct {
|
||||
Admin string
|
||||
Pending []*Enrolment
|
||||
Now time.Time
|
||||
}{
|
||||
Admin: adminCN(r),
|
||||
Pending: b.store.Pending(),
|
||||
Now: time.Now(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
|
||||
if err := adminTmpl.Execute(w, data); err != nil {
|
||||
log.Printf("admin template: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var adminTmpl = template.Must(template.New("admin").Funcs(template.FuncMap{
|
||||
"age": func(t time.Time) string { return time.Since(t).Round(time.Second).String() },
|
||||
}).Parse(adminHTML))
|
||||
|
||||
const adminHTML = `<!doctype html>
|
||||
<html lang="en"><head><meta charset="utf-8">
|
||||
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
|
||||
<title>fleet enrolment — pending</title>
|
||||
<style>
|
||||
:root{color-scheme:dark}
|
||||
body{background:#0b0f14;color:#cfe3ee;font:14px/1.5 ui-monospace,Menlo,Consolas,monospace;margin:0;padding:1.5rem}
|
||||
h1{font-size:1.1rem;color:#7fd1ff;margin:0 0 .25rem}
|
||||
.sub{color:#6b8294;margin:0 0 1.25rem}
|
||||
.empty{color:#6b8294;padding:2rem 0}
|
||||
.card{background:#111923;border:1px solid #1f2d3a;border-radius:8px;padding:1rem 1.1rem;margin:0 0 1rem}
|
||||
.fp{font-size:1.25rem;color:#aef9b0;letter-spacing:.5px;word-break:break-word}
|
||||
.meta{display:grid;grid-template-columns:max-content 1fr;gap:.1rem .8rem;margin:.6rem 0;color:#9fb6c4}
|
||||
.meta b{color:#6b8294;font-weight:400}
|
||||
.actions{margin-top:.7rem}
|
||||
button{font:inherit;border:0;border-radius:6px;padding:.45rem .9rem;cursor:pointer}
|
||||
.approve{background:#15602f;color:#d6ffe0}
|
||||
.deny{background:#5e1b1b;color:#ffd9d9;margin-left:.5rem}
|
||||
form{display:inline}
|
||||
code{color:#cfe3ee}
|
||||
</style></head><body>
|
||||
<h1>fleet enrolment — pending approvals</h1>
|
||||
<p class="sub">admin: <code>{{.Admin}}</code> · {{len .Pending}} pending · cross-check each fingerprint against the device's splash before approving</p>
|
||||
{{if not .Pending}}<div class="empty">no pending enrolments.</div>{{end}}
|
||||
{{range .Pending}}
|
||||
<div class="card">
|
||||
<div class="fp">{{.Fingerprint}}</div>
|
||||
<div class="meta">
|
||||
<b>enrol-id</b><code>{{.ID}}</code>
|
||||
<b>CN</b><code>{{.CN}}</code>
|
||||
{{if .Context.MAC}}<b>MAC</b><code>{{.Context.MAC}}</code>{{end}}
|
||||
{{if .Context.DMISerial}}<b>DMI serial</b><code>{{.Context.DMISerial}}</code>{{end}}
|
||||
{{if .Context.DMIUUID}}<b>DMI uuid</b><code>{{.Context.DMIUUID}}</code>{{end}}
|
||||
{{if .Context.EKHash}}<b>TPM EK</b><code>{{.Context.EKHash}}</code>{{end}}
|
||||
<b>pubkey</b><code>{{.PubKeyHash}}</code>
|
||||
<b>age</b><code>{{age .CreatedAt}}</code>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<div class="actions">
|
||||
<form method="post" action="/approve/{{.ID}}"><button class="approve" type="submit">approve</button></form>
|
||||
<form method="post" action="/deny/{{.ID}}"><button class="deny" type="submit">deny</button></form>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
{{end}}
|
||||
</body></html>`
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user