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adding secure rsyslog exceptions

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Audiobuzz
2026-06-19 05:01:32 +00:00
parent 18b47ca5b0
commit 13ac648267
3 changed files with 36 additions and 4 deletions
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docs/stig-deviations.md
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@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Posture decisions (2026-06-18, lab phase):
| 3 | **AIDE / file integrity** (`package_aide_installed`, `aide_build_database`, `aide_periodic_cron_checking`, `aide_scan_notification`, `aide_verify_*`) | The root is read-only and cryptographically verified; an on-disk AIDE db would also be non-deterministic and break the reproducible verity hash. | **dm-verity** verifies the whole root filesystem against a signed root hash on every read — continuous, hardware-backed integrity that supersedes AIDE's periodic scan. |
| 4 | **Firewall** (`service_firewalld_enabled`, `package_firewalld_installed`, `set_firewalld_default_zone`) | Currently `firewall --disabled`; auto-enabling firewalld/nftables risks the NVMe/TCP (`:4420`) and NetworkManager paths during bring-up. | Isolated boot LAN; egress controlled at the serving-stack / network firewall layer. **Future hardening** — re-enable with explicit allow rules once the secure path is verified. |
| 5 | **FIPS** (`enable_fips_mode`, `grub2_enable_fips_mode`, `package_dracut-fips_installed`) | Decision: off for the lab phase (interacts with the still-unsigned UKI / Secure Boot story). | Revisit with signing. No weakened crypto is configured in the meantime. |
| 6 | **Remote audit offload** (`auditd_audispd_configure_remote_server`, `..._encrypt_sent_records`, `..._network_failure_action`, `rsyslog_remote_loghost`) | The SSG `audisp-remote` native-protocol rules stay waived; offload is done via **rsyslog over TCP** instead (simpler, container-friendly receiver). Lab uses **plaintext** (mirrors the HTTP-boot stack); encryption/failure-action rules remain deviated until TLS/RELP. | **Now wired both ends.** Sender (image, provisioner 2f, `audit_host` var): audisp-syslog → LOCAL6 + rsyslog `omfwd` (disk-assisted queue) to the host-generic `audit.fleet.lab`. Receiver: `serving/audit-collector/` (rsyslog TCP/514, per-source-host files). No per-host state. **Future**: TLS (`gtls`) or RELP+TLS + a real collector — then the encrypt/failure-action rules can pass. |
| 6 | **Remote audit offload** (`auditd_audispd_configure_remote_server`, `..._encrypt_sent_records`, `..._network_failure_action`, `rsyslog_remote_loghost`) **+ rsyslog TLS offload** (`rsyslog_encrypt_offload_defaultnetstreamdriver`, `..._actionsendstreamdrivermode`, `..._actionsendstreamdriverauthmode`) | Offload is done via **rsyslog over TCP** (simpler, container-friendly receiver); the `audisp-remote` native-protocol rules stay waived. The **TLS-offload rules are waived** because the isolated lab boot LAN is plaintext (mirrors HTTP boot / no MACsec) and applying them forces `gtls` + x509 peer auth + a CA file, which **breaks** the plaintext `2f` forward (no CA, plaintext `:514`). | **Wired both ends, plaintext.** Sender (image, provisioner 2f, `audit_host`): audisp-syslog → LOCAL6 + rsyslog `omfwd` (disk-assisted queue) → host-generic `audit.fleet.lab`. Receiver: `serving/audit-collector/` (rsyslog TCP/514, per-source-host files). No per-host state; isolated LAN. **Production (tracked in docs/TODO.md #2):** issue the collector a TLS cert, bundle the CA in the image, switch `2f` + the collector to `gtls`/6514, then **re-select** the three `rsyslog_encrypt_offload_*` rules (drop the waivers) so they pass. |
| 7 | **Smart card login** (`require_smart_card_login`, `sssd_enable_smartcard`, `install_smartcard_packages`) | Diskless hosts have no smartcard reader; admin access is SSH key-based. Enforcing smartcard login would lock the host out. | Admin auth is an SSH **key-only** account; root is locked; password auth disabled. |
| 8 | **NOPASSWD sudo** (`sudo_remove_nopasswd`) | The baked admin is a **passwordless, key-only** account, so `sudo` cannot prompt for a password — NOPASSWD is required for it to function at all. | Single fleet-generic admin, key-only, `wheel`; no interactive password exists to protect. Tracked for the eventual per-host/rotatable access model (SSH CA / config-agent). |
| 9 | **GUI / autologin / GDM** (gnome screensaver, GDM banner, automatic-login rules) | No GNOME/GDM is installed; the kiosk is an **intentional** autologin single-app (weston + Chromium) session on kiosk builds. | Kiosk user is unprivileged and passwordless; the session runs a single locked-down browser (no shell, no nav). Applies to kiosk builds only; non-kiosk builds don't install the GUI stack. |